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Psychological attachment to an entrepreneurial opportunity may motivate the 
entrepreneur to persevere but can also bias decisions made in the entrepreneurial process, 
especially on market entry. This thesis investigates how psychological attachment to an 
entrepreneur’s idea influences decision making at the commercialization stage with special 
emphasis on control tendencies. Data collected from 106 fourth-year students from the 
Engineering Design Program at a top engineering-focused Canadian university revealed some 
interesting results. In the model estimated, the higher the subject’s psychological attachment to 
the opportunity, the more control oriented the subject was. Interestingly, psychological 
attachment is a strong predictor of control tendency even when subjects’ perceptions of projected 
returns (value) are statistically controlled in the analysis. Furthermore, psychological attachment 
correlates with proxy measures of the level of cognitive evaluation: the indication, affective 
constructs like psychological attachment elicit affect-laden evaluation of outcomes in a way that 
is divergent from the cognitive evaluation of commercialization situations. 
Within a framework of financial decision making, even as subjects generally 
acknowledged outside investor expertise in a potential commercialization partnership, the main 
finding was that high levels of attachment are more likely to lead to control-oriented funding 
preferences over optimal financing preferences. Further, alternative research explanations for 
control tendency failed to hold, as individual personality-type factors were not significant in 
explaining the variability in control tendency. Therefore, control tendency may be dependent on 
attachment to the creative process as opposed to an individual’s personality construct. The results 
provide insight into the role that affective constructs like psychological attachment and control 
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1.1 Introduction and Review of the Literature  
 
 
Commercialization of a new technology often involves relinquishing control of the 
technology to outside parties. In this thesis, an outside party is defined generally as an entity that 
provides resources (financial, production, logistic, etc.) towards the commercialization process. 
Relinquishing more control to an outside party, hereafter referred to as an “outsider”, implies 
choosing a strategy that reduces the technology developer’s involvement in decision making and 
increases the outsider’s involvement. Relinquishing less control implies choosing a strategy that 
increases the developer’s involvement and reduces the outsider’s involvement in the 
commercialization process. Based on their own interests, developers of technology and outsiders 
haggle over control at the point of commercialization. While the developer seeks to protect the 
technology from expropriation, the outsider seeks to protect her/his investment in the process. 
Therefore, each party’s perception of the other’s intentions, and uncertainty surrounding future 
behaviour, may play a role in how much control each party desires. This thesis attempts to 
investigate the issue of control from the developer’s point of view and discusses the dimensions, 
factors, mechanism of effects, and behavioural implications of the desire to control at the point 
of commercialization. More importantly, the thesis centres on the role of psychological 
attachment to one’s idea in shaping the desire to control. To proceed, the following identifies the 
background to the notion of control and the role of psychological attachment.  
The background concerns market problems or issues with transactions at the point of 
commercialization; developer and outsider actions and reactions in anticipation to market 




market problems and strategies they adopt to solve these problems. Next, I argue that the 
outsider’s demands and strategies are logical given the uncertainty and unpredictability 
surrounding new technological ideas. However, given that developers often need outsider 
investment for successful commercialization, avoiding outsiders will lead to non-optimal 
commercialization decisions.  Also, I introduce the notion and subsequent explanations as to why 
developers might choose to avoid outsider investment even if such investment is instrumental to 
success. Finally, I conclude this chapter by identifying some “real world” situations in which this 
research could be applied.  
1.1.1. Outside Party’s Concerns and Reactions  
Transactions at the point of commercialization involve costs, especially under conditions 
of risk and uncertainty. Williamson (1985) adopted the concept of transaction costs to describe 
the costs of interactions in an imperfect market situation where complete information is not 
available to all parties. Under such conditions of incomplete and asymmetric information, market 
problems of concern abound. Information asymmetry refers to the situation where the developer 
is believed to know more than the outsider (Jensen and Thursby, 2001). One such problem 
arising from information asymmetry is the “agency/principal-agent problem” to which outsiders 
react by wanting to control the technology when contracting with the developer. For instance, 
investors typically prefer to have control over a technology if they invest their funds (see 
evidence in venture capital literature Hart and Holmström, 1987, Hart, 1995, and Kaplan and 
Stromberg, 2003). Before elaborating on why outsiders want control when considering the 
agency problem, I will first provide a brief description of the principal-agent concept.  
The agency problem occurs when the economic incentives of the outsider (principal) and 




theory, as it pertains to entrepreneurship, can be described as follows. The principal (an investor) 
provides resources to an agent (entrepreneur) to innovate on the principal’s behalf. However, the 
principal cannot ensure that the agent uses the resources efficiently according to the agreement 
signed because of the high monitory costs and differences in economic incentives between the 
two. With that said, there are core reasons for the principal-agent problem. 1. The divergence of 
desires or goals of the principal and agent and the difficulty or cost the principal must incur to 
verify the agent’s appropriate behaviour. 2. The problem of the principal and the agent preferring 
different actions for risk sharing when they have different risk preferences (Eisenhardt, 1989). 
Consequently, in anticipation of the principal-agent (agency) problem, the outsider desires to 
control the technology in attempt to seek alignment between his or her economic incentives and 
the economic incentives of the developer. The long-term aim is to reduce agency costs (Jensen 
and Meckling, 1976) or loss in the relationship.  
The outsider’s conviction in the need for control stems from the underlying belief that the 
developer knows more about the technology (information asymmetry). This belief is 
strengthened when considering the fact that the development of a new technology involves the 
investment of developer knowledge and skills and, therefore, information asymmetry between 
the developer and the outsider may be high. Thus, control is needed to reduce any information 
asymmetry. Such control is seen in the two main approaches to reducing information asymmetry 
and combating agency problems. The approaches are as follows: design an optimal contract 
(Jensen and Meckling, 1976) through pre-contract screening, due diligence and contract writing; 
use the incomplete contracts approach which concentrates on the post-contract allocation of 
control (Hart, 1995). Alternatively, the outsider (principal) can extend a simple control structure 




actions preferable to the principal. Such complex techniques may include ex post punishments 
and rewards to align incentives. The incomplete approach may be common in the 
commercialization of new technologies due to the uncertainty and unpredictability associated 
with the future of the technologies involved. Under such circumstances, it’s not possible to 
specify the legal consequences of every possible state of the world; hence the contract is 
“incomplete” (Hart, 1995).  
Consequently, considering the above-mentioned agency problems in contracting within 
risky and uncertain domains, such as in technology development, it is logical to expect outsiders 
who invest resources to require control for the purposes of safeguarding their investment. 
However, relinquishing control to outsiders may not be an easy task for developers, especially 
those who are heavily and psychologically invested in the technology or the development 
process. For developers wielding maximum control until the point of commercialization, the 
experience of relinquishing control at that point may feel like losing “their baby” (I will return to 
this point shortly). In the next section, I discuss the market problems from the developer’s 
perspective and identify factors that make developers more worried about “loosing their baby”. 
This discussion is important since, in the agency theory domain, the culprit is the “agent” and the 
main objective is to get the agent to “behave” in the interest of the principal, with little 
consideration for how the agent might act in anticipation of the principal’s strategies. My interest 
is in the notion that possible reactions might include the developer “selecting out” of essential 
outsider agreements needed for successful commercialization. 
1.1.2. Developers’ Concerns and Reactions  
Developers may be more concerned about market problems at the point of 




market, opportunistic outsiders and potential competitors.  Typical problems of concern derive 
from the issues of appropriability, expropriation and opportunism (Williamson, 1985); paradox 
of disclosure (Arrow, 1962, 1963; Anton and Yao, 1994); information asymmetry (Jensen and 
Thursby, 2001); and disproportionate power of channel members (e.g., manufacturers and 
distributors), among others. The following are brief explanations of the non-self-explanatory 
concepts in the list. The explanations are constructed to suit the entrepreneurship domain from 
multiple sources and dictionary definitions and, thus, references are not necessarily cited. 
Appropriability is the ability to extract rents from the technology and is characterized by formal 
intellectual property rights such as patents, or informal mechanisms such as secrecy. 
Expropriation is the ability to extract rents from the technology belonging to another party in 
exchange for little or no compensation without regard to the original owner’s wishes. 
Opportunism is the propensity for people to act in self interest, “with guile” (Williamson, 1985), 
not be entirely honest and truthful about their intentions, or attempt to take advantage of 
unforeseen circumstances that gives them the chance to exploit another party. The paradox of 
disclosure occurs when the entrepreneur risks disclosing information about the opportunity 
before a binding contract is signed. Since appropriability is more central to the goal of achieving 
returns to the technology, the following discussion of developer response to these market 
problems employs “appropriability” for illustrations. 
How do developers respond to these concerns? The extent to which the above-mentioned 
developer concerns can materialize depends on the level of control that a developer grants to the 
outsider. If the perception is that the concerns are high, rampant or persistent, developers will 
likely desist from sharing control. There is empirical evidence suggesting that founders avoid 




for an increase in performance is evident (Cressy and Olofsson, 1997; Winborg and Landström, 
2001; Müller, 2007) – discussed later. Thus, a strong desire to appropriate returns from the 
technology demands more control than less. According to the viewpoint of the developer, the 
agency problem reinforces this position. The developer’s perception that the principal’s 
economic goals are likely to diverge from his or her perception is likely to increase weariness 
toward potential contracts due to the prevalence of concerns for appropriability. This weariness 
motivates a desire in the developer to control the technology.  In effect, on perceiving the market 
problems, the developer seeks control to safeguard appropriability since the extent of 
appropriability determines the level of returns from the technology.   
However, the main question of interest here is “why would some developers who 
perceive market problems, want control and desire to safeguard appropriability more than 
others?” I propose that the level of psychological investment in the technology or in the 
technology’s development process impacts the developer’s level of sensitivity towards the 
microeconomic environment and, therefore, the issue of appropriability. The following provides 
support for this argument.  
1.1.3. Why Some Developers will be More Concerned than Others  
I argue that affective experiences during technology development can culminate in a 
possessive sensation (I call this “psychological attachment” [PA]) which goes on to bias decision 
making through an excessive want of control (Control Tendency [CT]) as a reaction to the 
perceptions of market problems in the microeconomic environment. PA is characterized as an 
affectional tie that a developer feels towards the technology. I define CT as the willingness to 
intentionally produce desired outcomes and prevent undesired outcomes (Skinner, Chapman, and 




possible influences on making decisions (reasons provided later in this chapter). The following 
argues for PA as an affective construct operating in the technology development process.  
An important belief in this study is that attachment will emanate from the affective 
experiences in a typical technology development process. Until recently, the role of “affect” in 
entrepreneurship has not been considered. Developing a pioneering framework for studying 
affect in entrepreneurship, Baron (2008) identifies various areas of the entrepreneurial process 
where affect can play a role. The author characterizes affect as emotions and feelings, and notes 
that affect is likely to influence cognition and behaviour in entrepreneurial environments due to 
the unpredictability and rapid nature of change in that domain.  Baron (2008) also notes that 
affect may play a role in entrepreneurial creativity.  In fact, research in the creativity literature 
points to affect-related constructs such as intrinsic drive (Amabile, 1983) and flow – optimal 
experience (Csikszentmihalyi, 1990, 1996 and 1997).  
In addition, Baron (1998) notes that since entrepreneurs have a deep commitment to their 
opportunities, they are more likely than other people to experience intense emotions, more 
frequently, in relation to their work. In effect, the literature suggests a strong presence of affect 
in technology development and consequently, a higher level of concern over outsider control for 
the most affect-invested developers. In essence, developers that are more psychologically-
invested than others are more likely to have greater concern about the market problems identified 
above and, also, are more likely to take steps to reduce outsider control in contracts with the aim 
of ensuring high levels of appropriability. Next, I note empirical evidence of developers’ 




1.1.4. Evidence of Developer Reactions to Concerns 
 Before proceeding, the following provides the normative expectations for behaviour at 
the point of commercialization. Contrasting these expectations with the evidence of developers’ 
reactions shows why the evidence is interesting and worth studying.  
At the point of commercialization, the developer(s)’ behaviour is based on the creation of 
new ventures on new technology; however, this is not necessarily a defining condition for 
entrepreneurship (Shane and Venkataraman, 2000). As well, the developer is not required to 
engage in all parts of the entrepreneurial process (Venkataraman, 1997 and Shane and 
Venkataraman, 2000, Eckhardt and Shane, 2003). Hence, technology developers are expected to 
choose the most efficient strategy at commercialization even if it limits their control and personal 
involvement in the market process. This view is supported by the argument that, technology 
developers do not often possess the financial resources and complementary assets necessary to 
achieve a successful commercialization (Fontes and Coombs, 2001; Gans and Stern, 2003; 
Teece, 1986). As a result, developers normally need to depend on outsiders for investment in 
order to achieve successful commercialization and ensure performance.  
For developers who need outside investment, the task is to relinquish some of the 
ultimate control held from the time of idea recognition and also prepare for a limited 
involvement in the market process. These tasks are onerous for developers who have high 
psychological investment. Therefore, considering the risks and uncertainty surrounding new 
technology, one expects the typical technology developer to be more susceptible to outside 
investors or partners. However, as noted previously, outside investment comes with control 
conditions that will be most protested by developers who  are highly-attached. Hence, reactions 




elicit outside investment in the commercialization process. The following are some empirical 
evidence to that effect.  
While existing empirical evidence is more common to venture financing (Cressy and 
Olofsson, 1997; Winborg and Landström, 2001; Müller, 2007), it is insightful for general 
commercialization decision making.  For instance, Müller (2007) noticed that founders who 
experience a loss of control were reluctant to increase the size of equity, were prepared to pay 
higher interest rates for additional loans in order to maintain control and, as a result, experienced 
smaller growth. Winborg and Landström (2001) found owner financing to be the main method of 
financing in new firms. Cressy and Olofsson (1997) found that entrepreneurs aversive to losing 
control of the opportunity were mindful that relinquishing some control would improve 
performance. The concept of relinquishing control for success is not limited to venture financing. 
In the area of commercialization strategy, Gans and Stern (2003) argue that, through cooperation, 
start-ups can avoid duplicative investment thereby avoiding sunken investment in 
complementary assets necessary for commercialization.  
Essentially, except for special cases where the developer controls financial resources, 
complementary assets, tight intellectual property and or enjoys inalienable human capital, it is 
generally counter-intuitive to seek control over the technology during commercialization. 
Further, the resistance to relinquishing control to qualified outside parties seems to go beyond 
cognitive reasoning and connotes affective influences. If the developer needs to relinquish 
control to gain access to essential resources but does not, the developer is likely to defy his or her 
own cognitive reasoning, and rather listen to visceral voices that, for instance, trumpet the future 




tendency as affective constructs might help explain some of these findings. The following 
discusses the “affectiveness” of PA  and CT.  
1.1.5. Explaining the Empirical Evidence: The Affective Characteristics of PA and CT  
Affect has been shown to play a role in risky decision making and various aspects of 
human judgment (Lowenstein, Weber, Hsee, Welch, 2001) – reviewed in later sections. This 
section looks at how affective the construct of CT is. I focus on CT since the connection between 
PA and affect does not need further exposition when you consider the central theme in the 
definition of PA as the “affectional tie” between the developer and the technology.   
Having emotionally invested in the technology, the perception of outsider control in light 
of appropriability and opportunism concerns is enough to evoke a developer’s control tendency. 
Experts who research the concept of control argue that perceived or subjective control is a 
stronger predictor of functioning than actual or objective control (Skinner, 1996). Thus, an 
individual’s perceived control, or conviction that control is available, is enough to mobilize 
action and modulate arousal (Averill, 1973) as well as influence affective states and behaviour 
(Skinner, 1996).  
Hence, the point to note here is that CT could emanate from affective processes and may 
or may not have any cognitive or logical basis. Also note that by adopting the Shane and 
Venkataraman (2000) position that opportunities could be exploited without the developer’s 
complete involvement and control, the thesis narrowly characterizes CT as the developer’s urge to 
take charge of affairs at commercialization. Further, in concentrating on the affective components, 
the thesis links CT to PA and developer perceptions of control or loss of control in the 
microeconomic environment. If PA and CT possess strong affective components, the mechanisms 




developers or founders accurately perceive the need for developer involvement but choose to ignore 
it. Such mental processes can easily be described from the characteristics of affect (in terms of PA 
and CT) and the relationship between affect and cognition. The following characterizes affect and 
draws implications for venture performance if PA and CT can be described as affective constructs.  
1.1.6. Characteristics of Affect and Implications for Performance  
I start by reviewing the current status of research on affect and relate the empirical 
findings to the behavioural expectations for PA and CT. Zajonc (1998) identifies affective 
processes as those evaluative sensations that address the “go/no-go” questions (that lead to 
approach/avoidance behavior), while cognitive processes are those that answer the true/false 
questions. Further, there are key characteristics of affective processes in relation to cognitive 
processes. First, affect is primary and often occurs below the cognitive radar (Bechara, Damasio, 
Damasio, and Lee, 1999). Second, affect plays an informational role and guides cognitive 
reasoning (e.g., the somatic marker hypothesis - Damasio, 1994; affect-as-information 
hypothesis - Clore, 1992; affect heuristic theories - Slovic, Layman, Kraus, Flynn, Chalmers and 
Gesell, 1991). Third, in decisions under risk and uncertainty, empirical evidence shows that 
affective processes diverge from cognitive processes and, when they do, affective processes 
often exert a dominating influence on behavior (Lowenstein et. al., 2001, Wilson and Arvai, 
2006) leading to errors in judgment (Kahneman and Ritov, 1994; Kahneman, Ritov, and 
Schkade, 1999; Kahneman, Schkade, and Sunstein, 1998; Gneezy and Potters, 1997). For 
instance, considering specific affective states such as fear, Lerner and Keltner (2000, 2001) find 
that fearful people made more pessimistic judgments about the likelihood of adverse events and, 




Essentially, affect and affect-laden constructs are instrumental in decision making and  
can steer the process towards inefficiency especially in decisions involving risk and uncertainty.  
In other words, if highly invested developers develop PA, it will aid in moving the technology 
from conception through development. However, at the point of commercialization (i.e., when 
issues of control creep in), excessive attachment might evoke the desire to control the process 
and the technology, when relinquishing control would ensure higher efficiency. As shown above, 
such victory for affect (in terms of PA and control) over cognition (in terms of a more accurate 
evaluation) spells inefficiency for commercialization decisions and strategies. Thus, one can 
advance this argument toward explaining why entrepreneurs shun outsider investment even when 
they realize that such investment will improve performance (Cressy and Olofsson, 1997; Müller, 
2007). As noted earlier, those decision cases seem to initially involve an accurate cognitive and 
objective evaluation which is then discarded in the decision process.  
1.1.7. The Objectives of this Study  
As can be discerned from the foregoing this thesis studies developer CT at the point of 
commercialization. This study has five main objectives. The first is to identify the dimensions of 
PA. The second is to determine if PA leads to a decrease in cognitive evaluation of the 
microeconomic environment. The third is to verify if PA leads to CT. The fourth is to identify 
the moderators and, possibly, the mediators of the relationship between PA and CT. The fifth is 
to assess the relationship between PA in a hypothetical commercialization decision context 
where developers encounter outsiders and make decisions on how much control to share.  
In order to fulfill these objectives, an experimental survey process was employed. The 
main challenges in this research design were to gain access to respondents who started 




To minimize the problems posed by these challenges, the study employed a group of respondents 
tasked to develop engineering design projects within the same technology stream and with the 
same start and end dates. PA is elicited after a period of development, and respondents are 
presented with various hypothetical decision scenarios where their CT and other measures are 
captured.  
1.1.8. Contributions 
The study presents various contributions to the literature in entrepreneurship. The results 
of the study provide insight into the adverse effect of affect-laden concepts in entrepreneurship 
decision making, thereby contributing to a burgeoning literature on the role of affect in 
entrepreneurship. By presenting the viewpoint of affective biases, the study complements 
research on the role of cognitive biases such as overconfidence (Camerer and Lovallo, 1999) and 
overoptimism (Arabshabani, de Meza, Maloney, and Pearson, 2000) in entrepreneurial decision 
making, research that sometimes lacks consensus. For instance, Lowe and Ziedonis (2006) found 
no effects for overoptimism in the decision to start a firm for entrepreneurs commercializing 
university technology. The authors found that entrepreneurs continue unsuccessful development 
efforts for longer periods of time than established firms, and economic returns for many are 
realized after the start-up has been acquired by an established firm. By speculation, one can 
relate what appears to be unfruitful persistence to the adverse effects of PA  and CT.  Thus, the 
results in this thesis question the extent to which affect influences sub-optimal decisions to self-
commercialize.  
Further, the study contributes to the venture performance literature by suggesting a 
nonlinear relationship between affect and performance – affect is instrumental in venture 




constructs such as PA and CT may be fleeting, but have the potential to impact decisions with 
dire consequences in extemporaneous decision situations as found in entrepreneurship (Baron, 
2008).  
1.1.9. Other Areas of Research Application 
The concepts could be applied to study a variety of phenomena in entrepreneurship. One 
such area is risk perception in the case of over-entry into markets. For example, CT may 
motivate self-commercialization when market concerns “push” the developer to launch his/her 
own venture. However, self-commercialization to “safeguard” the opportunity denotes risk-
aversion but could be more “risky” due to higher uncertainty. This behavioural pattern denotes a 
simultaneous existence of gambling and insurance. Employing the prospect theory framework 
(Khaneman and Tversky, 1979) or other relevant frameworks can, in this context, complement 
current research on the role of emotions in expected utility computations (Caplin and Leahy, 
2001) in order to better explain risk seeking as well as risk aversion in entrepreneurship. Another 
application is the transfer of control from entrepreneur-managers to more professional hands 
during business re-structuring, mergers and acquisitions. Entrepreneur-managers’ resistance to 
the control transfer could stem from excessive attachment to the idea, technology or business. 
Other areas include the “not invented here” syndrome, where employees will only adopt systems 
that are initiated by them or within the company or react adversely to outsourcing by the firm, 
with implications for productivity. A specific application to new technology technicians, such as 
software coders, could unveil ways to manage ownership issues and improve performance. A 
final application that can be considered is the work of product champions in corporate venturing. 




new products and also identify avenues to improve on transition as well as performance in the 
process.  
Finally, there may be implications for government programs that support 
commercialization efforts, possibly supporting unnecessary or misguided entrepreneurial efforts 
in the economy. Implications for practitioners include strategies for reducing the biasing effect of 
attachment in decision-making, while implications for public policy include designing innovative 
financing schemes to ensure the positive effects of attachment and reduce the negative ones.   In 
general, the study has implications for the role of affect in various areas of entrepreneurship such 
as: opportunity recognition and exploitation, risk perception, strategy formulation, social, and 
venture capital formation.  
The rest of the thesis is structured as follows. Chapter 2 identifies relevant literature, 
detailing some of the literature previewed in the introduction; Chapter 3 concentrates on theory 
and predictions; Chapter 4 reports measures and results for the various main effects; Chapter 5 
describes application settings where control preferences in financial decision making is 












2.1  Literature Review  
 
“Again, if the affections in themselves were pliant and obedient to reason, it were true there 
should be no great use of persuasions and insinuations to the will, more than of naked 
proposition and proofs; but in regard of the continual mutinies and seditious of the affections— 
reason would become captive and servile, if eloquence of persuasions did not practise and win 
the imagination from the affections’ part, and contract a confederacy between the reason and 
imagination against the affections; for the affections themselves carry ever an appetite to good, 
as reason doth. The difference is that the affection beholdeth merely the present; reason 
beholdeth the future and sum of time. And, therefore, the present filling the imagination more, 
reason is commonly vanquished; but after that force of eloquence and persuasion hath made 
things future and remote appear as present, then upon the revolt of the imagination reason 
prevaileth”. 
                   Francis Bacon (1561 – 1626)1 
 
 
This chapter provides a review of extant literature on judgment decision making, relating 
cognitive to affective influences in evaluation of outcomes and decision making. In addition, the 
chapter reviews issues of control and ownership in various areas in management and 
entrepreneurship, citing the different effects of control and ownership on interactions and 
relationships between agents and principals. The chapter then narrows in on control and PA in 
idea development and ends with implications for venture performance.    
2.1.1 Decision Making in Entrepreneurship 
 
Entrepreneurial Decision Making: Heuristics and Biases 
Current research on entrepreneurial decision making concentrates on entrepreneurial 
cognitions: how entrepreneurs think and process information for opportunity assessment and 
exploitation. The focus on cognitions stems primarily from research in the area of judgment 
decision making which shows that people might not be expected-utility maximizers as the 
expected utility theory postulates. The subjective expected-utility theory (SEU) developed by 
                                                 
1The Advancement of Learning (Second book, XVIII, 4) The Web edition published by the University of Adelaide 




von Neumann and Morgenstern (1944/1947) and Savage (1954) is a model for “rational choice” 
derived from simple axioms of consistent preferences under risk and uncertainty. In the model, 
alternative decisions are based more on uncertain events rather than outcomes of well-understood 
gambles. The agent calculates SEU for each decision alternative, and subsequently chooses the 
alternative with the highest SEU. In terms of the underlying axioms, the independence axiom 
(where two alternative decisions can yield the same consequence) plays a crucial role since it 
allows the definition of conditional preferences. Although the model has enjoyed the status of an 
acceptable normative standard and a useful descriptive model for decision making, its axioms 
(especially the independence axiom) have been contested in laboratory experiments in which 
these axioms are violated (Allais, 1953; Ellsberg, 1961; Kahneman and Tversky, 1979).  
Tests by Allais (1953) and Ellsberg (1961) displayed paradoxical behavior while 
Kahneman and Tversky (1979) showed that subjects resorted to predictable “heuristics and 
biases” that were not in line with the expected utility theory. Earlier in 1955, Hebert Simon 
introduced the idea of “bounded rationality” when he argued that utility theory reflects 
assumptions about human information processing that are beyond the scope of people’s cognitive 
abilities. The limits on knowledge and cognitive ability motivate individuals to choose the first 
alternative that meets identified minimal criteria. This process is termed by Simon as 
“satisficing”.  It involves the use of cognitive shortcuts or heuristics rather than an elaborate SEU 
process that chooses an optimizing solution. However, satisficing, or to be more precise, the use 
of cognitive shortcuts, is not always an efficient strategy, especially when one considers risk and 
uncertainty about future outcomes. Consider an illustration from the realm of entrepreneurship. 
In relation to entrepreneurship, the level of uncertainty and risk involved in the process 




resulting in errors in their intuitive predictions and judgments. Kahneman and Tversky (1996) 
define judgmental heuristics as ‘a small number of distinctive mental operations’ while biases 
are described as cognitive errors made in decision making. Although the heuristics technique is 
often used in problem solving (such as entrepreneurship); it does not always guarantee a correct 
solution. Empirically, some individual-level and heuristic-laden factors able to introduce biases 
into entrepreneurial decision making, including: overconfidence (Camerer and Lovallo, 1999), 
overoptimism (Arabshabani, de Meza, Maloney, and Pearson, 2000; Astebro, Jeffrey and 
Adomdza, 2007), entrepreneurial self-efficacy (Krueger, 2000), entrepreneurial locus of control 
(Wijbenga and Witteloostuijn, 2007), among others. The following highlights the tenets of some 
of these cognitive biases (such as overconfidence and optimism) and also empirical evidence for 
their biasing role in decision making in general and, specifically, in the domain of 
entrepreneurship.  
Overconfidence was first explained to result from lack of meta-knowledge.  Thus, people 
are unaware of the limits of their knowledge when making forecasts (Oskamp, 1965).  Many 
other sources of overconfidence have been identified. An example is the “availability bias” 
(Kahneman and Tversky, 1973) – being influenced by the mental availability of instances when 
constructing perceptions of likelihood. Availability leads to the systematic overestimation of the 
probability of events that are familiar, recent and/or easily imaginable. Another source is the 
“confirmation bias” (Koriat, Lichtenstein, and Fishhoff, 1980) – the retrieval and use of evidence 
that supports existing hypotheses or a set of beliefs. The individual tends to want to confirm 
existing beliefs and avoid disconfirming evidence.  
In entrepreneurship, notable among studies on the overconfident bias is the work of 




asked to choose the extent to which they would enter a market where payoffs depended on 
entrant skill. The authors found that experimental subjects displayed overconfidence as they 
were more likely to excessively enter markets when they thought that post-entry performance 
depended on their skills. Further, subjects neglected the skill levels of other entrants and in doing 
so, neglected their reference groups in making market entry decisions. Camerer and Lovallo 
(1999) noted two reasons why firms would make biased entry decisions. First, firms are likely to 
be aware of their skill capacity but fail to appreciate the number of competing entities. Second, 
firms may accurately forecast the competition but overconfidently think that they will succeed 
while the competing firms will fail. Similarly, Cooper, Woo, and Dunkelberg (1988) asked 
nearly 3000 new business founders about their chances of success, and found that 81% of 
respondents thought their businesses had more than a 70% chance of succeeding.  
In addition to overconfidence, optimism has been largely studied in entrepreneurial 
decision making with positive and negative effects on decisions. Scheier and Carver (1985) 
define optimism as “the favorability of a person’s generalized outcome expectancy” (p. 232). In 
other words, optimism is the general belief that good things are more likely to happen and bad 
things are less likely to happen. However, the construct is often operationalized as a positive 
outlook on future financial states in business research. It has been studied in many other domains 
with good evidence of robustness in effects (see Weinstein and Klein, 1995 for a review of these 
studies).   
Moderate optimism might lead to rational financial decisions, but overoptimism may lead 
to bad financial decisions (Manju and Robinson, 2007). Landier and Thesmar (2004) used a 
dataset of French businesses to examine entrepreneurial optimism and its effect on capital 




term debt, and prefer inside rather than outside financing. Astebro, Jeffrey and Adomdza (2007) 
found that optimistic independent inventors continue to spend resources after receiving a 
negative expert evaluation. Further, Arabsheibani et al. (2000) found the self-employed to have a 
better financial outlook than employees, but had worse experiences. Crane and Crane (2007) 
surveyed extant entrepreneurship literature over a 25-year period and concluded that 
dispositional optimism predicts entrepreneurial success and appears to be a defining 
characteristic of entrepreneurs. These studies have provided insight not only in the way 
entrepreneurs make decisions, but in the general mechanisms for judgement decision making. 
The following provides a recount of some mechanisms unearthed over time in research in the 
area. 
 
Mental Processes in Decision Making  
All in all, research on decision making, including the avalanche of studies on heuristics 
and biases in the mainstream literature, has provided some consensus on the processes through 
which the human mind operates in making decisions. The following presents the state of current 
research on the process of decision making as shown in Figure 1. Figure 1 presents a map of the 
psychological decision making literature and relevant progress made in outlining the process of 
human decision making. In doing that, Figure 1 compares the dual process system of decision 
making with the affective-cognitive systems, identifying the similarities and differences between 
the two. The basic assumption used in developing Figure 1 is that the processes outlined in the 
dual system mirrors the processes outlined in the cognitive-affective systems. The discussion of 
the right side will focus on the characteristics of affective and cognitive factors, differences in 




show that affective processes are a powerful part of human decision making and then introduce 
PA as an affective construct with the potential to bias entrepreneurial decision making by way of 
unnecessary and inefficient control-seeking strategies during idea commercialization.   
Therefore, the discussion will briefly highlight the symmetric characteristics of the right 
(cognitive-affective) and the left (dual system) sides of Figure 1, and concentrate on the right 
(cognitive-affective) side of Figure 1. 
 
Figure 1  















It is widely agreed that decision making results from a dual process of information 
processing: “intuitive” and “analytical” (see Kunda, 2001 for a review). Notable among these 
theories is the dual process concepts of System 1 and System 2 which exhibit the interaction 
between intuitive and reflective judgments (Kahneman and Frederick, 2002). According to the 
model, System 1 involves a more rapid, associative, automatic and effortless intuitive process 
Affective processes 
Non-cognitive evaluative sensation 
go/no-go’ questions (that lead to 
approach/avoidance 
(Zajonc 1998, Bechara, Damasio, Damasio, and 
Lee, 1999) 
Deliberative processes 
System 2 process of making judgments 
- rule-based 
- deliberate and  
- effortful  
(Sloman, 1996; Stanovich and West, 1999). 
Cognitive processes 
Analytic reasoning above consciousness  
Automatic processes 
System 1 process of making judgments 
 - more rapid 
- associative 
- automatic, and  
- effortless intuitive process 
(Sloman, 1996; Stanovich and West, 1999). 
Dual Process Cognitive versus affective 
Decisions   
• Good judgements when System 2 prevails 
• Errors when system 1 generates them and 
system 2 fail to correct them 
• Affect informs cognition (Damasio, 1994) 
• Affective dominates cognition (Lowenstein et al., 
2001) 
• Affect dominated judgment often erroneous 




while System 2 involves a rule-based, deliberate and effortful process of making judgments 
(Sloman, 1996; Stanovich and West, 1999).  System 1 processes do not necessary occur with 
awareness or consciousness and, therefore, may be out of cognitive reach.  In the model, errors in 
the decision making process take effect when System 1 generates them and System 2 fails to 
correct them, as noted in the middle panel of the left side column in Figure 1.  
Although the intuitive and reflective processes in the dual process model could be argued 
to operate purely on a cognitive basis, the distinction between intuitive and reflective is mirrored 
in the distinction between cognitive and affective processes (column on the right side of Figure 
1).  Zajonc (1998) identifies affective processes as those that address the ‘go/no-go’ questions 
(that lead to approach/avoidance behaviour) while cognitive processes are those that answer 
true/false questions. At this point, it should be noted that some researchers distinguish between 
“affect”, “feelings” and “emotions”. For instance, Masters (2000) noted such distinctions. He 
describes affect as an innately structured, non-cognitive evaluative sensation that may or may not 
register in consciousness. Feelings are described as affect made conscious, possessing an 
evaluative capacity that is not only physiologically based, but that is often also psychologically 
(and sometimes relationally) oriented. Finally, Masters (2000) describes emotion as 
psychosocially constructed and dramatized feeling. Although these distinctions are important and 
may influence conceptualization, the terms are used loosely in this thesis due to the interest in 
their behavioral outcome. Therefore, it is assumed that affective/feeling/emotional processes lead 
to approach/avoidance behaviour, meaning that there is no need to distinguish between them for 
the purposes of this study.  
Going back to the idea that intuitive and reflective processes mirror cognitive and 




Affective responses are generally positive or negative (has valence) and may occur above the 
threshold of conscious awareness (knowing how you feel) or below it  (reacting to a noise before 
you know what it is). Similar to System 1, affective processes are mostly automatic and 
unconscious as they often occur below the cognitive radar (Bechara et al., 1999). The question, 
therefore, is: “if affective processes can be automatic and unconscious, what effect do they have 
on cognitive processing or on decision making?” 
I start with evidence from the judgment decision making literature and neuroscience and 
go on to briefly review the conclusions on how affect influences cognition. Theories have been 
developed to support the claim that analytic (cognitive) reasoning cannot be effective unless it is 
guided by affective processes (e.g.. the somatic marker hypothesis - Damasio, 1994; affect-as-
information hypothesis - Clore, 1992; affect heuristic theories - Slovic, Layman, Kraus, Flynn, 
Chalmers and Gesell, 1991). Neuroscience studies show that cognitive processes are controlled 
by the cerebral cortex (or the higher brain) while affective processes are controlled by the 
amygdala (the lower brain).  Conducting studies within this domain, Damasio (1994) argues that 
events and stimuli get tagged affectionately and these tags (somatic markers) are evoked when 
similar stimuli are encountered. Damasio (1994) found evidence for his theory when he observed 
that patients who have suffered prefrontal brain damage (leading to the uncoupling of their 
cognitive processes from their affective senses) were, in some cases, not able to make good 
decisions although they were capable of logical analyses. Studies in the domain of judgment 
decision making by Clore (1992), such as affect-as-information hypothesis model, hypothesizes 
the direct effect of feelings on judgment. In terms of social judgment, this is exemplified in how 




From the foregoing, there are two main effects through which affect influences decision 
or cognition. First, affect can be evoked without intervention from cognition and second, the 
influence of cognition on decisions is mediated, to an extent, by affective processes. In the 
mediation process, affect can have a positive impact when it plays an informational role and aids 
cognitive decision making as Damasio pointed out. However, beyond the informational role, 
affective processes are likely to evoke negative consequences on decisions.   
In effect, affective processes could be automatic and unconscious and their prevalence 
over cognitive processes could lead to errors in judgment and, therefore, failure in decision 
making. Much empirical evidence supports this claim. Empirical evidence shows that when 
affective processes diverge from cognitive processes, affective processes often exert a 
dominating influence on behaviour (Lowenstein et al., 2001; Wilson and Arvai, 2006) and 
thereby lead to errors in judgment in various domains (Kahneman and Ritov, 1994; Kahneman, 
Ritov, and Schkade, 1999; Kahneman, Schkade, and Sunstein, 1998; Gneezy and Potters, 1997; 
Benartzi and Thaler, 1995; Gneezy and Potters, 1997; Thaler, Tversky, Kahnerman, and 
Schwartz, 1997). Further, illustrating with empirical evidence from work on specific affects such 
as fear and anxiety, researchers found evidence in line with cautious and risk-averse decision 
making (Lerner and Keltner, 2000, 2001). Fear, the response to imminent threat, discourages 
people from taking advantageous gambles (Gneezy and Potters, 1997). Lo, Repin and 
Steenbarger (2005) found that subjects whose emotional reaction to monetary gains and losses 
was more intense on both the positive and negative sides, exhibited significantly worse trading 
performance. There is also evidence from neuroscience research. Kenning, Mohr, Erk, Walter, 
and Plassmann (2006) used functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) to investigate the 




correlation between activity within the amygdala-hippocampal regions of the brain, a region 
involved in negative emotional processing such as fear, and the investor’s general risk aversion.  
 
The Divergence between Emotional and Cognitive Processes  
A number of reasons have been identified for the divergence between emotional and 
cognitive processes. Lowenstein et al (2001) identify immediacy of risk and the manner of 
emotional responses to probabilities and outcome values as some factors responsible for the 
divergences. How individuals perceive risk and its immediacy determines, to a large extent, how 
they react to it. Essentially, individuals’ personal risk preferences are driven at least in part by 
emotional reactions to risky choices (Hsee and Weber, 1997; Lowenstein et al., 2001). 
Elaborating on the mechanism by which negative emotions such as fear can affect risky decision 
making, it is important to note that the functional objective of fear centers on minimizing the 
potential for harm to oneself or something close in relationship to oneself. Lerner and Keltner 
(2000) argue that the specific impact of an emotion on cognitive appraisal shapes the willingness 
to take risks. Identifying characteristics of fear (in comparison with anger), the authors note that 
fear is associated with low certainty, high anticipated effort, low control, and medium 
responsibility. Also, fear produces a tendency to perceive negative events as unpredictable and 
under situational and not human control. So, in relation to the technology developer who is faced 
with commercialization, fear of outside encroachment and loss threatens existing control over the 
opportunity and, therefore, motivates risk-averse and control-oriented decision making.   
Further, emotional responses to probabilities and outcome values in the perception of risk 
also determine how individuals react to risk. Technology entrepreneurs, for instance, may 




that it may be secure enough. Such fear, as a response to imminent threat of loss, motivates 
escape and the search for safety (Frijda, 1986; Lazarus, 1991; Levenson, 1999; Öehman and 
Mineka, 2001). Thus the possibility of loss of the creative idea will evoke enough fear to cause a 
risk-aversive action even if the probability of a loss is negligible. Lerner and Keltner (2000, 
2001) found that fearful people made more pessimistic judgements about the likelihood of 
adverse events and also made risk-averse choices. Entrepreneurs who put undue weight on the 
possibility of adverse circumstances befalling the opportunity miss the chance to collaborate and 
partner in areas such as financing and technology development; areas that provide crucial 
support for a successful commercialization of an innovation.  
In short, affective processes are important for efficient decision making under risk and 
uncertainty. However affective processes play an informational role serving as somatic markers 
for guiding decisions. Also, affective processes mediate the influence of cognitive processes on 
decisions, and when they dominate cognitive processes, there is the potential for inefficiency in 
the decision outcomes. Having established these notions, the discussion can turn to the role of 
affective processes in the domain of the entrepreneurial processes and implications for 
performance.  
 
2.1.2. Empirical and Anecdotal Evidence of Psychological Attachment and Control in 
Entrepreneurship 
The above review discussed the decision-making literature and the role of affective and 
cognitive processes in risky decision making in uncertain decision scenarios, typical of the 
domain of entrepreneurship. The following provides an account of empirical evidence that 
suggests the role for PA and CT as affective constructs in entrepreneurial decision making. The 




possessiveness in how entrepreneurs deal with outside parties. To proceed, I start from research 
on cognitive biases in entrepreneurship (introduced earlier). The aim of this recapitulation is to 
argue that evidence of no effects reported for some cognitive biases suggests that affective biases 
could be considered.  
Beyond Cognitive Biases: Affective Biases 
Although biases may stem from cognitive factors as earlier reviewed, the review of the affect 
literature also suggests that affective factors might play a far more significant role in decision 
making. The fact that many new ventures normally fail (Dunne, Roberts and Samuelson, 1988 
and Cooper, Woo and Dunkelberg, 1988) implies that entrepreneurial decision making is often 
biased in judgment (Cooper, Woo and Dunkelberg, 1988; Busenitz and Lau, 1996, Barnes, 1984; 
Arabshabani, de Meza, Maloney and Pearson, 2000; Coelho, de Meza and Reyniers, 2004; 
Camerer and Lovallo, 1999; Forbes, 2005; Palich and Bagby, 1995; Åstebro, 2003; Åstebro, 
Jeffrey and Adomdza, 2007).  I argue that it may be useful to consider affective biases in such 
decisions. One reason is that biases may not only emanate from cognitive thought processes but 
also from affective psychological states. As reviewed earlier, affective processes can dominate 
cognitive processes, thereby, biasing the decision-making process with a higher likelihood of 
inefficiency in outcomes. For illustration, let me turn to a study that suggests a lack of consensus 
on the role of cognitive biases while also suggesting a stronger role for affective biases (from 
factors such as psychological attachment and control tendency).  
Consider Lowe and Ziedonis (2006) who found no effects for overoptimism in the decision 
to start a firm for entrepreneurs commercializing university technology. The authors find that 
entrepreneurs continue unsuccessful development efforts for longer periods of time than do 




has acquired the start-up. Thus, the authors question whether entrepreneurs are overoptimistic in 
continuing to develop products with limited chances for future success. From this illustration, it 
appears that another type of bias is influencing these entrepreneurs in their decision to persist – 
possibly, a bias that is affective and probably eludes consciousness.  
Clearly, the lack of evidence for overoptimism is worrisome because it indicates that despite 
their seemingly excessive persistence, these entrepreneurs do not necessarily believe in the 
prospects of their ideas. As well, it may also imply that they are not overconfident in their 
abilities to ensure the ventures success, otherwise they would have scored high on optimism and 
most possibly be overoptimistic. On the other hand, evidence from the data shows that they 
persisted with little success, success was only realised when they relinquished control to an 
outside party. Although not implied in the discussion given by Lowe and Ziedonis (2006), there 
appear to be reasons to believe that these entrepreneurs were reluctant to allow outside 
involvement till it was absolutely necessary. The realization of positive financial returns for the 
opportunities upon transfer implies that the entrepreneurs’ control over the ideas prevented the 
enactment of efficient strategies for commercialization. If these analogies hold, evidence will 
indicate a biasing influence from affective constructs such as desiring control over the 
opportunity, most likely due to attachment to the opportunity.    
 Similarly, Roberts (1990) studied the early years of technology-based firms and found lone 
founders to be slower to evolve from an engineering focus to product and market orientation. 
One can argue that according to intuitive logic, faster decision deliberations will emanate from 
lone founders compared to groups. However, on the contrary, we see lone founders being slower 
in adding value to their innovations. There appears to be stagnation and persistence at the 




Again by sheer speculation, one can envisage technology entrepreneurs who are too highly 
attached to the technology to organise market deployment in a more efficient and timely manner.  
Another point of illustration is what is commonly referred to in the business press as 
“entrepreneurial disease” (Rubenson and Gupta, 1992). This notion is based on the idea that 
entrepreneurs have difficulty developing skills they need to transition into professional 
management. Thus, manager replacement becomes the efficient strategy as the firm grows. The 
business press is littered with founders and CEOs who do not possess the requisite human capital 
necessary to lead the firm forward, but who are  reluctant to hand over control to more competent 
hands. Although there is no hard evidence of empirical research that links these behaviours to 
affective constructs such as psychological attachment and control tendency, the situations match 
the behavioural stipulations for these constructs.  
 
Control over an Entrepreneurial Idea 
In addition to the anecdotal and implied sense of control found in the literature, there are a 
few empirical studies citing “control over an entrepreneurial idea” as a variable of interest.  An 
example from the broader management area is that entrepreneurs strongly desire to control the 
activities of their organizations (Drucker, 1970; Gray and Ariss, 1985; Mintzberg, 1984) even 
though most of them lack managerial competence.  
However, most of the studies on the topic have been done in the area of new venture 
financing. For instance, Müller (2007) did a study on the influence of the benefits of control on 
the capital structure and the growth of private companies for a sample of 8,964 UK companies 
with limited liability observed for up to five years. She notes that “[owners of private companies] 




on their investment. In order to stay in control, they need to forego some growth opportunities, if 
the opportunities are too extensive to be realized with debt finance alone. This means that 
companies do not reach their growth potential and employ fewer people than would otherwise be 
the case”. She found that founders who might experience a loss of control were reluctant to 
increase the size of equity, were prepared to pay higher interest rates for additional loans in order 
to maintain control and as a result they experienced smaller growth.  Similar conclusions are 
drawn from other studies, which also show that entrepreneurs seem to prefer internal financing 
over external financing especially if it affects ownership (Winborg and Landström, 2001; Cressy, 
1995; and Berggren, Olofsson and Silver, 2000). Cressy (1995) relates the phenomenon to 
“control aversion” where entrepreneurs are averse to losing control of the opportunity although, 
they are aware that relinquishing some control would improve performance (Cressy and 
Olofsson, 1997).  
 
Post Market Entry Problems of Private Benefits and Control 
At the heart of appropriability are private benefits. One can argue that entrepreneurs who 
enjoy private benefits from their technologies are likely to feel that they have appropriated the 
returns to the technology to a large extent. This argument works on the assumption that private 
benefits are over and above “normal” returns to the entrepreneur. Although private benefits are 
not operationalized in this study, interest in them stems from the notion that psychological 
attachment may explain the notion that control-oriented entrepreneurs behave in a certain way 
due to their quest for private benefits. In other words, deep interest in private benefits might stem 
from attachment and can also lead to non-optimal decisions. Entrepreneurs may be in the “I 




Research in corporate finance provides empirical evidence that points to the agency problem 
of extraction of private benefits by shareholders from the firm when their voting rights far 
outweigh the cash flow rights (Bebchuk, Kraakman and Triantis, 2000; and Shleifer and Vishny, 
1997). Recall the agency theory (Eisenhardt, 1989) where an agency relationship exists in which 
one party (the principal) delegates responsibilities to another (the agent). Problems such as: 
divergence of goals, cost of information and different risk preferences exist in these 
relationships.  
Thus, private benefits are pursued by entrepreneur-managers (agents) who are entrusted with 
the management of funds provided by financiers (principals). A more exact description of the 
problem is given by evidence of controlling shareholders (entrepreneur-managers) extracting 
private benefits or profiting unfairly by deliberately choosing ineffective projects (e.g. see Berle 
and Means, 1932; Zingales, 1994; Dyck and Zingales, 2004; and Nenova, 2003). Dyck and 
Zingales (2004) show higher benefits of control in less-developed capital markets where there 
may not be high government protection for minority shareholders. In the US and UK, firms 
mostly respect the “one share-one vote” rule. However in areas or countries with a high 
concentration of entrepreneurs like in Canada, larger shareholders will have the advantage even 
when there is government regulations that protect minority shareholders.  
Closely related to the private benefits problem is the desire for founders and entrepreneur-
managers to remain at the helm of affairs even if relinquishing control might appear more 
prudent. Data provided by Dyck and Zingales (2004) show that for most of continental Europe 
and Asia, ownership is concentrated in the hands of individuals, families, governments or 
industrial groups and, therefore, the reluctance is evident. In Canada, ownership is concentrated 




Bombardier Inc., Quebecor Inc. which are still controlled by their founders or their families 
(Ben-Amar and Andre, 2006). Ben-Amar and Andre (2006) reported a study that suggests that in 
spite of the legal protection offered by the Canadian Business Law, some reserachers find certain 
forms of expropriation in Canada (Attig, Fischer and Gadhoum, 2004 and Bozec and Laurin, 
2004). In addition, Ben-Amar and Andre (2006) also report numerous research findings from 
around the world that note the decrease in firm value when there is a separation of ownership and 
voting rights as well as a decrease in firm performance (even though the evidence is mixed) 
when families consolidate their hold on the business through generations. Clearly, the 
concentration of ownership indicates the willingness of founders to remain at the helm of affairs 
when there is the possibility of greater potential for these firms to grow beyond their present 
capacity. A possible solution to this problem would be the relaxation of founder control of the 
firms.  
In a quick summary, the incidence of private benefits indicates the willingness of agents to 
take advantage of their control positions and unfairly expropriate from agreements with 
principals. When such agents are entrepreneur-managers, their behaviour might be a reaction to a 
sense of entitlement to the technology, an attachment from conception or development that 
makes them think they deserve more than they are getting.  
 
Market Entry Financing Issues 
Agency problems are not limited to after-market-entry interactions between entrepreneurs or 
managers and financiers. These problems guide interactions, decisions and relationships during 
financing of market-entry efforts. As briefly noted earlier, financiers encounter asymmetric 




their attempt to fund entrepreneurial ventures or opportunities. The problem is more profound 
when the non-human elements of such a contract can be more easily secured than the human 
elements especially when the entrepreneur’s human capital is inalienable from the 
entrepreneurial opportunity.  
In the venture capital financing literature, Van Osnabrugge (2000) reiterated two primary 
causes of agency problems: conflicts in alignment and verification of goals; and conflicts in risk 
sharing. The author identifies two approaches to combat agency problems. The first, aimed at 
decreasing asymmetric information, is the classical agency theory approach of designing an 
optimal contract between the principal and agent (Jensen and Meckling, 1976) through pre-
investment screening and due diligence of the entrepreneur and idea. The second approach is the 
incomplete contracts theory which notes that because of transaction costs, bounded rationality, 
and asymmetric information, contracts are “incomplete” and the emphasis is on the post-contract 
allocation of control rather than the pre-contract screening and contract writing (Hart, 1995). 
There has been considerable work done on the structuring of post-contract allocation of control 
(Hart and Holmström, 1987; Hart, 1995; and Kaplan and Stromberg, 2003). Venture capitalists 
are typically concerned about monetary returns to safeguard their investments. Hence, to boost 
the entrepreneur’s performance, venture capitalists typically enable the entrepreneur to obtain 
more control rights when company performance improves. It is often hoped that transfer of such 
rights may satisfy the entrepreneur’s non-pecuniary motives and increase performance. However, 
any party’s want to control is not solely dependent on that party’s individual motive, but also in 







Control and Trust 
It is incomplete to discus control and not mention “trust”. Dasgupta (1988) points out that 
trust between contracting parties is essential to overcome control problems that plague contract 
environments with severe agency risks and incomplete contracts. In extant research reports, 
control is viewed as relating to formal legal contractual agreements, while trust relates to 
psychological contracts. Also, the substitutability of trust and control has been discussed. Ring 
and Van de Ven (1994) contend that the two constructs are substitutes in interfirm cooperation, 
while Das and Teng (1998) argue that “a higher trust level does not automatically dictate a 
lowering of the control level, and vice versa.” (p. 496). At each development stage of a 
cooperative relationship, there is an optimum level of trust and control introduced to facilitate 
both the transaction and the long-term business success (Shepherd and Zacharakis, 2001). The 
implications are that trust and control play different roles in cooperative relationships. Control 
mechanisms include social controls, imposed on both parties externally, behavioural controls, 
based on agreements between both parties that establish rules around future behaviours, and 
output controls, designed to reward good and punish poor performance (Das and Teng, 1998). 
Controls can be introduced to coerce appropriate behaviour by the agent and build confidence. 
However, control can have a negative impact on outcomes, motivation of the innovator and 
innovation rates (Bromiley and Cummings, 1995; Dyer and Chu, 2003; Ring and Van de Ven, 
1992; Teece, 1992). In this thesis, the concept of trust is not a major operational variable since 
discussions concentrate on the early stage of a potential relationship between a developer and an 




the outsider for trust to have developed, we can only discuss the developer’s dispositional trust 
when evaluating the outcomes of a possible relationship.   
In summary, this section reviewed the literature on the issues of control from various 
perspectives. There is empirical evidence that point to the desire to control or cases which 
illustrate or suggest the desire to control in entrepreneurial endeavours. There is very little 
evidence in the empirical reports that the control instances emanate from a psychological 
attachment to one’s creative idea. However, some of the cases of control denote some sort of 
attachment to the technology making it difficult for the developer (e.g. founders) to relinquish 
control, a strategy sometimes needed to improve performance. The following section discusses 
why control is detrimental to venture performance especially when emanating from attachment 
to the technology.  
2.1.3. Why Control from Attachment Can Be Detrimental To Venture Performance   
 
The arguments in this section were briefly introduced in the introduction of this thesis. I 
provide more detailed discussion here. Entrepreneurs may need to control the entrepreneurial 
process, especially during opportunity recognition and development, as well as initial stages of 
venture creation to ensure the realization of set goals. Therefore, one will expect control to be 
instrumental to the continuity of the entrepreneurial process. For instance, the Schumpeterian 
model of entrepreneurship states that the work of the entrepreneur is done when a business is 
established (Schumpeter, 1934). Thus, the underlying theme of entrepreneurship is own-venture 
creation. However, Shane and Venkataraman (2000) argue that entrepreneurship consists of 
opportunity discovery and exploitation. The authors define entrepreneurship as “examination of 
how, by whom, and with what effects opportunities to create future goods and services are 




necessarily a defining condition for entrepreneurship and, also the opportunity discoverer is not 
required to engage in all parts of the entrepreneurial process (Venkataraman, 1997 and Shane 
and Venkataraman, 2000; Eckhardt and Shane, 2003). Essentially, an entrepreneur does not need 
to establish a sole-venture on the idea but can cooperate with an outside party to commercialize 
or sell the idea outright. For instance, Gans and Stern (2002) note that cooperating with an 
outside party is particularly desirable when the degree of excludability is high and 
complementary assets belong to a third party. Generally, cooperating with third parties should 
bring as much benefit, if not more, as competing with existing ventures (Weick and Eakin, 
2005).  
In effect, if entrepreneurship is not defined by the entrepreneur’s sole effort in venture 
creation, then the entrepreneur’s control of the idea or the process is not paramount to successful 
innovation. Control is only of strategic importance if supported by available capacity (human, 
financial and complementary capital). Without such capacity, negotiations for financing, 
manufacturing and distribution contracts will involve some level of control trading since third 
parties typically require some control to reduce information asymmetry. This is evident in 
partnerships with manufacturers, R&D outfits and financiers, which often come with the 
redistribution of equity and control.  In fact, entrepreneurial pedagogy stresses training students 
on how to “cooperate” with important outsiders like venture capitalists and other members of the 
value chain. Certainly, in these partnerships, the entrepreneur’s control over the idea is 
acceptable if the entrepreneur’s human capital is inalienable (cannot be surrendered) and the 
entrepreneur possesses some managerial ability.  
However, given that most entrepreneurs lack the capacity or the managerial ability to solely 




outsiders especially at the point of market entry or commercialization to ensure success. 
However, the empirical evidence chronicled above indicates otherwise. The evidence points to 
control behaviour deriving from some attachment to an innovation of one’s creation and not from 
the position of available capacity or existing ability. This attachment seems to drive founders and 
entrepreneurs to choose inefficient strategies and to persist longer than is required in their 
entrepreneurial endeavours when relinquishing some control can increase performance to a 
greater extent. If such inefficient decisions and persistence can be explained by the desire to 
control due to attachment, then such a behavioural tendency is expected to be directed away from 
objective normative behaviour and lead to sub-optimal outcomes. Attachment-laden control will 
result in behaviour that is expected to be limiting since objectivity in evaluation is curtailed and 
cooperation with essential outsiders is discouraged. The reasons for these expectations have 
already been outlined above when the characteristics and differences between affective and 
cognitive factors were discussed, and psychological attachment and control were identified as 
affective constructs.   
Consequently, the underlying theme in this thesis is that the desire to control (resulting from 
attachment) is likely to be detrimental to performance. Some major implications include 
resistance to feedback and rejection of base rates in decision making. Thus, highly-oriented 
entrepreneurs will be less likely to accept feedback from evaluation of their ideas (mostly if 
negative); less likely to pursue R&D with outsiders that they fear might change the core design 
of the innovation; more likely to disregard statistics on performance in the industry; and 
therefore, in addition to other reasons, resort to decisions that are narrow-minded and indifferent 
to important and available information. Given these implications, psychological attachment 




commercialization where the issue of control is prominent. Control preferences resulting from 
psychological attachment may explain additional variance in entrepreneurial decision making 
with implications for venture performance. Therefore, it is imperative to understand the 
constructs of control and psychological attachment, dimensions and effects. Chapter 3 provides 























3.1  Theory and Predictions 
 
In the previous chapter I showed evidence of control tendency CT being an instrumental 
factor in commercialization of new technology. Also, I linked CT to psychological attachment 
(PA), when I argued that CT is most detrimental if it is based on subjective factors, such as 
attachment rather than objective factors such as inalienable human capital. In this chapter, I 
discuss the dimensions to PA, the relationships between PA and CT and the expected 
behavioural effects by way of hypotheses.  
 
3.1.1 Psychological Attachment (PA) 
This section outlines the construct of PA, its tenets and its relationship with CT. The basic 
idea behind the construct is that the entrepreneurial process establishes a relationship between 
the developer and the opportunity. Figure 2 provides the conceptual view of the proposed 
relationship. In the right panel there is a set of steps identified in Bowlby’s (1969, 1973) 
attachment theory. The right panel provides concepts identified in the entrepreneurship and 
creativity literature that relate to items in the steps from attachment theory. For instance, 
concepts such as intrinsic motivation relate to the formation and maintenance of an affective 
bond between the creator and the idea. The following sections discuss the constructs and 
























The construct of “attachment” is inherently affect driven. Considering the tenets of 
attachment theories in psychology (Fairbairn, 1952; Bowlby, 1969, 1973), PA can be generally 
characterized as an affectional tie that forms based on interactions between “self” and “other” 
often accompanied by affective experiences, and constitutes affective states that can be major 
building blocks for decision making. Bowlby’s (1969, 1973) attachment theory provides a 
complete account of the normative and individual difference processes that generate emotions in 
close relationships. According to Bowlby, the attachment system plays the roles of protecting 
vulnerable individuals from potential threats and regulating subsequent negative affect. In his 
book “Attachment and Loss” Bowlby (1969) explains… “Many of the most intense emotions 
arise during the formation, the maintenance, the disruption, and the renewal of attachment 
relationships [as shown on the right side of Figure 2]. The formation of a bond is described as 
falling in love, maintaining a bond as loving someone, and losing a partner as grieving over 
someone.” In a parallel relation to the entrepreneurial process (technology especially), one can 
envisage entrepreneurs developing intense emotions when conceiving the opportunity (falling in 
love), developing an attachment to the opportunity (maintaining the bond as loving the 











of affective bonds  
• Intrinsic motivation (Amabile, 1973) 
• Flow (Csikszentmihalyi, 1990, 1996,1997) 
• Psychological ownership 
(Pierce, Kostova, and Dirks, 2003) 
•  Passions (Cardon et al, 2005) 
• Affect in entrepreneurship  
(Baron, 2008) 
Attachment Theories   
(Bowlby, 1969, 1973) 
Entrepreneurship/Creativity Literature    
• Venture failure (depression) 
• Overcoming failure  
     (Sheppard, 2003, 2004)  







opportunity), developing sorrow or depression from failing in venture formation (losing the 
opportunity and grieving over it) (see Figure 2).  
In addition, Bowlby notes that “[the] threat of loss arouses anxiety, and actual loss gives 
rise to sorrow, while each of these situations is likely to arouse anger”. Further, Bowlby (1973) 
postulated that an individual’s attachment system activates when the person perceives a threat 
thereby forcing her/him to protect themself from that threat. In his example, a child’s attachment 
system is activated when he/she perceives threats in the environment and because of that he/she 
is motivated to seek protection from a caregiver. Bowlby says the unchallenged maintenance of 
this bond with the caregiver is “experienced as a source of security and the renewal of a bond as 
a source of joy”. He says “…because such emotions are usually a reflection of the state of a 
person’s affectional bonds, the psychology and psychopathology of emotion is found to be in 
large part the psychology and psychopathology of affectional bonds”.  
Again, in relating to the entrepreneurial process, the entrepreneur develops an attachment 
to the idea and the perception of a threat of loss from the commercialization environment leads to 
a protective psychological posture. The emphasis is in guarding and maintaining the bond with 
the opportunity and then, the entrepreneur derives security from the maintenance of that bond. 
Further, Bowlby advocates the concept of “internal working models” which demonstrates the 
process through which children internalize their childhood attachment experiences with 
caregivers and rely on these internalized experiences when they form new personal relationships 
with outsiders. These models are the basis of current work in attachment that distinguishes 
between different styles of attachment (Hazan and Shaver, 1987; Mikilincer and Shaver, 2003). 
 In effect, one of the key characteristics of attachment theory is the developmental 




relationship: why an individual is attracted to a relationship; the appeal factor; and how the 
individual reacts to its dissolution. In relation to the entrepreneurial process, the attachment 
theory could provide a framework for studying the affective factors that: motivate an individual 
to be attracted to entrepreneurship; makes the entrepreneurial relationship with the opportunity 
appealing; and affective factors that explain reactions to disengagement from that entrepreneurial 
relationship (the dissolution of the relationship). In other words, the opportunity recognition, 
development and growth stages of the entrepreneurial process map onto the developmental 
paradigm noted by Bowlby within which an entrepreneur experiences the formation, 
maintenance, disruption and renewal of the affectional bond with the opportunity (see the 
mapping in Figure 2).  
Also, entrepreneurs internalise their entrepreneurial experiences which influence their 
interactions with outsiders. The perception of a threat will kick in the attachment system that 
motivates the protection of that bond with the opportunity. However, these developmental 
experiences form an essential part of the affective experiences that entrepreneurs must encounter 
as they develop opportunities. The following provides empirical accounts of concepts that may 
apply to the various stages of the developmental process of formation, maintenance, disruption 
and renewal of the affectional bond with the opportunity.  
Developer–opportunity interactions that indicate the formation and maintenance of 
affectional ties or psychological bonds as described in Bowlby’s work are noted in the creativity 
and entrepreneurship literatures and are characterized by concepts such as intrinsic drive (Ryan 
and Deci, 2000; Amabile, 1983); psychological ownership (Pierce, Kostova and Dirks, 2003), 
flow (Csikszentmihalyi, 1990, 1996 and 1997); passions (Baum and Locke, 2004; Branzei and 




(Baron, 1998); and the role of affect in entrepreneurship (Baron, 2008). Although they don’t 
directly argue for the effect of PA, these concepts provide evidence for affect-induced behaviour.  
For instance, Baron (2008) notes that affect is likely to influence cognition and behaviour in 
entrepreneurial environments due to the unpredictability and rapid nature of change.  He also 
points out that affect may play a role in entrepreneurial creativity. The author specifically 
identifies opportunity recognition (corresponding to formation in attachment theory) and 
acquisition of essential resources (pertaining to the issue of control) as two areas where affect 
may play a role in entrepreneurship. Further, Baron (1998) notes that since entrepreneurs have a 
deep commitment to their opportunities, they are more likely than other people to experience 
intense emotions, more frequently, in relation to their work, and are more susceptible to affect 
infusion — when affective states elicited by one source or experience influences judgments 
about other, unrelated events (Forgas, 1995).  
There are other concepts, such as entrepreneurs’ grief over business failure (Shepherd, 
2003, 2004), which illustrate the disruption of the affectional bond (business failure and loss 
leading possibly to depression) and renewal of the bond (getting over the loss and continuing to 
pursue the opportunity). For instance, Shepherd (2004) notes that the reasons entrepreneurs start 
their own businesses could highlight entrepreneurs’ emotional attachment to their businesses. He 
advocates for pedagogical methods to help students in entrepreneurship manage emotions to 
avoid failure, learn from failure and improve their emotional intelligence. The following 
provides more illustrations of how some of the other identified concepts and processes might 
motivate PA to the opportunity. 
Further, the concept of intrinsic motivation demonstrates a platform for the formation and 




development or creation is intrinsically motivating and rewarding (Deci, Koestner and Ryan, 
2001; Rossman, 1931; Schumpeter, 1934; White, 1959; deCharms, 1968; Deci, 1975). For 
instance, White’s (1959) effectance motivation theory suggests that individuals are motivated 
from the feeling of having an effect on their environment. deCharms’ (1968) personal causation 
theory suggests that individuals get motivation from the feeling of being the initiators of their 
own actions. Amabile (1983) found that an individual’s interest in an activity, rather than in 
external rewards, leads to a more creative performance. However, Deci’s (1975) intrinsic 
motivation theory emerges as the most tested theory of motivation. It is defined as the doing of 
an activity for its inherent satisfactions rather than for some separable consequences (Ryan and 
Deci, 2000, p. 56). Deci’s theory suggests that individuals’ need for relatedness, competence and 
autonomy, individuals drive them to persist with tasks and report high interest and enjoyment. 
Intrinsic motivation then provides the mechanism through which the entrepreneur forges a closer 
bond with the opportunity; to form and maintain an affectional bond out of the reactions to 
successful problem solving and other positive experiences.  
Another construct capable of providing an environment within which an affectional bond 
can be discussed is “psychological ownership”. Psychological ownership is essentially the 
psychology of MINE. It is related to possessive tendencies (biological, social, situational or 
developmental) that establish the connection between self and targets of possession. Pierce, 
Kostova, and Dirks (2003) define the state of psychological ownership as ‘that state where an 
individual feels as though the target of ownership or a piece of that target is theirs’. They 
identified the following features for the construct. The first feature is based on the concept of 
possession and relates to the sense of ownership which manifests itself in the meaning and 




relationship between the individual and the object. Here the object is experienced as having a 
close connection with the self or becomes part of the extended self. The third feature is a 
complex mix of cognitive-affective elements in which the individual is aware through 
intellectual perception. The affective component of interest here, according to Pierce et. al. 
(2003), ‘becomes apparent in the feelings that arise when others lay claim to objects for which 
one feels a sense of personal ownership”  
In addition to the features, Pierce, Kostova and Dirks (2003) identify three routes to the 
emergence of the construct or the state of psychological ownership; controlling the ownership 
target (object); coming to know the target intimately; and investing the self into the target. Of 
particular interest is the process of investing the self into the target. It is easy to realize that the 
process of opportunity development is commensurate with investing the self into the idea. Pierce 
et. al. (2003) notes that ‘the most obvious and perhaps the most powerful means by which an 
individual invests him/herself into an object is to create it’. The authors mention writings of 
Locke (1691) who argued that we own our labour and ourselves, and therefore, are likely to feel 
that we own what we create, shape or produce. Along the same lines, Norton and Ariely (2005) 
show that people value goods more highly when they invest their own labour in creating them. 
They show that novices who make origami value their creations as highly as those made by 
experts, and individuals who make self-built Legos value it more highly than sets built by others. 
Thus, when creators endeavour to solve problems on their ideas and go through iterative rounds 
to develop a working prototype, they invest emotional energy into the process and the outcome 
(which is the idea).  
Lastly, Pierce et al (2003) note that just like our words, our thoughts and emotions are 




and even one's values and identity’. Feelings of ownership in these circumstances are clearly not 
derived from legal possession, but from the feelings of the ownership target belonging to or 
being a part of the self as the creator conceives and develops the idea.  Pierce et al (2003) indeed 
acknowledge that individuals may feel ownership for the products they create in vocations such 
as academia (through scholarly pursuits), entrepreneurship (through pursuing entrepreneurial 
opportunities), and politics (through the drafting of bills). In effect, effective reactions from 
interaction with the idea and resultant ownership are expected to lead to emotional attachment 
when the ownership target is felt to be threatened, as postulated by Bowlby (1969, 1973). The 
same way politicians are staunch defenders of bills they draft, entrepreneurs’ PA will magnify in 
the face of perceptions of hostility on the market.  
Going further, the concept of Flow is another construct that suggests the formation and 
maintenance of an affectional bond during the entrepreneurial process. Flow is the concept of 
optimal experience developed by Mihalyi Csikszentmihalyi (1990, 1996 and 1997). 
Csikszentmihalyi describes the feeling of having been able to create something new and original 
by focusing attention on a challenge. He notes the concept of ‘Flow’ which is a state of 
consciousness where an individual experiences feelings of deep enjoyment and of control and 
dominion. In this state, individuals are immersed in the present as they eradicate from their 
minds the impossibilities of the past and the uncertainties of the future. However, the state of 
Flow is a balance between psychological processes of differentiation and integration. The 
process of differentiation follows the notion of individuation put forth by Carl Jung (see Jung 
and Baynes, 1921). It is the process where the individual opens up to parts of him/herself beyond 
his/her ego. According to Jung, the individual needs to pay attention to dreams and question the 




assumptions. Therefore, differentiation is a break from the norm to realize dreams or attain new 
goals –in effect, is passion-laden. Integration, however, is bringing together information and 
experience into the process, and could be described as objectivity. Complexity is generated when 
differentiation interacts with integration. Having interviewed 91 people described as exceptional 
individuals, Csikszentmihalyi (1996) notes that some respondents describe the creative process a 
yin-yang alternation between the two extremes. With sufficient complexity to challenge and hold 
their attention, intrinsically motivated creators can easily achieve the optimal experience. The 
objectivity does not slow down the process of creation but lends credibility to the ideas 
conceived.  
The concept Flow seems to imply that individuals are not inherently creative until they 
are intrinsically motivated by the complexities they face. Csikszentmihalyi (1996) notes that 
without passion individuals lose interest in a difficult task. Further, the state of consciousness 
could occur several times a day and might not give birth to novel ideas worth pursuing. 
However, the concept is appealing due to the importance of drive in the creation process, and 
also, due to the feelings of deep enjoyment, control and domination that accompany the Flow 
state. These are feelings at conception and at problem-solving points during development which 
are in line with Bowlby’s (1969) formation and maintenance concepts when applied to the 
psychological bond between the idea and the entrepreneur.  
 Lastly, there are a number of other positive emotions identified in the literature which 
suggest an affectional bond between creator and idea. An example is “passion” in idea creation. 
Passion described by early philosophers such as Aristotle is what is now referred to as emotion.  
Bennett-Goleman (2001) describe passion as that gift of emotion that causes individuals to take a 




associated with entrepreneurship. Also, Cardon, Zietsma, Saparito, Matherne and Davis (2005) 
argue for the consideration of emotion in entrepreneurship, compare entrepreneurial creation to 
parenthood, and identify factors such as passion, commitment and identification as drivers in 
entrepreneurship. As entrepreneurs conceive an idea and work on it, they are more likely to seek 
security in it and be protective of it. Further, working in the domain of relationship literature, 
Branzei and Zietsma (2004) provide a long list of qualitative evidence showing that founders 
speak with more passion about their business opportunities than non-founders. If the 
entrepreneurial process leads to passion, it is not difficult to see how the process will generate 
affectional ties between the entrepreneur and idea through passion.  
In summary, attachment theory postulated by Bowlby (1969, 1973) can provide a 
framework for conceptualizing the formation, maintenance, disruption and renewal of the 
affectional bond between an entrepreneur/creator and an opportunity/idea. Concepts that 
illustrate the formation and development of this affectional tie are identified above. Among them 
are psychological ownership, intrinsic motivation, flow and passions. These factors are 
conceptualized to motivate an attachment to the opportunity which gets stronger when 
entrepreneurs perceive threats from the commercialization environment. Further, through the 
concept of internal working models these factors are expected to motivate entrepreneurs to 
internalize their affective experiences and evoke them during interactions with outsiders. Given 
these observations, the following identifies two dimensions of PA. The first dimension relates to 
the formation of the affective tie and is identified as the positive-experience affective states 
resulting from the entrepreneurial process. The second dimension relates to the maintenance of 
the affective tie and that is identified as affective states that enhance entrepreneurial self-identity 




Figure 3  








3.1.2 Entrepreneurial Process-Generated Affect (Opportunity Recognition and 
Development) 
 
Positive- and Negative-experience Affective States  
Characterizing the entrepreneurial process (before commercialization) as comprising 
opportunity recognition and opportunity development, the following discusses the 
characterization of opportunity, opportunity recognition and development, and relates to the 
generation of affect in these two areas. I start with opportunity recognition, and provide a 
definition, review the literature on the issues of recognition process and what it entails. Then I 
discuss the role of affect in the process.  
Extant literature on the nature of opportunity and recognition of opportunities 
Opportunity recognition is defined as a process of perception, discovery and creation of new 
ideas (Singh, Hills, Hybels and Lumpkin, 1999). However, what characterizes an opportunity is 
subject to debate. The debate relates back to what defines entrepreneurship. A number of 
definitional paradigms can be identified (see Shane and Eckhardt, 2003). I review them because 
they focus on the role of the individual, and since affect emanates and resides in individuals, the 
paradigms provide insight into how affective states relate to the opportunity recognition process. 
One of these paradigms is the psychological-theories paradigm that suggests that there are a 
number of psychological traits possessed by the entrepreneur which allow him or her to 
undertake the task of entrepreneurship. There is also the Neoclassical equilibrium theories 
Construct  
Psychological Attachment  
Affectional tie between 
entrepreneurial opportunity and 
entrepreneur  
Dimensions 
Entrepreneurial process-generated  
affective states 
• Positive-experience  affective states 




paradigm which notes that markets are made up of maximizing agents and that there are no 
unnoticed business opportunities. Thus, only the people who choose to become entrepreneurs do 
so - not because the opportunities themselves haven't been noticed by anyone else. Then, there is 
the Austrian school paradigm which claims business opportunities arise because not everyone 
has the same amount of information and thus some are not equipped to "see" the opportunities. 
In essence two overarching paradigms emerge, one where entrepreneurship is a function of the 
individual and the other where it is a function of an enabling environment.  
In the same fashion, the definition of an opportunity is also subject to debate; and this 
debate also has a bearing on the arguments for this thesis. Acs and Audretsch (2005) contend that 
a set of weakly held assumptions appear to dominate this debate leaving the fundamental nature 
of opportunity vague and unresolved. The debate is on whether “opportunity” is a subjective or 
an objective construct. Some researchers dwell on the subjectivity and the “socially-constructed” 
nature of opportunity arguing that these characteristics make it impossible to separate the 
opportunity from the individual. Others argue that an opportunity is an objective construct visible 
only to knowledgeable and attuned individuals. For instance, Shane and Venkataraman (2000) 
portray opportunities as objective phenomenon that may be discovered by entrepreneurs with 
unique cognitive abilities. However, Shane (2003) develops the idea of an individual-opportunity 
nexus which merges the traditional views of entrepreneurship offering a coherent and 
overarching conceptual framework that explains the different parts of the entrepreneurial 
process: the opportunities, the people who pursue them, the skills and strategies used to organize 
and exploit opportunities, and the environmental conditions favourable to them.  
Mirroring the debate of entrepreneurship stemming from the individual or from the 




independent of the individual. The view that is eventually adopted will determine the nature of 
the discussion of the role of affect in the opportunity recognition process. However, the role and 
traits of the individual can be seen to play a part in either approach. The following argues for the 
role of the individual irrespective of what approach is adopted, and what the implications are for 
the role of affect in the process.  
The individual in opportunity recognition Without arguing for an individual-centric 
process for dealing with opportunities, it is clear that the role of the individual cannot be 
relegated to the background. Even if opportunity recognition is episodic as the critics of the 
person-based view argue, when the episodes occur, it still takes an individual to realize the 
prospects of the opportunity and act on it. From that view point it could be argued that, 
irrespective of the characteristic of the opportunity, there is a certain level of personal judgement 
and decision making that must come from an individual for the opportunity to be exploited. For 
instance, Schwartz, Teach and Birch (2005) contend that opportunity recognition may follow a 
cognitive or a process approach. The cognitive approach is based on personal characteristics of 
entrepreneurs, scripts and mental models behind opportunity recognition, while the process 
approach emphasizes opportunity recognition as more of a manageable activity. In both 
approaches there will be the need for an individual mental (cognitive and affective) factor to 
move the process forward.  
First dimension: Positive affect in opportunity recognition and development Having 
argued that the individual (and, therefore, his or her affective experience) plays a role, in 
opportunity recognition and development, I proceed to argue for the role of affect in these 
processes. I start by making the case that since affect goes hand in hand with cognition, where 




expect an affective dimension to play an informative, supporting or reactionary role. Therefore, 
whether by a cognitive or process approach, the employment of a cognitive entrepreneurial 
capability (Baron, 2004, 2006a) that implies the recognition of opportunities is grounded in 
cognitive realizations with accompanying affective states (e.g., the ‘Flow’ concept of 
Csikszentmihalyi, 1996). Positive affective reactions to these cognitive realisations are expected 
to initiate an affectional tie to the idea as a natural response to the experiential experience. Baron 
(2008) identifies two ways in which affect influences opportunity recognition: through the 
influence on creativity and through the moderating effects of affect on the influence of other 
individual-level factors on opportunity recognition. Specifically, Baron (2008) notes that, in 
general, positive affect is more likely to facilitate creativity than negative affect and, thereby, 
enhance opportunity recognition. However, it should be noted that while Baron (2008) discusses 
affect that aids the creative process, the emphasis in this study is on affect that is a “by-product” 
of the creative process. In other words, the study dwells on the affective reactions to the events 
comprising the creative process.  
For an illustration, let’s revisit the concept of “Flow”. Csikszentmihalyi (1996) associated 
the feeling of Flow with having to create something new and original by focusing attention on a 
challenge. As introduced above, “Flow” is a state of consciousness where an individual 
experiences feelings of deep enjoyment and of control and dominion. In a unique study of 
creativity, Csikszentmihalyi (1996) studied 100 individuals who had produced socially 
recognised creative works and were made up of scientists, artists, writers, educators, politicians 
and social activists, engineers, and religious leaders. He identified domain expertise as an 
instrumental factor in their excellence and creativity.  This suggests that intrinsic motivation is a 




motivated to endeavour in their areas of expertise. With the view that intrinsic motivation has 
affective components, it is not difficult to see that intrinsically motivated creators will experience 
positive affect from successful endeavours, and possibly negative affect, such as 
disappointments, from failure. These two cases will reinforce the creator’s actions positively and 
negatively. One will expect that positive affect will correlate more with an affectional tie to the 
opportunity than negative affect (if at all).  
The development stage will consist of similar mechanisms. Take the view that 
development is typically grounded in problem solving (see Brown and Eisenhardt, 1995). Then, 
for technology entrepreneurs developing product innovations, the development stage presents 
difficult tradeoffs in the areas of demand expectations, quality, design and fabrication in order to 
achieve goals such as the lowest manufacturing cost structure. Therefore, positive affective states 
resulting from successful recognition or discovery, as well as finding solutions to development 
problems (or to a previously difficult problem) are expected to increase attachment to the 
opportunity.  
Further, creative problem solving has been identified to follow two different thinking 
processes: convergent or analytical, and lateral or associative (Guildford, 1967).  While 
convergent reasoning produces one solution, divergent thinking produces multiple solutions 
thereby producing novel ideas and unusual responses to questions. Thus, divergent thinking 
cognitively leads in various directions some conventional and some original. Research in 
neuroscience supports these distinctions. For instance, the brain is found to function differently 
under the two types of thinking. Dacey and Lennon (1998) find the brain to be involved in a 
higher degree of neural complexity and, therefore a greater degree of neural connections under 




with analytical problem solving (devoid of insight) showed increased activity in the right 
hemisphere anterior superior temporal gyrus, an area of the brain noted for initial problem-
solving efforts.  
In addition, the existence of different thinking processes imply subjects can make 
connections across distantly related information and find connections that were not previously 
obvious (Jung-Beeman et. al., 2004; Bowden et. al., 2005). It is also known that observed 
Gamma bursts seen in these neuroscience studies activates emotions increasing the plasticity of 
the cortex and facilitating the formation of new associations in the thinking process. The 
divergent nature of thinking and the brain processes associated with creative thinking, suggest a 
high level of emotions from cognitive realizations when patterns are found or when discoveries 
are made. Divergence in thought suggests that discovery will be “unusual” and, therefore, evoke 
a high-level emotional reaction, in this case, positive emotions such as joy. The classic discovery 
story is told of Archimedes who rushed out of his bathtub onto the street, naked, and yelling 
“Eureka, Eureka” when he suddenly discovered his well-known principle of hydrostatics. 
Clearly, there was an intense outflow of emotions evoked by the discovery.   
For entrepreneurs, such an experience is likely to initiate an affectional tie with the idea 
since the “affective discovery mode” might linger for a longer period. Empirically, there is also 
some correlation found between positive moods and creativity. In several studies conducted by 
Isen and colleagues, they found positive mood to positively affect creative problem solving than 
negative or neutral moods (Isen, 1990; Isen and Baron, 1991; Isen et. al., 1987). In relation to 
entrepreneurship, affect can shape thoughts during opportunity recognition (Baron, 2006b; 




depressed, sad and/or stressed people are less likely to conduct creative problem solving because 
the negative moods restrict attention and evoke stereotypic responses (Gazzaniga, 1988). 
Further, I recount one of the processes of attachment theory (Bowlby, 1969, 1973): the 
formation of attachment – “falling in love”. The presence of affective states in creativity, 
whether emotions (such as joy, excitement) or drive states (such as intrinsic drives), suggest the 
likelihood of the actor falling in love with the creation. Referring to entrepreneurs as creative 
individuals, the argument can be made that positive affective states will garner attachment 
towards the entrepreneurial opportunity, while negative experiences, in contrast, will inhibit 
affectional ties to the opportunity. In this sense, the affective states in question relate to the 
equilibrium state the developer is in. So, during opportunity recognition and development, 
positive states refer to cases in which the problem (or key problem) is solved, while negative 
states refers to cases where the problem is not solved and, therefore, the creator is reacting 
negatively.  
 
H1a: Positive affective states resulting from opportunity development process will be positively 
related to PA while negative affective states will be negatively related to PA2.  
 
Second dimension: Self- Identity- Enhancing Affective States As the entrepreneur 
identifies self with the opportunity the notion of the entrepreneurial role identity may begin to 
form. The entrepreneur may begin to envisage a burgeoning identity based on the idea and likely 
begin to develop possessive feelings. Using a related concept, Pierce, Kostova, and Dirks (2003) 
noted that the motivation for psychological ownership (of one’s creation) is partially grounded in 
                                                 
2 Hypothesis H1a and H1b are what I refer to as validation hypotheses. Since hypotheses are not typically developed 
to investigate dimensionality, I developed these two hypotheses to assess the theoretical underpinnings of the two 
constructs as presented. I achieved this by correlating the dimensions with alternative measures of PA.  A high 




self identity. The authors note that “the most obvious and perhaps the most powerful means by 
which an individual invests him/herself into an object is to create it” (pg 93). Through the 
reinforcing process of affect shaping opportunity and vice versa, entrepreneurs gain self 
understanding, express self identity to others, and become attached to the opportunity as they 
begin to view it as a natural extension of the self. Cardon et al. (2005) note that, entrepreneurial 
decisions sometimes stem from “emotions and deep identity connections between an 
entrepreneur and an idea or opportunity” (pg 24). As entrepreneurs begin to see the opportunity 
as an “extension of self”, they begin to develop a sustained commitment to the role-identity as 
they define themselves in terms of that role “I am going to be an entrepreneur”. Thus, the role 
identity will come to define the person, and to some degree, the role will merge with the person's 
self-definition (Turner 1978). 
With roots in sociology, role identity relates to a person's individualized version of a 
social role. Role theory is based on the idea that people function within a society; and as a result 
there is communication of certain expectations regarding one’s behaviour (Burke and Reitzes, 
1991; Hoelter, 1983; Pilivain, and Callero 1991; Stryker 1980).  Thus, a role becomes a set of 
individual and shared meanings (see Weigert, Teitge and Teitge 1986, for a comprehensive 
review of different views of identity theory).  
Further, role identity has been shown to be a strong predictor of behaviour. For example, 
focusing on blood donors, Callero, Howard and Piliavin (1987) show that the extent to which an 
individual views himself or herself as a blood donor is more likely to sustain the behaviour of 
blood donation. When a role is sustained over time, it may become part of an individual’s role 
identity (Reich, 2000). Thus, over time, the person becomes a “blood donor” as perceived by self 




symbolic interactionism and connects symbols and positions to roles in social interaction. He 
notes that “In this usage, positions are symbols for the kinds of persons it is possible to be in 
society: rich man, poor man, thief, fool, teacher, sergeant, intellectual, rebel, president, and so 
on” (Stryker, 1980, p. 57). On symbols he adds, “Symbols enable people to predict their own and 
other’s behaviour and to anticipate the future course of interaction” (1980, p. 37). And on 
positions he notes that, “Like other symbolic categories, positions serve to cue behaviour and so 
act as predictors of the behaviour of persons who are placed into a category” (1980, p. 57). Thus, 
symbols and positions have certain behaviours attached to them and individuals use these roles to 
describe aspects of the self. Callero, Howard and Piliavin (1987) suggest that predictions of 
future behaviour can be made based on the extent an individual has merged a given role with his 
or her definition of self.  
The identity literature provides some conceptualization of this role-person merger. Turner 
(1978) describes the role-person merger as the extent to which a role identity is integrated with a 
person’s overall self definition. A greater role-person merger implies a higher impact of role 
identity factors in the definition of self and consequently corresponds to a higher amount of time 
spent in the role. High role-person merger has been associated with self labeling as a person who 
performs the role (e.g., Burke and Reitzes, 1991; Piliavin and Callero, 1991; Stryker, 1980). The 
more an entrepreneur merges the self into the entrepreneurial role, the more he or she labels him 
or herself as an entrepreneur (or entrepreneurial). Research also shows that the choice of roles 
and the definition of self, is based on those roles develop over a period of time through role-
related development stages. Kleine and Kleine (2000) outlined five stages of role-identity 
development for freely chosen, ordinary role identities (e.g., bridge player):  role-identity 




discovery relates to the process of exploring a particular identity to determine the level of fit with 
the self, while identity construction refers to the individual choosing actively to devote time and 
energy to the pursuit of the identity. In relation, opportunity recognition is expected to motivate 
the entrepreneur towards entrepreneurial identity discovery while the process of problem solving 
through opportunity development might motivate the construction of an entrepreneurial identity 
through the experiences enjoyed. The crucial argument here is that entrepreneurs may need to 
necessarily develop some affectional tie to the opportunity in order to successfully discover and 
construct the entrepreneurial role identity.  
Recent research in this area in entrepreneurship is beginning to discuss the role of 
entrepreneurial identity in the nascent process and effects on persistence and performance. For 
instance, employing role theory, George, Jain and Maltarich (2006) conceptualize the nascent 
process as a role identity transformation, and find, among other factors, perceived social and 
economic enablers to affect role identity adoption and opportunity commercialization. In general, 
attempts try to describe the entrepreneurial process in terms of identity dynamics as an 
alternative to the trait research in trying to understand the motivations to pursue entrepreneurial 
activity (Hoang and Gimeno, 2007, and Hytti, 2000). For example, Hytti (2000) argues for 
studying how the entrepreneurs define themselves as well as how other people define 
entrepreneurship and entrepreneurs according to their interactions in different circumstances.  
Further, Hoang and Gimeno (2007) develop the concept of founder role identity and 
describe how centrality and complexity affect successful role transition. The authors explain 
founder centrality as how important the entrepreneurial identity is to the entrepreneur’s self 
concept while complexity is explained as the depth and breadth of the entrepreneur’s conception 




entrepreneurship favourably and, therefore, begin investing emotionally into the opportunity as 
they observe its prospects. Also, developers may endeavour to actualize whatever entrepreneurial 
role they conceptualize such that they will carry out entrepreneurial activities to various stages. 
Thus, some will only develop ideas to transfer to outsiders for commercialization while others 
will build new ventures on their ideas in accordance with their perceived entrepreneurial role 
identity.   
On the whole, it is clear that an entrepreneurial identity might be an attraction for 
potential entrepreneurs, and this may also help explain entrepreneurial endeavours and 
persistence. However, since identity is constructed and not innate, the process might begin with 
opportunity identification but will be fostered through the development process. Positive 
experiences and celebrative affective states resulting from success in problem solving and other 
developmental achievements, may result in cognitive anticipation of a prospective 
entrepreneurial identity in the future. The affective reactions to this cognitive anticipation are 
expected to motivate a stronger bond between the opportunity and the developer, creating a PA. 
 
H1b: Self-identity-enhancing affective states will be positively related to psychological 
attachment to the opportunity    
 
 
3.1.3 Psychological Attachment vs. Cognitive Evaluation  
 
Figure 4 






Having argued that PA stems from affective conditions during opportunity recognition 
and development, it is important to discuss the differences in mechanisms between decision 
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processes governed by PA and those governed by cognitive evaluation, as indicated in Figure 4. 
Figure 4 shows that there is a relationship between PA and cognitive evaluation, the nature of 
which is discussed in this section. As briefly introduced earlier, affective processes are known to 
diverge from cognitive processes, and sometimes overshadow them, in judgment decision 
making (see Lowenstein et al., 2001 for a review). The authors note that  “ …other strands of 
literature in psychology most closely associated with the clinical literature suggest that [affect] 
often conflict with cognitive evaluations and can in some situations produce pathologies of 
decision making and behaviour” (p. 269). They cite examples such as anxiety and fear which 
make people react more strongly to outcomes they recognize as highly unlikely (such as airplane 
crashes) or not objectively terrible (such as public speaking), while reacting less strongly to 
negative outcomes that are more likely and probably more severe (such as car accidents).  
The differences in mechanisms are also shown in related evidence which supports the 
notion that highly anxious individuals attend preferentially to threat-related stimuli and interpret 
ambiguous stimuli and situations as threatening (Eysenck, 1992 Derakshan and Eysenck, 1997; 
Eysenck, Mac-Leod and Matthews, 1987; Vasey, El-Hag and Daleiden, 1996). Further, studies 
by Wilson and Arvai (2006) show that despite expected gains in evaluability, affective responses 
to a stimulus may overwhelm analytic computations in decision making.  These positions can be 
bolstered with the mood congruence theory. Baron (2008) suggests that entrepreneurs’ current 
moods may affect the information they store in memory and retrieve for later use. In relation, 
technology developers might envisage emotional reactions to adverse commercialization 
situations and the resulting mood may affect information storage, retrieval and use.   
The differences in mechanisms for affective and cognitive processes are also seen in dual 




between rule-based and associative processing. Similar to the System 2 – System 1 dual 
processes reviewed earlier, rule-based processing “is a relatively controlled form of processing 
that operates according to formal rules of logic and evidence and is mediated by conscious 
appraisal of information”, while “…associative processing is a more spontaneous form of 
processing that operates by principles of similarity and temporal contiguity” (p. 270). They argue 
that since associative processing is not mediated by conscious appraisal it is difficult to suppress 
its influence on judgments and decisions. Thus, in the case of divergence, the consequences can 
be dire mostly due to the negative influence of affective processes.  
Lowenstein et al., (2001) also noted determinants of affective reactions that differ from 
cognitive evaluations. They argue that the divergences between affective and cognitive reactions 
occur for two reasons. Firstly, affective processes respond to probabilities and outcomes in a 
different manner from what is expected with cognitive evaluation. Secondly, there are situation-
specific factors that have a minimum effect on cognitive evaluations: time-course of the decision, 
nonconsequentialist (not ‘if then’) aspects of the decision outcomes (e.g. vividness) and 
evolutionary preparedness for some reactions. The time-course of the decision refers to the 
temporal nature of affect, while vividness is concerned with individual differences in mental 
imagery in influencing affective responses.  However, evolutionary preparedness relates to the 
idea that humans are preprogrammed to experience certain types of fears that are not cognitively 
dangerous but because evolution has prepared them for such experiences.  
For an illustration of the divergence between affective and cognitive processes, consider 
the case of an entrepreneur of a low-technology household appliance, faced with a simple 
decision of choosing a type or size of distribution channel. A reasonable expectation is for the 




of reasons. A large distributor will ensure high volume and market share or reach, hence, the 
entrepreneur will experience higher economic returns and brand building or possibly quicker 
brand dominance. However, when the entrepreneur is highly attached to the idea, the pattern of 
decision making may deviate from this normative expectation, reflecting a divergence between 
affective and cognitive evaluation based on the reasons identified by Lowenstein et al. (2001).  
To see the reasons at play, assume the marketing/distribution channel the entrepreneur 
contacted demands more than 50% mark-up on the final price of the product, and the 
entrepreneur was aware of this information. First, in relation to the evaluation of probabilities 
and outcomes, as identified by Lowenstein et al. (2001), a highly-attached entrepreneur will 
begin considering all the possibilities of his or her profits being squeezed to the barest minimum 
(against the probability that it might not happen), as well as envisioning all the possible negative 
future outcomes. In terms of situational factors identified by Lowenstein et al. (2001), the 
proximity of the decision moment (at the point of commercialization) will bring these concerns 
to the fore (time-course). Likewise, the value of the mark-up will serve as a vivid signal of 
expropriation which might emanate from the entrepreneur’s evolutionary make up. All these 
mechanisms can occur irrespective of the fact that operating costs and the complexity of 
channels of distribution require high mark-up fees. 
In effect, the divergence between affective and cognitive processes will reflect in 
differences in PA-infused evaluations and cognitive evaluations of the commercialization 
environment as shown in Figure 5. Figure 5 relates the situational factors just reviewed and 
entrepreneurial effort to the differing cognitive and affective forms of evaluation, and further 
relates these forms of evaluation to types and differences in perception (shown in the right most 




process, Figure 5 emphasizes on the affective influences on the process. Following Lowenstein 
et al. (2001), three areas were identified to illustrate the differences in perception from cognitive 
and affective points of view. The three areas are: the perception of the commercialization 
environment, the difference in perception as it relates to possibilities and probabilities, and the 
retrieval and use of information. Further illustrations are provided below.  
 
Figure 5 
Differing Approaches to Perception Due To Divergence between Cognitive and Affective 












First, it is assumed that a strong affectional tie (a high level of PA) induces an affective 
evaluation of the microeconomic environment. Thus, as shown in Figure 5, PA-infused 
evaluation of the microeconomic environment will make developers envision threats and not 
opportunities in the microeconomic environment. As well, such developers will evaluate 
possibilities (from the threat) and not the probabilities of the “bright side” and may also avoid the 
use of base rates in their evaluations. To illustrate further, the commercialization stage, as noted 
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elsewhere, is characterized by exposure of the idea to potential stakeholders, an exposure that 
carries an element of risk due to the stakeholders’ unknown and untested motives. The developer 
will naturally perceive threatening signals. As noted in Bowlby’s (1969) attachment theory, the 
affectional tie increases when a threat is perceived.   
Second, cognitive evaluation is based largely on the probability and desirability 
associated with the consequences, while affective evaluation is more sensitive to outcomes than 
to probabilities (Lowenstein et al., 2001). For example, emotional evaluations of strong positive 
or negative consequences of outcomes in uncertain or risky situations will be more sensitive to 
the possibility than the probability of outcomes. This pattern leads to an overweight of very small 
probabilities (Loewenstein et al., 2001). Thus developers will be psychologically affected by the 
possibilities of encroachment on property and appropriability rights even if property protection 
and alternative safeguards such as non-disclosure agreements and trade secrecy are available. 
Further, there is substantial research on the distinction between affective evaluation and 
cognitive evaluation relating to probabilities and possibilities. For instance, Rottenstreich and 
Hsee (2001) found that strong sensitivity to departure from impossibility and certainty (and also 
insensitivity to changes in probability), are more dramatic for affect-rich than for affect-poor 
outcomes.  
Third, attachment will prevent the use of valuable information such as base rates in the 
face of perceived adverse outcomes, even if the developer acknowledges the value of such 
information. So, even if highly-attached developers realize the value of cooperation with a 
potential outsider and associated potential gains, they may fail to make use of this realization and 
place undue emphasis on the severity of a possible loss and less so on the probability of a 




“positive” probabilities and reduces objective and cognitive evaluation of the microeconomic 
environment.  
Therefore, considering the level of affective investment a developer pours into an 
opportunity, a high level of attachment is expected to magnify the possibilities of negative 
outcomes without full consideration of the probabilities of those outcomes. Hence, a high 
attachment to the opportunity is expected to lead to a lower level of cognitive evaluation of 
commercialization outcomes, most especially, when the possibility of loss is perceived.  
 





3.1.4. Control Tendency and Psychological Attachment  
 
To discuss the concept of control, there is the need to first introduce the concept of 
commercialization options, the point where the issue of control in this study is argued to be most 
intense. 
 
3.1.4.1. Commercialization Options 
There is a variety of frameworks for categorizing options of commercialization. Gans and 
Stern (2003) note that key aspects of the commercialization environment motivate start-ups to 
choose between cooperative or competitive strategies. Others categorize options of 
commercialization into licensing or creation of new firms (Colyvas, Crow, Gelijns, Mazzoleni, 
Nelson, Rosenberg and Sampat, 2002; Shane, 2001; Shane 2002; and Neckar and Shane, 2003). 
Another type of categorization is provided by Pries and Guild (2004), who argue for substance 




sell. Yet, others look at more novel categorizations that depend on the type of technology 
involved (Nicolaou and Birley, 2003).  
Simplifying the options Acknowledging the variety and the strategic implications of the 
various commercialization options, the simple bi-modal framework of “compete” or “cooperate” 
(Gans, Hsu and Stern, 2002 and Gans and Stern, 2003) is adopted in this paper for its simplicity 
and generalizability. This adoption is to orient the commercialization options to the Shane and 
Venkataraman (2000) notion of entrepreneurship where successful commercialization weighs 
heavily on collaboration with outside parties. The compete or cooperate framework is for 
evaluating start-up commercialization strategy and patterns of competitive interaction between 
start-ups and established firms. Gans and Stern (2003) contend that commercialization strategy 
for start-up innovators often presents a trade-off between establishing a novel value chain and 
competing against established firms, and leveraging an existing value chain and earning returns 
through cooperating with others. The following is a short elaboration on the two modes of 
commercialization and the modifications done to them to support the framework for this thesis.  
Gans and Stern (2003) describe the option of competing as a situation where the start-up 
sets up a venture on the idea to compete with incumbents. Some factors that motivate firms to 
consider the competing option is the design of the technology (enabling trade secrecy – 
Pressman, 1988), pioneering nature of the invention, first mover advantage (Lieberman and 
Montgomery, 1988), and learning curves (Levin et al, 1987). However, Gans and Stern (2003) 
argue that without seeking cooperation, start-ups may lose the opportunity to earn returns as was 
the case of Robert Kearns who fought royalty payments for his intermittent windshield wiper for 




Conversely, the option of cooperating is where the start-up enters into agreements with 
other firms (Gans and Stern, 2003). There are many strategic options with cooperating. The 
authors identify licensing, acquisition of start-ups, joint ventures, strategic and educational 
alliances, milestone financing, among others. Essentially, cooperating is likely to make the start-
up disclose technical information to the established firm, weakening its bargaining position 
(Gans and Stern, 2003). A possible solution is for the start-up to threaten pervasive disclosure 
which will increase its bargaining power and reduce the degree of expropriation (Anton and Yao, 
1994, 1995). In addition, start-ups face problems of higher search costs for appropriate partners, 
unknown reputations of potential collaborators, differences in industry experience, among others. 
Even though obstacles in this option may be higher, cooperating has the advantages of allowing 
sellers of technology to soften downstream competition, avoiding duplicative investment, and 
enhancing complementary technology development (Gans and Stern, 2003).  
Commercialization options as pertains to this study In moving from the frame of 
technology start-ups to technology entrepreneurs, a few adjustments need to be made to the Gans 
and Stern model. Competition will imply a number of options with the extreme being solely 
developing a venture on the idea while a less extreme option will entail subcontracting a part of 
the value chain, e.g. manufacturing or distribution. Cooperation will also include a number of 
options with extreme cooperation implying a complete sale of the idea and a less extreme option 
entailing partnering with outside parties in the areas of finance, manufacturing, R&D and 
distribution, among others. It should be noted that the options of “cooperating” and “competing” 
are not directly operationalized in this study. However, this characterisation forms the basis of 




Cooperating implies sharing or relinquishing control for performance and competing implies 
restricting control sometimes at the cost of performance.  
 
3.1.4.2. Control At The Point of Commercialization 
At the point of commercialization, the technology entrepreneur has to decide on what 
commercialization strategy to employ. Choosing a roll-out strategy is always challenging and as 
Gans and Stern (2003) put it, start-ups typically lack the knowledge and expertise needed to find 
the appropriate markets for their idea and to translate their ideas into returns. However, many 
entrepreneurs and start-ups make these important decisions all the time. From the foregoing, we 
have seen that given knowledge constraints, uncertainty with the environment, and perceptions 
of outsider’s motives as per agency theory, decisions emanate from a battle between cognitive 
and affective forces. Thus, in line with the conceptual issues developed in this study, the 
commercialization environment for a highly-attached entrepreneur naturally presents threats to 
the developer’s control over the technology. Also, due to the affectional tie to the opportunity 
there is also a high sensitivity to these threats. Thus, the primary explanation for such high 
sensitivity to threats is the perception of fear of loss (of control) over the opportunity. For 
instance, fear will elicit appraisals of uncertainty and lack of individual control, two central 
determinants of risky judgments (Slovic, 1987). Therefore, due to such threats or fears, highly-
attached entrepreneurs must perceive a high possibility of controlling their ideas in the future, to 
be openly receptive to partnership proposals from outsiders, while lowly-attached entrepreneurs 
may be relatively more receptive to such proposals. In line with this preface, the following 





3.1.4.3. The Construct of Control  
Control generally refers to the extent to which an agent can intentionally produce desired 
outcomes and prevent undesired outcomes (Skinner, Chapman, and Baltes, 1988). Skinner 
(1996) developed a framework that classifies all constructs of control as objective, subjective or 
experienced and these labels refer to connections between ‘agents’ and ‘means’, ‘means’ and 
‘ends’ and ‘agents’ and ‘ends’. Further, the framework compares constructs on whether they 
refer to future or past experiences and whether they have specific or general domains as their 
referents.  According to Skinner (1996), the classical definitions of control hinges on the 
connections between agents and outcomes. Thus, entrepreneurs perceive control or lack of 
control depending on their perception of the commercialization environment or expected 
entrepreneurial outcomes.  
This also implies that control does not need to be actual in order for it to be effective. 
Research provides support for perceived or subjective control as a stronger predictor of 
functioning than actual or objective control (Skinner, 1996). Therefore, an individual’s perceived 
control or conviction that control is available is enough to mobilize action and modulate arousal 
(Averill, 1973) as well as influence affective states and behaviour. Entrepreneurs are therefore 
expected to react to perceptions of control or lack of control in the commercialization 
environment. Accordingly, the concept of control hypothesized in this study concerns the desire 
to control the rights to the opportunity in reaction to the perception of threats from the 
commercialization environment. The control phenomenon is therefore a “drive” state premised 
on the affective connection between the entrepreneur and the opportunity. 
Similar control constructs This concept of desire to control in the entrepreneurial 




(Rotter, 1966) and self-efficacy (Bandura, 1977). Locus of control is the individual’s general 
expectancy of the outcome of an event as being within his or her personal control and 
understanding or beyond his or her personal control and understanding (Rotter 1966). Rotter 
developed the concept in studying individuals’ perception about the underlying main causes of 
events in their lives. Rotter's view was that behavior was largely guided by "reinforcements" 
(rewards and punishments) and that through contingencies such as rewards and punishments, 
individuals come to hold beliefs about what causes their actions.  These beliefs, in turn, guide the 
kinds of attitudes and behaviors people adopt.  
Rotter (1966) differentiated between internal and external locus of control on his Rotter 
Internal-External Locus of Control Scale which measures generalized expectancies for internal 
versus external control of reinforcement. Internals (with internal locus of control) believe that 
their own actions determine the rewards that they obtain, while externals (with external locus of 
control) believe that rewards in life are generally outside of their control and their behavior has 
little effect. The scoring for the scale ranges from 0 to 13 and a low score indicates an internal 
control while a high score indicates external control. Many studies have found entrepreneurs to 
have more locus of control than others (e.g. Evans and Leighton, 1989; Brockhaus, 1980; Cromie 
and Johns 1983; Gilad 1982; van Praag, van Sluis and van Witteloostuijn, 2004). For example, 
van Praag, van Sluis and van Witteloostuijn (2004) studied interviews of 6,111 young US 
citizens over a two-decade period and show that entrepreneurs had higher mean locus of control 
score than employees. The authors note that having an internal locus of control positively relates 
to earnings while entrepreneurs realized a higher effect than employees. 
Self-efficacy is also closely related to the control concept in this study. Self-efficacy is an 




tasks at designated levels, expend greater effort, and persevere in the face of adversity (Bandura, 
1977; 1986). Self-efficacy beliefs influence the choices people make and actions they take. 
People tend to select tasks and activities in which they feel competent and confident and avoid 
those in which they do not. In that sense one expects the self-efficacious entrepreneur to envisage 
control over the rights to the entrepreneurial opportunity. Empirically, Krueger (2000) argues 
that the perception of entrepreneurial opportunities depends on an individual’s perception that 
the situation is controllable and positive.  
How they differ Clearly, there are overlaps between locus of control, self-efficacy and 
the concept of control as described in this study. For example, self-efficacy in the Bandura 
(1977) formulation is assessed as prospective and at an extremely specific behavioural level 
(Skinner, 1996) while locus of control is time-neutral and domain-specific. However, despite 
these overlaps, control as conceptualized in this study is unique to the opportunity creation 
context, connects past to future experiences with emphasis on control expectancies, refers to 
connections between agents (entrepreneurs) and ends (outcomes) and is related to perceptions of 
loss of control at the point of commercialization. In this sense, control in this study is more 
influenced by context rather than individual level factors such as the personality of the 
entrepreneur.  
Theoretically, an entrepreneur who is affectively-invested in the process may become 
control-oriented even if he or she has low self-efficacy and an external locus of control. A low 
self-efficacy implies the entrepreneur doesn’t believe in the strategic importance of his or her 
skills in ensuring performance while an external locus of control implies the entrepreneur 
believes performance is determined by external forces and is not under his or her control. In 




entities to ensure a successful commercialization. However, a high level of PA is expected to 
motivate non-cooperative behavior. At worst, a highly-attached entrepreneur may shelve the idea 
to prevent others from controlling the rights rather than expose it to the market.  
 
3.1.4.4. Reaction to the Perception of Control And The Role Of PA 
The control response is characteristic of emotions It has been established above that the 
perception of control or lack of control is enough to mobilize action.  The perception of lack of 
control sets a coping mechanism into motion. Skinner (1996) identifies approach vs. avoidance 
as reactions to perceptions of opportunity and loss of control. The emotional/affective connection 
to control should be noted here. Frijda (1986) describes emotions as the change in action 
readiness through the appraisal of a situation. Thus, emotions carry a tendency for action. Similar 
to reactions to perceptions concerning control, Zajonc (1998) identifies emotional processes as 
those that address the ‘go/no-go’ questions (that lead to approach/avoidance behaviour), while 
cognitive processes are those that answer true/false questions. Thus, we see that behavioural 
reactions conceptualised for control and emotions are identical: approach vs. avoidance.  
Control as a coping strategy Skinner (1996) identifies two coping strategies in response 
to threats and loss of control: primary control and relinquishment of control (Heckhausen and 
Schulz, 1995; Rothbaum Weisz, and Snyder, 1982). Primary control relates to the individual’s 
attempt to change the environment to fit his or her own desires and wishes while relinquishment 
of control relates to the voluntary yielding of control to another person (Burger, 1989). In 
general, when people perceive a high degree of control there is a general sense of action 
orientation where they exert more effort and are optimistic (Skinner, 1996). When people 




In related literature in health psychology, positive affect elicits approach strategies while 
negative affect elicits avoidance strategies in dealing with stress (Carver, 2001). Further, across a 
number of domains, a number of theories illustrate the approach-avoidance behavioural tendency 
although most of these theories typically assume a conceptually cognitive paradigm. The theories 
include loss aversion (Kahneman and Tversky, 1979); risk aversion (Camerer, Lowenstein, and 
Rabin, 2004); regret aversion (Bell, 1982; Loomes, and Sugden, 1982, 1987); and protection 
motivation theory (Rogers, 1975, 1983; Boer and Seydel, 1996). 
 Similar coping-strategy theories The following are short descriptions of these theories. 
In each of the descriptions, one observes the notions of approach and avoidance in reaction to the 
level of risk and uncertainty perceived. In prospect theory3, Kahneman and Tversky (1979) 
describe loss aversion as the tendency for individuals to strongly prefer avoiding losses to 
acquiring gains. Much research evidence on this theory put the weight of losses at about twice 
that of gains in their psychological effects. Risk aversion could be described as the reluctance of 
an individual to accept a bargain with an uncertain payoff rather than another bargain with more 
certain, but possibly lower, expected payoff. Research in behavioral finance (see Camerer, 
Loewenstein and Rabin, 2004) considers risk as the degree of uncertainty associated with the 
return on an asset. Regret theory (Bell, 1982; Loomes and Sugden, 1982, 1987) says that 
individuals anticipate regret when they think of making a wrong choice and this anticipation is 
considered when making decisions. The fear of regret can therefore lead to risk-seeking in 
attempt to breakeven and risk aversion in a threat-coping fashion. The last is the protection 
motivation theory developed by Rogers (1975, 1983). Rogers (1975) first developed the theory 
                                                 
3 A descriptive theory of risk taking in which individuals, due to diminishing sensitivity for absolute quantities, are 
both risk averse for gains and risk seeking in the domain of losses. An important metric is reference-dependency 
where changes in the reference point often lead to reversals of preference (Lichtenstein and Slovic, 1971; Tversky 
and Kahneman, 1991). Thus, evaluation and perception of the decision outcomes will depend on the initial wealth of 




to explain fear appeals and extended it into a cognitive model for studying the effects of 
persuasive communication on behaviour (Rogers, 1983). The protection motivation theory 
describes adaptive and maladaptive coping with a health threat from two appraisal processes 
(Boer and Seydel, 1996). An individual resorts to a threat and a coping appraisal process leading 
to adaptive responses such as protecting oneself or maladaptive responses such as failing to 
protect oneself.  
 Focusing on loss aversion theory The loss aversion theory is closer and more 
appropriate to the mechanisms advocated for PA and CT in this study. Therefore, it better 
illustrates the approach-avoidance mechanism since decisions relate to the perception of threats 
(such as the threat of loss) in the commercialization environment. In effect, there is the need to 
elaborate a little on it. One implication of loss aversion is that individuals have a strong tendency 
to remain at the status quo, because the disadvantages of leaving it loom larger than the 
advantages.  In experiments, Burmeister and Schade (2007) find that entrepreneurs are as 
affected by the status quo as students but less affected than bankers. Some studies show that fear 
or myopic loss aversion causes employees to forgo substantial financial gains by investing their 
retirement in safe bond or money market funds rather than in equities even though the long-term 
return of equities is often many times higher (Benartzi and Thaler, 1995; Gneezy and Potters, 
1997; Thaler, Tversky, Kahnerman and Schwartz, 1997). 
In relation to this study, when entrepreneurs perceive loss of control, avoidance strategies 
will include preferring or choosing among commercialization strategies that preserve prior 
control (the status quo) and avoiding choices that reduce prior control. In addition to influencing 
the commercialization stage the control tendency also applies to the development stage of the 




acquire part-ownership of the innovation. Such outsiders will include design or fabrication 
experts who propose significant changes to the design as well as financiers who contribute 
substantial development funds. Anecdotal evidence from personal interviews with Canadian 
inventors indicates that some will rather avoid such partners and delay the development process 
despite being aware of the potentially-adverse implications for the technology. However, most 
concede that due to current regrettable experiences; they will consider partnering or collaborating 
on their next project at an early stage.  
Further, one relevant and related research area where the loss aversion theory is 
employed is the endowment effect phenomenon. The endowment effect concerns the increase in 
the value of a good and therefore resistance to exchange the good when it becomes a part of a 
person’s endowment (Kahneman, Knetsch, and Thaler, 1990, 1991; Thaler, 1980). Several 
studies suggest that emotional attachment, through loss aversion, plays a role in the endowment 
effect (Ariely and Simonson, 2003; Carmon, Wertenbroch, and Zeelenberg, 2003; Dhar and 
Wertenbroch, 2000; Strahilevitz and Loewenstein, 1998; Ariely, Huber, and Wertenbroch, 2005). 
Following this view, the argument for the effect of PA on CT will be stronger in the 
entrepreneurship case than in the endowment effect case. I cite this evidence again: Norton and 
Ariely (2005) show that people value goods more highly when they invest their own labour in 
creating them. The authors show that novices who make origami value their creations as highly 
as those made by experts and, individuals who make self-built Legos value it more highly than 
sets built by others. Generally, an individual’s reaction towards the good/object will be similar in 
both cases. However, in the entrepreneurship case, the good is not just endowed to the individual 
but is self-conceived and developed by the individual.  In other words, if individuals are so 




with control over a created object, an object of ones labour and investment of self, as in the case 
of the entrepreneur.  
In the forgoing, it was established that the perception of loss can influence a CT, leading 
to avoidance behaviour. I conclude the section with a summary of the mechanism through which 
PA will influence CT in the evaluation of the microeconomic environment, during 
commercialization attempts. I use Figure 6 to provide a graphic picture of this summary. Figure 
6 provides the processes that developers will go through from the opportunity recognition and 
development stages to the commercialization stage and the affective mechanisms for the effect of 
PA leading to a CT.  
 
Figure 6 












Affective experiences during opportunity recognition and development contribute to an 
affectional tie between the entrepreneur and the opportunity. In line with attachment theory, the 
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PA is assumed to lead to a higher sensitivity to threats from the commercialization environment 
(shown in the left panel of Figure 6). The commercialization stage presents a very strategic point 
in the technology entrepreneurial process where important decisions need to be made about what 
market options to adopt. Due to the latent sensitivity to threats (middle panel of Figure 6), 
transaction costs, the issues with information asymmetry, etc, the developer is primed to sense a 
possible loss of control in future interactions with outsiders (as seen in right panel of Figure 6).  
The threat of loss and the complicity of agency problems initiate a coping mechanism which 
urges avoidance of strategies that relinquish control of the opportunity and reduce the affectional 
tie with the opportunity (right bottom panel of Figure 6). In other words, a threat of loss 
introduces a tendency to seek control. Thus, since the affectional tie encourages sensitivity to 
threats, an affectional tie (PA) will generally motivate a CT (middle bottom panel of Figure 6). 
However, the presence of an actual threat is expected to increase CT further.  
 




3.1.5. Moderated Relationship between Psychological Attachment and Control 
 
As already noted, the threat of loss is expected to influence the perception of future 
control or lack of control in the commercialization environment. The argument was that, issues 
of, and concerns about, transaction costs emanating from economic situations such as 
asymmetric information and perceptions of loss of control will provide threatening signals. In 
effect, threat is treated as a moderator of the relationship between PA and CT. When the 
perception of threat is high, a stronger relationship between PA and CT is expected. The 




perceived threats: anticipatory and anticipated responses (Loewenstein et al., 2001). The 
illustrations employ the specific-emotions approach4 rather than the global positive-negative 
valence approach (Johnson and Tversky, 1983; Wright and Bower, 1992). Specific emotions 
have been shown to elicit specific appraisals (Lerner and Keltner, 2000, 2001; Tiedens and 
Linton, 2001) and are appropriate for this study since the concepts of PA and CT will elicit 
specific affective reactions such as fear and dread. Figure 7 presents an illustration of the 
moderating effects of anticipated and anticipatory emotions on the relationship between PA and 
CT. 
 
Figure 7  





3.1.5.1.     Moderating Effect of Anticipated Emotions on the Relationship between PA and CT 
Anticipated emotions are emotions that are not currently experienced but are expected to 
be experienced in the future. Research on emotion and rationality (Elster, 1996, 1998) as well as 
emotions and decisions under risk and uncertainty (Bell, 1982, 1985; Loomes and Sugden, 1982, 
1987; Mellers et. al., 1997, 1999) employ this category of emotions. Essentially, people are seen 
as “consequentialist” in the manner in which they consider the future in making some decisions 
                                                 
4 Studies on emotions in recent years argue for the importance of studying specific emotions (DeSteno, Petty, Wegener, and 
Rucker, 2000; Lerner and Keltner, 2000, 2001; Tiedens and Linton, 2001; Lerner, Gonsalez, Small, and Fischhoff, 2003). One 
example is the appraisal tendency theory (Lerner and Keltner, 2000). This approach moves away from past research, which 
modelled emotions in a global positive-negative valence paradigm (Johnson and Tversky, 1983; Isen and Patrick, 1983; Wright 
and Bower, 1992). For instance, Lerner and Keltner (2001) show that fear and anger influence judgments of risk in opposite 
ways. Thus, fearful individuals make pessimistic judgments about future events while angry individuals seem to make optimistic 
judgments. 
Psychological attachment Control tendency  





in the present (Loewenstein, et. al., 2001). Typical emotions that are expected to be experienced 
considering the future outcomes of present decisions are disappointment or regret that may arise 
from counterfactual comparisons (Bell, 1982, 1985; Loomes and Sugden, 1982, 1987; Mellers, 
Schwartz, Ho and Ritov, 1997; Mellers, Schwartz and Ritov, 1999; Baron, 2000).  
For instance, entrepreneurs making decisions within this framework may be reluctant to 
adopt a strategy of cooperating with an outsider, fearing expropriation or infringement on the 
rights to their idea. Such reluctance might result from perceived disappointment and regret in the 
future states considered. Thus, entrepreneurs may seek to control the situation to avert perceived 
undesirable outcomes. As noted by Skinner (1996), control tends to be considered in terms of its 
effectiveness in interactions with the environment. As a result, control outcomes have often been 
equated to changing the external world to fit the demands and wishes of the individual 
(Rothbaum et al., 1982) and also when dealing with the multiple consequences of the outcome.  
 
H4a: Anticipated emotional reactions to perceived threats will positively moderate the 
relationship between psychological attachment and control tendency 
 
3.1.5.2. Moderating Effect of Anticipatory Emotions on the Relationship between PA and CT 
Anticipatory emotions, however, are immediate visceral reactions and mood states such 
as fear, anxiety, worry and dread of uncertainties and risks. The “moment of truth” when the 
entrepreneur has to decide on a commercialization option, given perceptions of threat in the 
market environment, is likely to evoke emotions that will affect the choice made. Affective states 
enable individuals to seek mood-congruent information (Bower and Cohen, 1982; Blaney, 1986). 




higher probabilities on positive events (Wright and Bower, 1992) and affect the process of 
information retrieval, e.g. complexity reduction (Isen and Means, 1983). Baron (2008) cites 
similar work in his review of the role of affect in entrepreneurship.  
Further, for entrepreneurs, anticipatory emotions will take input from memories from the 
development period. Difficult, exciting, and anxious experiences of self or others during problem 
solving and feasibility studies may stay in the entrepreneur’s limbic system5 and be evoked by 
perceptions of threat. Adverse experiences are expected to loom larger and stay longer than 
pleasant ones. For instance, Lowenstein et al (2001) note that fear responses could be evoked by 
crude or subliminal cues and fear conditioning may be permanent or last longer than other types 
of learning. Thus, in addition to pleasant memories, adverse circumstances resulting from 
persistence in the development of the opportunity such as divorce or bankruptcy may result in 
precautionary and self-protective behaviour (safeguarding the idea – the only consolation left). 
Studies have shown that individuals tend to develop precautionary and self-protective behaviour 
towards issues where they have previously had a personal experience that led to adverse 
consequences (Kunreuther, et al., 1978; Weinstein, 1989; Browne and Hoyt, 2000).  
 
H4b: Anticipatory emotional reactions to perceived threats will positively moderate the 
relationship between psychological attachment and control tendency 
 
 This chapter introduced the constructs, outlined conceptual underpinnings and provided 
expected relationships between the constructs of psychological attachment, cognitive evaluation, 
                                                 
5 The limbic system is a term for a set of brain structures including the hippocampus and amygdala that support a 
variety of functions including emotion, behaviour and long term memory 




and control tendency. The next chapter identifies methodological issues and statistical analyses 



































4.1   Methodology and Analysis  
4.1.1. Domain of Study  
 
There are a number of decision making areas in the commercialization or market entry 
domain where the behavioural effects of PA and CT can be studied. However, due to the nature 
of the constructs involved (such as attachment and control), there was the need to consider 
laboratory-type studies where the potential effects of alternative hypotheses could be minimized. 
Prior to describing the study population and the rationale for the sample choice, the following 
provides insight into preparation for conceptualization of the constructs identified.  
4.1.2. Preliminary Work  
A background study on CT included a study of responses to two sets of semi-structured 
interviews, one with 13 actual independent inventors and the other with a sample of subjects 
used for this study (post-study). The independent inventors were selected randomly from a pool 
of 1,776 independent Canadian inventors based on close proximity (driving distance of 150 kms) 
to the interviewer. The interviews were mainly unstructured, but with probing questions on the 
origins of the idea; development and financing; the inventor’s personal situation and experiences; 
plans developed and actions taken; expectations for the invention; achievements, 
disappointments and failures, market outlook and future plans. On the question of what triggered 
the idea, the respondents recounted stories of conceiving the idea from recreational endeavours, 
house chores or professional experience. Most of the descriptions indicated ‘Eureka’ kinds of 
moments during the inventive process: the type of moments that can spur emotional attachment. 




or playing a role in the decisions that inventors made. In the following accounts, I provide 
portions of transcripts on various issues in the commercialization process.  
Independent Inventor interviews The first issue deals with inventors’ reservations about 
members of the value chain such as manufacturers and distributors. Almost all the respondents 
whose products were near or at the market stage expressed some reservations towards the 
distribution and marketing channels. One respondent, having pulled his product off the shelves 
due to dissatisfaction with returns, had this to say about his search for a new distributor: “……so 
I’m still in the process of finding that perfect relationship corporately”. The product in question 
was a simple household fixture with very little potential for long term market success. Without a 
patent and being very easy to copy, the product did not possess characteristics that afforded a 
pause in sales for any length of time. Hence the decision to pull it off the market and spend a 
considerable period of time searching for a new distributor was economically inefficient.  
The second inventor commented on a similar situation. He had stocks of supplies for his 
product in storage at the time of the interview and marketing efforts had seized for a long time. 
This is what he has to say: “Yes, there’s that issue [not wanting to discuss with outsiders] again, 
and do I want to go through that?, because I would kick myself if I did do that and the product 
was then developed by somebody else, and I’d be left with nothing”. Asked if trying to get a 
distributor was not a better strategy than hording the pieces in storage, he responded “I suppose, 
I don’t want anyone else benefiting from it without me…but, I don’t know, maybe I just don’t 
trust people enough, I just, and maybe that’s part of my problem, I have to get over that hurdle 
but, I don’t know, I don’t know what I am going to do” 
Another inventor made comments concerning intellectual property (IP) protection which 




increase cooperation due to the IP strengthening the inventor’s bargaining power. A patent on the 
idea should assure and encourage the inventor to be willing to engage a host of outsiders with the 
aim of finding an efficient commercialization strategy. However, the transcript from this inventor 
suggests otherwise: “………you know, when you start an idea and you start a product and 
you’re using…and you apply for intellectual property protection and you get patents granted in 
the United States and Canada and you get trademarks granted in United States and Canada, 
you’re pretty close to the idea and you are pretty close to the product and you are very leery 
about who comes in to work with you and you want to protect it…. so was I over protective and 
missed out on some opportunities?, maybe, I don’t know”  
One striking note to make of this inventor’s comments is that he starts being “protective” 
after obtaining patents, not before. The implication is that IP protection reinforces that feeling of 
ownership and the claim over rights to the idea, evoking protective tendencies that are 
characteristic of PA. As noted above, a stronger bargaining position from IP protection was 
expected to make the inventor “open” to outsiders and not be overly protective. The respondent’s 
partner continues: “Well, probably we did because when you are trying to keep everything close 
to, close to yourself, you sometimes get a bit of a tunnel vision and you don’t see that maybe 
there are…but again, it’s the caution thing where you are being cautious, maybe a little too 
cautious, and probably, if you were…just in hindsight today...I think that we would look at 
bringing someone in, maybe to ease some of the financial burden, but again, it’s got to be 
someone that you totally trust and is pretty much thinking…either they’re thinking along the 
same lines as you and they are a partner as such, or they’re just a silent partner and don’t want 
anything to do with it” The last parts of the response point to the need to consider level of trust in 




literature review sections of this thesis and included as a control variable in the analysis section. 
However, since respondents are being asked to respond to hypothetical scenarios, disposition to 
trust and not actual trust was operationalized.  
In another transcript, the inventor commented on his feelings towards commercialization 
efforts that may tarnish his personal image through a reduction in the quality of the product. 
Although logical and expected, his concerns indicate a level of connection he shares with the 
idea which I believe points to a possible attachment. When asked whether his want of control 
over the idea was responsible for his seemingly low tolerance for cooperation, the inventor had 
this to say: “I would say, yes.  And I’m [control-oriented]…and as years pass I get less and less 
concerned about it.  Certainly at the beginning I had to control everything…..if I were to have it 
made in China I would be very concerned about product quality.  Because I do look at it as its 
got my name written on it and I want it to work as I would expect it to work when a consumer 
picks it up, pumps it up and down in the tub, I expect it to work for them.  So yeah, I take it very 
personally.  That’s one of the reasons I don’t do any of the sales…I do very few sales calls.  
There has been some, where they want to speak to the guy who made it. And I have been a little 
bit involved in the whole Canadian Tire thing.  But I typically leave all of that up to my wife and 
to my buddy [name omitted] because in the sales business there’s tons of rejection.  And I hate 
it…because you are beating up on my baby“.  This response also shows the difficulty with which 
inventors take critical evaluation of their creations. It has the potential to determine their level of 
susceptibility to feedback from evaluators. If inventors tend to dismiss critical but useful 
evaluation feedback, because it stabs their ego, their ability to improve on their inventions will 
be limited. On another hand, the inventor’s response suggests that his control orientation 




In addition to aversion to manufacturers, distributors and potential imitators, inventors 
indicated reservations towards financiers taking control of their ideas. The perception of losing 
control is instrumental in this study in terms of the commercialization strategies that inventors 
adopt. In this example where the inventor talked about financing the commercialization effort, he 
had this to day; “We’ve also looked at Venture Capital and different people like that.  But to go 
into that level is an entrepreneurial step back because they basically want 3/4 of the company, 
right?  So you kind of go, no I don’t really think I want to go there”. There was a clear reluctance 
to consider venture capital (VC) funding due to reservations towards high VC equity stake 
conditions. In effect, the VC agent’s ability to raise the much needed funds for the company is 
entirely ignored. High attachment is capable of blurring the perception or even knowledge of an 
outsider’s potential to support commercialization goals.  
Similarly, another inventor who was initially more accepting of VC financing reported 
disappointment with the process at the end.  This inventor had spent about 20 years developing 
various improvements and applications of the idea. Rather than resisting cooperation, this 
inventor embraced cooperation and regretted doing so. “In our attempts to get funding in 
Vancouver, people in Seattle became aware of this and they ended up funding,...they put in 
$3million… we moved, shut down the operations in Guelph, moved it to Seattle and they took 
control of the whole thing.  They eventually sold it for 20 million dollars and [the firm] is now 
going to commercialize it.  But in the process I lost control and my net financial reward for this 
was $170, 000. So the inventor did not get well rewarded at all.  Fortunately this is only first of a 
series of technologies and I’m now working on the next ones with the hope that having done it 
once it should be easy to do it a second time.  The Ontario Government is acutely aware of all 




all to the west coast, and were unable to do anything to help.  But it’s being used in example now 
why government programs should be changed to try and encourage this type of thing happening 
in Ontario, rather than moving it” 
The inventor’s decision to cooperate was influenced by the choices he had available at 
the time. Rather than hold on to control and risk bankruptcy, he decided to cooperate with 
potential financiers risking takeover of control from him. However, the loss of control initiated a 
set of events that created discontent: “When you lose control, you have no bargaining power at 
all, and we lost control when the Americans put the money in……. there was no choice.  It was 
either that or go bankrupt.  If you go bankrupt, then they pick it all up for nothing.  So, we just 
weren’t in a strong bargaining position, we just could not raise the money and by the time we 
raised it, we were out of it. And a lot of these investment people, the venture capitalists, enjoy 
this messiness; it just increases their leverage.  So they made their fantastic returns.  Out of the 
$20 million, the guy who put the $3 million in, he got $12 million.  The guy they put in as CEO 
got $2 million, so there’s 14 of the 20 million gone right there.  The US government took 2 
million in taxes, so we’re down to 4 million,… that is what we got out of the whole thing, the 
Canadian group and over those years we put in it, we put in about $4 million so we got our 
money back, big deal! 
…………. No incentive at all, very frustrating.  But, better to see technology go than to have it 
just fail. It’s a nightmare, an absolute nightmare. The biggest frustration is the money people are 
only interested in one thing…making money.  They don’t give a damn about anything else.  So 
they don’t care that I can’t carry on, they don’t care about job creation, they don’t care about 
anything, they just want to make their money. They get their 40% rate of return, bang!, that’s 




government, if they are going to do anything about encouraging innovation and 
commercialization and have it stay here in Canada, they’ve got to address some of these 
problems head on.  Up to now, they have not been able to address the problems that need to be 
addressed” 
 Clearly, VCs want good return on investment and their actions may not necessarily 
constitute attempts to expropriate returns from inventors. Once a venture financing process goes 
through multiple stages, share dilution is expected to leave the inventor with low and 
unsatisfactory returns. However, of particular interest is being aware and perceiving this situation 
prior to closing financing deals. Accurately reading the VC capitalization sheet will show the 
extent of share dilution and associated returns at the end of the day. However, it is likely that the 
discontent will creep in at the end when the returns are compared with the investments. 
Nevertheless, the interesting point is that inventors who are able to predict their reaction or 
feeling at that end state might reconsider the decision to accept VC investment (see from the 
empirical evidence presented earlier). Therefore, although VC financing of some inventions is 
the most appropriate route to commercialization, the perception of VC “expropriative” 
tendencies may leave many inventors wanting to avoid them and explore sub-optimal financing 
avenues.    
The last issue identified in the inventor interviews is the indication that some inventors do 
perceive their attachment to the idea or want of control over the rights to the idea as well as the 
possible negative consequences on decision making. For an illustration, this inventor noted that 
he was making efforts to emotionally disengage from the project: “I am trying to remove myself 
from my idea because I know how dangerous it is to be possessive of it. I am ready to listen to 




realize their strong commitment to their ideas and its potentially negative effects on decision 
making, yet do nothing to counterbalance with objectivity.  Realizing the attachment, this 
inventor perceives the potential to err in assessing commercialization options and therefore 
decides to remove self from the idea to allow a more effective evaluation of commercialization 
issues. His attitude points to a potential remedy for control-oriented behaviour being 
disengagement from the idea. This concept is not researched in this thesis.  
Study subject interviews The second set of interviews involved five (5) individuals from 
the pool of subjects used for this study. The subject pool is taken from a final year engineering 
design class in one of Canada’s top technology-oriented universities – University of Waterloo. 
Subjects worked in groups of four or five to develop a novel idea with proven consumer need. 
The sample is described in more detail in the next section. However, the interviews were 
conducted after the study and interviewees were asked to respond to questions on the origins of 
the idea, experiences during the development process, instances of excitement and frustrations 
and their personal views on PA and CT; with respect to their own experiences and with respect 
to the experiences of others.  
Most of the descriptions pointed to technological innovation. One respondent noted: “The 
intent was to come up with a high-tech solution with some marketing potential”. Respondents 
indicated that attachment was likely if the idea was something they were passionate about from 
the beginning rather than if it was suggested by someone else in their group. One respondent 
commented: “Personally, I'm not too attached to the project.  It wasn't the idea that I came up 
with…the one I was most excited about.” Respondents indicated that they believed people could 
be attached to new ideas in which they invest. Sample responses were as follows. “I think that 




[which I was most interested in], I would have been more attached to it.” Another commented, 
“It depends on the motivation behind their development. There can conceivably be three in my 
opinion: something to pass the course, something to market, or something revolutionary... the 
last motive will definitely cause emotional attachment. I think any could apply to any group, 
depending on the idea they came up with in time for the proposal submission.” 
 The respondents were also of the view that the projects may not involve the high level of 
investment expected of full-time technology developers so attachment might not be high. 
However, they indicated that they believed emotional investment in the idea may develop an 
attachment to the idea and there was the potential for this attachment to affect the decision 
making process with likely dire consequences. One respondent commented: “I don't think it's 
beneficial to keep control for emotional reasons. It should depend on interest and potential 
revenue”. Another commented: “I'm not sure... My father is an entrepreneur, and I know how 
attachment limits marketing potential due to insistence on control and resistance to sharing. It 
will depend on how the majority of the group feels. If enough people want to participate in future 
development, we will keep control, otherwise, perhaps we should sell all of it”. Clearly, although 
respondents wouldn’t say they were highly attached to the idea (social desirability effect) they 
perceive the possibility of attachment to the project and also realise that attachment may have 
negative consequences on revenue generation. Two samples of these transcripts are provided in 
the Appendix 3. Together, these two sets of interview cases (independent inventors and subjects 
in this study) provide insight and anecdotal support for the concept of CT and PA at the 
commercialization stage while informing on elements that aided in the development of the 




Secondary search effort To complement the first-hand anecdotal evidence of attachment 
and control in idea and venture creation, a search was conducted on Proquest research database 
through the University of Waterloo library website. Keying in the words “invention” and 
“inventor” and indicating multiple databases as search source, Proquest provides pages of 
academic, business and regular articles (on empirical studies and business cases), as well as news 
items (on inventions and inventors). Empirical research publications often referred to 
cooperation with outsiders as a strategic approach to commercialization while business articles 
often cited idea developers’ want for control to attain pecuniary and non pecuniary gains even 
when they lacked the resources to do so. For the subjects in these stories, if by a stroke of luck, 
or extraordinary execution of strategy, they succeed, they were hailed as entrepreneurial heroes. 
Idea creation was also often described as a positively and negatively exciting process with stories 
depicting Eureka moments, emotional attachment, perceptions and exaggeration of threats, 
overcoming threats in various ways –many of the notions that have been expressed in theorizing 
PA and CT in this study.  
There were stories on perseverance both at the individual and at the corporate level, 
perseverance which is likely to result from a certain level of attachment and be impacted by 
affective influences on behaviour. On the corporate level, the accounts were sometimes on 
“product champions” such as in the Sony Walkman and 3M’s Post It Note cases where the 
champions defied business analysts’ negative feedback and pressed on to push the ideas to 
market. In the case of the Sony Walkman, the perseverance of its product champion, Akio 
Morita, is well noted. He is reported to have said: “I do not believe that any amount of market 
research could have told us that the Sony Walkman would be successful, not to say a sensational 




latent consumer need by providing people with an innovative product they hadn't known they 
needed. In the case of the Post It Note, there were accounts of perseverance on the part of Dr. 
Spence Silver, inventor of the adhesive, Arthur Fry, who discovered the Post It application, and 
Geoff Nicholson, the product champion in upper management (all of the 3M Company). 
Through their individual and collective perseverance they were able to chart a winning course 
through the corporate minefield despite the “doomed to fail” predictions they received in 
feedback. Fortunately in their case, the product was successful and is one of 3M’s famous 
inventions.   
Accounts of individual cases of perseverance, most strongly explainable by some type of 
attachment to the idea, were also available. There is the story of Thomas Edison, the inventor 
accredited with the invention of the light bulb, who is also noted for saying “invention is 95% 
perspiration and 5% inspiration”. Despite reports of rampant failure in developing inventions, 
Edison is widely regarded as a very accomplished and successful inventor. Others were not so 
lucky. One such account is the story of Robert Kearns who waged a protracted legal battle 
against auto manufacturers for hijacking his intermittent windshield wiper technology. After 
winning and losing some of the cases, his net winnings went to pay legal fees. His frustrations, 
the various reports noted, were because “He had hoped not just to collect royalties but make the 
devices himself”. One of the US district judges who presided over five of his trials was reported 
to have said "His zeal got ahead of his judgment." Finally, there was the story of a Chicago man 
who shot and killed three people at a law firm in 2006. The Chicago Tribune reported that 
“sources said they believed the shooter was a disgruntled former client of the attorney he had 
asked to see. Joe Jackson, 59, told police, before he was shot, that he had been cheated over a 




shooter’s behaviour, the story is an indication of how far some people will go to protect the fruit 
of their creative endeavours.  
 On the whole, the preliminary exercises provided insight into the creative process, 
concerns, issues, organisation, and management of the creative environment. Such insight was 
useful in helping identify appropriate and fitting concepts to investigate for this study. It was also 
useful in providing motivation for arguments and ideas on how to operationalize concepts 
theorised.  
4.1.3. Participant Population  
The participant population for the study is made up of students recruited from the area of 
engineering design. The rationale for recruiting from this population was to ensure that subjects 
were all at an equal level of creative endeavour and were developing products that had minimal 
technical variability. Specifically, the study sample was from the ECE 492A class of the 
University of Waterloo (UW) (see Appendix 4 for more details on design projects). Subjects 
were engaged in opportunity identification and development in a manner close, in process, to 
what actual technology entrepreneurs encounter.  The project curriculum requires that students 
develop a novel design project following strict design rules. Project deliverables include a project 
specification, design block verification, a detailed design, prototype testing, prototype 
demonstration, and an experience report6. The projects are developed in groups of four or five 
and receive support in the areas of lab space, machine shop, educational discounts, student 
research funds and sponsorship in-cash and in-kind from companies such as Microsoft or 
through the university. The groups are also given direction on patenting and commercialization 
                                                 




by firms associated with the program after development. At the time of the study, they had not 
received any such direction.  
The subjects engage and develop their design projects in an environment with a high 
level of commercializable research productivity. The indication is that the quality of the projects 
is high and the commercialization of successful projects is encouraged, mostly due to the 
“creator owns it” intellectual property policy of the university.  To gain an understanding of the 
technology environment of the university and the impact of its intellectual property, consider a 
report that was produced by PricewaterhouseCoopers (PwC) in 2001 from an effort to document 
and quantify the economic impact of UW on the economy of the Waterloo Region. Comparing 
with a 1999 Statistics Canada report, the PwC report indicates that UW accounts for over 22% of 
all spin-offs in Canada, generating over 100 of the 454 spin-offs from 84 universities across the 
country. The report indicates that when the definition of the transfer of technological resources is 
broadened to include the transfer of intellectual resources, 250 spin-off companies with some 
level of attribution to UW were identified. Essentially, UW boasts of a more than 25-year old 
legacy of spin-off companies including reputable companies such as Waterloo Maple, Open Text 
Corp. and Dalsa Inc.  
The university also has the largest co-operative education enrolment of any university in 
the world, enrolling about 10,000 students across multiple faculties in the year 2000 
(PricewaterhouseCoopers, 2001). Among prominent beneficiaries of this coop system are 
Microsoft, Google and RIM, makers of Blackberry (RIM is also located one block away from the 
university). In fact, the coop option is mandatory for the subject group and they are expected to 
complete a minimum of six (6) work terms (2 and a half years of work experience) throughout 




a minimum of four (4) work terms and an average of five (5). The coop placements equip 
subjects with different skill-sets as they are exposed to engineering design tools in industry. 
Further, the flexible intellectual property policy of UW, the spin-off track record of UW 
and the coop experience of the students has implications for the projects they develop. On such 
implication is that most projects will have a considerable commercialization value and some of 
the groups or developers will endeavour to develop ventures on their projects. Although there is 
no hard data on the number of projects attempting commercialization or leading to start-ups, the 
ratio is considered to be close to 50% if not more (personal conversation with program director). 
From this viewpoint it is not unreasonable to posit that the quality of some, if not a significant 
number, of these projects match the average quality of technology innovations developed by 
independent inventors or start-up project teams in industry. Hence the sample group provides 
significant benefits in terms of costs and access, etc, to studying the concept of attachment in 
technology entrepreneurship.   
Further support for the relevance of the subject group emanates from the approach to the 
formation of the groups, which bears similarity to the structure of technology teams or start-up 
firms. Post-survey interviews revealed that most project groups are set up by individuals who 
had recognized an opportunity and needed “experts” to form a team to develop the idea. Thus, 
group members typically possessed complementary skills in the different areas of product 
engineering. However, the group efforts threaten biasing the subjects’ responses due to different 
kinds of group psychological effects or biases. To prevent or reduce these biases, survey 
questions elicited individual evaluations and subjects were instructed to concentrate on their 
individual perceptions and discard any group views they might hold. Subjects were also asked to 




(excluding themselves) to acquire total ownership of the project technology. The procedure of 
thinking about the task and writing down the amount is expected to evoke a sense of ownership 
that will encourage individual judgement in the survey. In addition to these characteristics of the 
sample, the subject pool also theoretically ensures variance in the attachment measure since 
some students are normally actively involved and heavily emotionally invested in the project 
while others are not. 
4.1.4. Descriptive Analysis: Participant Population  
Survey Online surveys were sent to subjects twice with email reminders sent on a weekly 
basis for a period of three weeks. The first survey captured background and control factors and 
the second captured research measures identified for the study. The second survey was sent two 
weeks after the first ended. At the end of the second survey, of 248 contacts, 106 students 
responded culminating in a response rate of 43%. Out of the 106 responses, 89 students 
completed the surveys with 60 participating in the first and second while 29 participated only in 
the second. There were no significant differences between those who participated in both surveys 
and those who participated only in the second survey. Also, dividing the sample between ‘early’ 
and ‘late’ respondents, led to no significant differences between the groups.  
Descriptive statistics The average age of subjects was 22 years, 83% were men and 17% 
women. The average number of hours spent on the project per week was 14 hours (Std. Dev.= 
12). More projects (30) fell within the “hi-tech equipment” category (21%) than in any other 
category. This category was followed by household or general consumer products, then games or 
toys, sports or leisure, and security or safety products. See the distribution of projects in the 
various categories in the Table 1 below. Subjects were allowed to choose more than one category 




Table 1  
Descriptive Statistics of Industries Categorization for Projects 
Industries – categories N % 
Environmental or Energy  6 4 
Automotive 10 7 
Sports or Leisure  16 11 
Games or toys 16 11 
Medical or health 11 8 
Tools 6 4 
Household or general 
consumer products 23 
16 
High tech equipment 30 21 
Security or safety  16 11 
Industrial equipment 4 3 
Other  8 5 
Total 146 100 
 
Participants generally ranked their knowledge of commercialization as low (Median=2, 
Std. Dev = 1) on a five-point Likert-type scale. The results are provided in Table 2 which shows 
percentages of subjects distributed among options of how much they knew about 
commercialization prior to the study. The question was “on a scale of 1 to 5, rank your 
knowledge of commercialization and attendant issues prior to this study.  About 63% reported 
knowing “little” (2) and “very little” (1) with 20% being neutral (3) and 16% knowing 
“something” (4) and 1% knowing “everything” (5). For those who indicated knowing about 
commercialization, in the two latter cases, their knowledge was gained from the following 
sources: 26% read about it, 20% attended a talk or seminar where commercialization was 
discussed, 11% took a course in which commercialization was incorporated, 24% did personal 
research, 20% learned about the topic on the job while none of the subjects had a personal 
commercialization experience.  Clearly, subjects did not know much about commercialization 




develop new ideas, and attempt to commercialize while learning about commercialization at the 
same time.  
Table 2  
Descriptive Statistics of Sources of Commercialization Knowledge  
Source of Knowledge  %
Reading about it 26
Seminar/public lecture 20
took a course 11
personal research 24
Previous experience from a job 20
Previous personal experience  0
Total   100
 
4.1.4. Measures and Analysis: The Dimensions of Psychological Attachment   
 
Measure: The Dimensions of Psychological Attachment  
Hypothetical items Since psychological attachment cannot be directly measured, it is 
expected that when the unobservable magnitude is measured with a scale of hypothetical items, 
the resulting measure will capture the true score of the construct (see Appendix 1 for scale 
development process).  The strength and quantity of psychological attachment is believed to 
cause the hypothetical items to take on certain values (DeVellis, 1991). Each item then gives an 
indication of the strength of psychological attachment.  
Therefore, hypothetical items were designed for the two dimensions identified in the 
theory section. Positive affective states and self-identity-enhancing affective states were the two 
dimensions of PA identified in the theory section. For the positive-experiences dimension, items 




negative experience, “I am personally experiencing a lot of frustrations working on this project”. 
The self-identity dimension comprised of items such as “The project reflects who I am” and its 
reverse written item “The project does not reflect who I am” (See Appendix 2 for study 
instrument). 
Pre-tests led to the refinement and removal of some of the items and this process was 
based on inter-item correlations and interviews with a sample of pre-test respondents. The 
refined list of items was measured on a five-point Likert-type scale: subjects rated agreement 
from 1 (strongly disagree) to 5 (strongly agree). The latent items were randomly presented and 
mixed with filler items. For validation purposes, PA was also measured “directly” with the item 
“I feel emotionally attached to this idea” and a reverse coded version on a five point scale. 
However, due to the importance of the construct development process, there is the need to 
illustrate further, the mechanism behind the use of hypothetical items. To arrive at an efficient 
scale for the construct, there is the need to consider the issues of validity and reliability.  
Validity Validity is considered a vital aspect of psychological tests (Anastasi and Urbina, 
1997) and is instrumental in ensuring the value of the construct under study. Validity refers to 
the truthfulness of findings and if the measures used capture what was planned or what was 
expected to be measured.  Cronbach (1971) describes validation as a process used by the test 
developer to collect evidence that supports the types of inferences to be made from the test 
scores. Crocker and Algina (1986) identified three types of validity: content, criterion-related and 
construct validity7.  The other type of validity is face validity, which looks at an evaluation by 
the researcher or an external expert to examine the extent to which the survey instrument 
measures what was intended to be measured.  
                                                 
7 Validity was reduced from four categories to three by the American Psychological Association (1954) with criterion-related 




Elaborating on the various types of validity, content validity assesses whether the items in 
the inventory adequately represent psychological attachment or if inference could be drawn from 
test scores to a larger domain. Criterion-related validity encompasses predictive and concurrent 
validity and deals with the ability to draw inference about a test score to performance on a real 
behavioural variable that has practical importance. Construct validity is for drawing inference 
from a test score to performances that can be grouped under a particular psychological construct, 
such as PA. Construct validity is therefore the extent to which the items are tapping into the 
underlying theory or model of behaviour in conceptualising psychological attachment. Further, 
construct validity consists of convergent validity which deals with how well the items belong 
together or discriminant validity which deals with how well the items distinguish different 
respondents on the measures. Some researchers have argued that construct validity comprises 
both content and criterion-related validity (Shepperd, 1993; Anastasi, 1986). In this study, 
construct validity is the main type of validity investigated in measuring PA. To investigate the 
convergent and discriminant validity the affective items were taken through a factor analysis 
(Thurstone, 1931). 
Reyment and Joreskog (1993) describe factor analysis as a generic term used to describe 
a number of methods aimed at analysing the interrelationship between a set of variables resulting 
in fewer hypothetical variables called factors8. This is based on the assumption that the observed 
                                                 
8 DeVellis (1991) identifies three purposes for doing a factor analysis on a set of items. The first purpose is to help the 
investigator to determine how many latent variables underlie a set of items. The second purpose is to provide a means of 
explaining variation among relatively many original variables or items from a few newly created variables or the factors. The 
third purpose is to define the substantive content or meaning of the factors (i.e. latent variables) that account for the variation 
among a larger set of items. The substantive content or meaning of the latent variables could be defined by identifying groups of 




or measured values are linear combinations of some underlying source variables or factors. There 
are two types of factor analysis: exploratory and confirmatory factor analysis9.  
Exploratory factor analysis is appropriate for this study because the items developed need 
to be accessed in terms for their affinity to the dimensions that were theorised. The process of 
exploratory factor analysis initially involves analyzing the fit of the model after producing factor 
loadings. Factor loadings represent the relationship of a specific variable to a specific factor 
without the influence of other variables (Stevens, 1992). Since factors are latent aggregates of the 
observed variable, the factor name will depict the aggregate. In order to determine the factors 
underlying the variables, a variable reduction scheme is used (Gorsuch, 1983) resulting in a 
matrix of association which shows how the variables cluster together or are correlated with one 
another. Further, the factor loadings are determined through the process of rotation which 
indicates the simplest solution among a potentially infinite number of solutions that are equally 
compatible with the observed correlations (Kim and Mueller, 1978).  
Rotation gives a more interpretable solution for the factor loadings. In this study, the 
principal axis factor method10 is employed and among other methods, a scree plot of eigenvalues 
was evaluated to identify the number of factors to retain. There are several methods to determine 
how many factors to retain. The decision of the number of factors to be retained and the 
substantive meaning given to a factor are decisions that mainly stem from the researcher’s 
intuition. According Gorsuch (1983), it’s advisable to use a method that accounts for 70% of the 
total variance.  A statistical measure of association is then used to analyse the variance and 
                                                 
9 Exploratory factor analysis is a theory-generating study used to determine the number of existing factors and the pattern of their 
loadings (Stevens, 1992). Confirmatory factor analysis is a theory-confirming study with the measurement items based on 
theoretical or empirical foundation and the researcher’s ability to specify the exact factor model in advance (Stevens, 1992). 
10 Principal components were extracted through a process which amounts a variance maximizing (varimax) rotation of the 
original variable space. This type of rotation is called variance maximizing because the criterion for the rotation is to maximize 




covariance structures. The fit of the model depends on the level of convergent and discriminant 
validity. 
Results: The Dimensions of Psychological Attachment  
Factor analysis results An exploratory factor analysis was conducted with Varimax 
rotation.  The results reported in Table 3 contain factor loadings with Eigen values greater than 
one (Gorsuch, 1983). Without restricting the number of factors to compute, the process revealed 
two factor dimensions with the positive and self-identity affective states emerging as separate 
factors (Eigen values, 3.84 and 1.65). Judging from the structure of the loadings, there are 
indications of possible discriminant and convergent validity as the theoretical dimensions 
defined separate as well as group some latent items together.  Discriminant validity was verified 
by determining for each latent variable the extent to which the average variance extracted by the 
latent variable’s measures was larger than the latent variable’s shared variance with any other 
latent variable (Fornell and Larcker, 1981). The items for positive affective states seem to load 
together and separate from the items identified for the self-identity affective states. In terms of 














Results for Principal Component Analysis on Affective Latent Items for PA 
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I am personally experiencing a lot of frustrations 
working on this design project   0.91* 
Eigen value  3.17 2.27  
Percentage of variance explained 31.72 22.70  
Cumulative percentage of variance explained 31.72 54.42  
*Reported only for comparison sake, not as a separate factor 
NB: Values bold are those defining a factor 
(N, 60)   
 
Further, the negative affective item loaded on a separate dimension but since it is a single 
item, this loading is not analysed further than just to note that negative affect might relate 




loadings did not change much and the percentage variance improved (35% from 32% for positive 
affect and 25% from 23% for self-identity affect). The cumulative variance also improved (61% 
from 54%).   
Cross loading items Table 3 also indicates the specific hypothetical items that loaded on 
the dimensions. One could see items such as “I am experiencing a lot of exciting moments 
working on this design project” making the strongest presence in that dimension.  However, 
there appear to be cross-loading items. Some items loaded below 0.70 (although slightly above 
0.50) for the identified primary factor and above 0.30 (in two cases) for the cross-loading factor. 
Further, some items that should intuitively fall in the self-identity dimension are seen loading 
under the positive experience dimension. An example is “working through this project, I feel like 
a genius” While the argument could be made that the subjects may be concentrating mainly on 
the positive experience of feeling like a genius, the argument can also be made that the subject 
maybe be responding to the self-identity-enhancing aspect of feeling like a genius. Another 
factor loading with relative ambiguity is the item “I see my personal ideas in every aspect of the 
project”. Intuitively a similar argument could be made about this item. The subject may be 
responding with elation from seeing their personal ideas in the project or from the self-identity-
enhancing feeling from seeing their ideas in the project. Thus, there are some indications that 
some of the items identified for one dimension belong to another, and that some important items 
were left unidentified or that there is possibly just one dimension to psychological attachment. 
These possibilities are analysed by correlating the individual items with the average of the two-
item measure of attachment administered (reported in Table 4).  Before proceeding to that 




Reliability of the measure Reliability assesses the element of consistency if the study is 
repeated several times. DeVellis (1991) defines scale reliability as the proportion of variance 
attributable to the true score of the latent variable; a definition shared by the various reliability 
methods11. One common type of reliability is internal consistency reliability12. DeVellis notes 
that internal consistency deals with the homogeneity of the items comprising the scale. This is 
based on the notion that the relationships among variables are logically connected to the 
relationships the items have with the latent variable. If the items of a scale have a strong 
relationship to their latent variable, they will have a strong relationship to each other. A scale is 
therefore internally consistent by the level to which the items are highly intercorrelated. Thus, 
high-item correlations imply the items are measuring the same thing which indicates a strong 
link between the items and the latent variable. A commonly used measure of internal consistency 
is Cronbach’s (1951) coefficient alpha13,α  which denotes high internal consistency between 
items when α is closer to one (1). The internal consistency for the items of the positive affective 
dimension (Mean=3.13, Std Dev=0.76) was quite high (α =0.79). The self-identity-enhancing 
items (Mean=2.95, Std Dev=0.87) also recorded a high reliability (α =0.75). The average of the 
total set of items (hereafter referred to as the multiple-item measure) recorded an even higher 
internal consistency (α =0.82). This composite measure was computed as the average of all the 
individual items employed in the factor analysis (without the negative affective item) 
                                                 
11 There are different methods for measuring reliability (see Nunnally, 1978 and Crocker and Algina, 1986). Some methods 
identified are test-retest, multiple forms, inter-rater and split-half methods. The test-retest method administers the test instrument 
to the same study population at different points in time and reports a reliability coefficient computed from a correlation 
coefficient between the two scores of the population. The multiple forms method which is also known as parallel forms is the 
technique of mixing up the questions in the test instrument and presenting to the same study population twice. The split-half 
reliability, is estimated by analyzing half of the test instrument and comparing the results with the overall analysis on the full 
instrument. One example of this method is the Cronbach (1951) alpha 
12 Internal consistency is the convergent validity rule of unidimensionality while external consistency is the discriminant validity 
rule of unidimensionality. 
13 Alternative measures include composite factor reliability and average variance extracted. The composite factor reliability 
assesses whether there is a sufficient relationship between the scale items and their respective constructs. The average variance 





(Mean=3.10, Std Dev=0.68). Summing across the facets of a latent construct seems conceptually 
appropriate since the composite of the dimensions should relate to a diverse range of affective 
instances better than does one any one component dimension. Thus, the composite measure will 
contain more important information than any lower level information obtained (see Carver, 
1989).  Further, as noted in the previous paragraph, a two-item measure of PA (Mean=3.43, Std 
Dev=0.85) was also computed. Since only two items, this measure recorded a low internal 
consistency (α =0.30). The following provides further analysis on validation.  
Validity of the PA measure: The concept Further to the indications in the factor analysis 
of the possibility of achieving convergent and discriminant validity for the PA measure (in terms 
of the dimensions); additional analysis is conducted to investigate the issue of validity. An 
appropriate procedure is to collect data from independent samples and use these samples as 
validation samples to test for invariance of the factor structures across the calibration and the 
validation samples (Cudeck and Browne, 1983). However, due to the unavailability of validation 
samples, an “in-sample” test of validation was conducted. This involved testing the correlation 
between the multiple PA items used in the factor analysis and a two-item measure of PA (noted 
earlier). The multiple items were elicited in the first round and the two-item measure was 
administered three weeks after the first round of the survey. Since the two item measure asked 
specifically whether the respondent felt attached to the technology, it is believed that correlating 
with the multiple items will provide an avenue for investigations according to the basic objective 
of validity; which is the extent to which the survey instrument measures what was intended to be 
measured. The procedure also provides the analysis for the validation hypotheses H1a (Positive 




while negative affective states will be negatively related to PA) and H1b (Self-identity-
enhancing affective states will be positively related to PA to the opportunity).  
The analyses were conducted on two levels. On the first level, the dimensions from the 
factor analysis, the two-item PA measure and the multiple-item PA measure are correlated to test 
the validation hypotheses H1a and H1b. The second level of analyses correlated the items in the 
multiple-item measure individually with the two-item measure, to learn about the pattern of 
correlations the individual items bring to a PA measure. This procedure is deemed important 
since the factor analysis recorded near cross-loading items. It is believed that some insight into 
why the near cross-loading happened could be gathered from this exercise.   
Validity of the PA measure: The analyses, Level 1 Correlations were computed between 
the two-item PA measure and the factor scores of the two dimensions, to investigate support for 
hypotheses H1a and H1b. The results are presented in Table 4. The results show a significant 
relationship (r= 0.49, p<0.01)14 between the two-item PA and the factor scores of the positive 
affective states. Hence H1a is supported partially (this procedure couldn’t test the relationship 
for the negative affective states. It is operationalized in the next section). Also, there was a 
positive relationship between the two-item PA measure and the self-identity factor score (r= 
0.34, p<0.01)15. Hence H1b is supported. There was also a high positive relationship between the 







                                                 
14 A correlation was also computed between the two-item PA and the average of the actual scores of the positive 
affective states  (r= 0.60, p<0.01) 
15 A correlation was also computed between the two-item PA and the average of the actual scores of the self-efficacy 





Correlations between PA Measures  
 



























Factor scores for self-
identity-enhancing 
states dimension 
-0.00 0.96 0.34** 0.64** 
 
(N, 60, 91),       **p < 0.01,        *p <  0.05 
 
 
Validity of measure: The analyses, Level 2 The second set of analyses is to assesses the 
individual correlations between the individual attachment items and the two-item measure. The 
correlation matrix provided in Table 5 shows that almost all the items were correlated with the 
two-item measure of PA with significant correlation coefficients ranging from 0.30 to 0.67. 
However negative affect was not correlated with the two-item PA measure and therefore H1a 





Correlations between Psychological Attachment and Latent Items 
 
 








0.85           






0.42**          
3 Working through this project, I feel like a genius 2.43 1.17 0.32* 0.52**         




1.03 0.66** 0.51** 0.28*        




1.01 0.42** 0.43** 0.42** 0.29*       




0.97 0.40** 0.47** 0.41** 0.47** 0.43**      
7 The project reflects who I am 3.00 1.07 0.30* 0.47** 0.48** 0.28* 0.61** 0.23     
8 The project does not reflect who I am (r-coded) 3.27 1.12 0.46** 0.48** 0.35** 0.44** 0.39** 0.25 0.63**    
9 The key concept for this project came from me 2.70 1.28 0.31* 0.26* 0.22 0.41** 0.29* 0.21 0.46** 0.38**   
10 
 
The key concept of this project is from others in the 
group (r-coded) 
2.93 1.13 0.23 -0.06 -0.13 0.20 -0.03 -0.12 0.22 0.46** 0.45**  
11 
 
I am personally experiencing a lot of frustrations 
working on this design project 
2.90 1.15 0.06 -0.08 0.08 -0.03 0.06 0.16 0.15 -0.16 0.04 -0.10 
 (N, 60) 
 **p < 0.01 
 *p <  0.05  
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Upon further scrutiny, it was interesting to discover that the most correlated item in the 
list is “I have personally put a lot of work into this project” (r= 0.66, p<0.01). This item was 
positively correlated with the item “the key concept for this project comes form me” (r= 0.41, 
p<0.01) (which is also weakly correlated with PA). This finding is surprising given those who 
initiated the idea were also expected to be the ones more attached to it. However, judging from 
the weak correlations between these items, it appears conception of a new idea does not directly 
increase PA.  
Further, one can realize that there is no significant correlation between “the key concept 
for this project came from me” and “Working through this project, I feel like a genius” (r= 0.22, 
p>0.10). The indication is that those who conceived the idea are not necessarily the subjects who 
“worked hard” on the idea. This was expected considering that most groups started with the 
“leader” assembling fellow “technician” colleagues to develop his or her conception (learned 
from post-survey conversations). It is therefore not surprising that when subjects conceived the 
idea, they were not necessarily attached to it. However, what is interesting is the notion that idea 
conception and development might affect PA in different ways. There are real world 
implications for this notion. The following are a few of such implications.  
This notion of different effects for the two dimensions could be considered in the scope 
of corporate venturing where the project scientist conceiving an idea may not necessarily be the 
technician working on it, generating positive affective states and therefore being attached to the 
project. An illustration could be made of the 3M Post It Note case, where although Spence Silver 
was the one who discovered the adhesive, it was Arthur Fry who is more noted for championing 
the product. Comparing to the scenario above, one can argue that Fry invested a lot more 
psychologically in the product’s applications than Silver, hence Fry would be more likely to be 
attached (if he was) to the Post it Note than Silver.  
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Another area of application is the distinction in attachment between entrepreneur-
managers and investor-managers. Will both have the same level of attachment to the idea? Is the 
process of attachment different for each group or is it the same? I propose that given the 
evidence from above it is possible that investor-managers might become as attached as 
entrepreneur-managers so long as they spend a considerable amount of emotion, time, money 
and experience affect working on the project. The result shows that one does not necessarily 
need to conceive the idea to be attached to it. The implication being that, investor-managers are 
capable of developing the level of attachment that can have consequences on decision making at 
the point of commercialization.  So the development process is crucial for the growth and 
sustenance of PA.    
In sum, given the results above –findings of the different effects of idea conception and 
development on attachment— the main implication for this study is that conceiving an idea does 
not necessarily guarantee PA. Working through the development phase and psychologically 
investing in problem solving, etc., is more likely to lead to attachment to the idea. This finding 
will be explored in future research. Further, PA might be a multidimensional construct as there 
was some distinctive difference in the loadings for the two dimensions put forth by this study.  
 
4.1.5. Measures and Analysis: Psychological Attachment and Cognitive Evaluation  
 
 In the theory section, it was proposed that due to the differences in cognitive and 
affective processes, PA as an affective construct was likely to instigate an affective evaluation of 
the microeconomic environment. It was theorized that such an evaluation will limit the use of 
cognition and therefore through a number of processes, high PA will reduce cognitive evaluation 
of the microeconomic environment. One mechanism identified that could result in this reduction 
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of cognitive evaluation is the individual emphasizing more on possibilities than on probabilities. 
The following presents the operationalization of the level cognitive evaluation.   
Measures: Subjects’ cognitive evaluation To approximate subjects’ cognitive evaluation, 
an expected value-based model was adopted. A good cognitive model giving full consideration 
to probabilities can be evaluated within the subjective expected utility (SEU) paradigm (Savage, 
1954). The paradigm combines the decision-maker’s perceived utility function and a subjective 
probability to obtain the expected value of the utility. SEU dwells on strong assumptions such as 
completeness or independence which have be vigorously challenged in behavioural decision 
research. Subjects for experiments on SEU displayed predictable “biases” and “heuristics” 
(Kahneman and Tversky 1979) leading to many modifications of SEU in behavioural decision 
research (see Wakker, 2006 for annotated reference review). However, I resort to simple 
expected value (EV) calculations to operationalize the construct of cognitive evaluation. The 
following describes the process designed to obtain subjects’ subjective values and probabilities 
for this computation. 
Measures: Subjects’ rating of outcomes and probabilities Subjects’ ratings of severity 
and probability for identified adverse future commercialization outcomes and pleasureability of 
favourable outcomes were collected in the areas of intellectual property, financial management 
and product development. The outcomes are chosen to represent possible outcomes in a 
commercialization partnership with an outsider. Hypothetical items were developed on these 
outcomes for subjects to evaluate. To illustrate, the hypothetical item based on IP presented a 
future possibility of the idea being stolen (by a potential partner).There is also the possibility of 
imitation by a potential partner in the form of the partner leveraging the technology in outside 
private products. The third item presented the possibility of hidden clauses in contracts signed 
with potential partners. The final item was based on level of success achieved with a potential 
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commercialization partnership with the outsider. The severity or pleasurebility of these future 
outcomes was scored on a Likert-type 5-point scale. Subjects were given a prelude concerning an 
unfamiliar outsider who was described as being able to successfully help them commercialize as 
well as cheat them in the process. Subjects were then asked to generate probability judgements 
and place a mark on a 10-point scale to determine their perceived probability of the outcomes 
occurring.  
Table 6 reports the descriptive statistics of subjects’ judgements on the severity/ 
pleasureability and likelihood of the commercialization outcomes just reviewed. For each 
outcome, there are two columns. The first column reports that scores of severity/pleasureability 
and the second reports the likelihood. I report on some of the results. Responding to the 
possibility of an adverse IP outcome (first set of columns), a majority indicated on a five-point 
scale that it would be “extremely painful”(1) “if the potential partner forcibly took over their 
idea” (62%, Median=1, St. Dev.= 0.68). In terms of probabilities, most participants believed (on 
a 10-points scale) that there is a 50-50 chance that the potential partner would “forcibly take over 
ownership of their idea” (Median=5, St. Dev = 2.04). For pleasurable outcomes, most students 
indicated that it will be “extremely pleasurable” if the partner assisted in achieving the level of 
expected success (77%, Median=5, St. Dev=0.52). However, they only perceived a just above-
average likelihood (on a 10-points scale) that the potential partner will assist in that manner 
(Median=6.50, St. Dev =1.73). These results are interesting because although the subjects were 
presented with a hypothetical situation, they indicated some affect as they noted the 







Descriptive Statistic for Severity and Likelihood of Commercialization Outcomes 
 
 
Forcible takeover of 
ownership by partner  Imitation by partner  
Hidden clauses in 
contract 




Pleasurable (5)   
Likelihood 
(1 – 10) 
Severe (1) 
Pleasurable (5)  
Likelihood 
(1 – 10) 
Severe (1) 
Pleasurable (5)  
Likelihood 
(1 – 10) 
Severe (1) 
Pleasurable (5)  
Likelihood 
(1 – 10) 
Mean 1.47 5.28 1.57 5.65 1.97 6.33 4.73 6.13 
Median 1.00 5.00 1.00 6.00 2.00 7.00 5.00 6.50 
Mode 1.00 5.00 1.00 5.00 2.00 8.00 5.00 7.00 
Std. Dev 0.68 2.04 0.81 2.18 0.69 2.30 0.52 1.73 
N 60 60 60 60 60 60 60 60 
 
Measures: Computing EV The concept of expected value (EV) stems from the basic idea 
that the value of an option is an additive function of the value of outcomes that are supported by 
the option’s attributes. In computations, there is the assumption of an explicit set of options and 
that each option in the set has identifiable potential outcomes. Each outcome holds the subject’s 
perceived value with a perceived probability of that option. The computation of EV comprises 
summarizing the value of each option as the sum of the values of its potential outcomes, each 
discounted by or multiplied by the probability of the outcome occurring. The product sum is 
known as the option's expected value.  
Subjects’ EV calculations of the commercialization outcome were computed as a 
summation of their rankings of severity (and pleasureability) multiplied by the probability of the 




ii pxEV where x denotes the ratings of the commercialisation outcomes 
presented and the p denotes the probabilities of those outcomes occurring. i represents the 
outcomes: 1. forcible takeover of ownership, 2. imitation by partner, 3. hidden clauses in a 
contract, 4. private success with partner.  
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Measures: EV – Subjects’ cognitive evaluation As noted above, the underlying 
assumption for EV-type models (SEU type models and other modifications) is that the rational 
decision-maker maximises some kind of expectation by evaluating beliefs or probabilities and 
the values or utilities of possible outcomes. Given this view, employing the expected value 
calculations in assessing entrepreneurial outcomes denotes consideration for the probabilities of 
the outcomes and hence an appreciable level of objectivity in judgement.  Further, a cognitive 
process involves a conscious analysis of a situation, resorting to base rates and past information 
that informs the decision-maker’s intuitive judgement on the value of the option and the 
likelihood of its occurrence.  
The use of EV to tap into cognitive evaluation is in line with the arguments for the 
mechanism by which affect-based constructs like PA influences evaluation of the micro–
economic environment. As argued in the theory section, PA is expected to affect perceptions of 
the environment, the evaluation of possibilities and probabilities and the retrieval and use of 
information from the micro-economic environment. Subjects are expected to weight the values 
of the negative outcomes high and positive outcomes low when they are highly attached to the 
opportunity. This is because they tend to place a high value on the idea as a result of the 
attachment. Likewise highly-attached subjects are expected to report high probabilities for 
negative outcomes more than for the positive outcomes. In essence the EV variable is used in 
this study to represent the level of cognitive processing the subject employs. A decrease in the 
EV variable is assumed to signify a decrease in cognitive engagement possibly due to the 
differences in evaluation within the cognitive and affective paradigms and consequently, an 
influence of an affective evaluation process over the cognitive evaluation process. The EV 
variable therefore represents the level of cognitive evaluation in this study. It was found to have 
a mean of 2.95 and a standard deviation of 1.21. 
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Measures: Discrepancy measure – Difference between assumed objective and 
subjective evaluations Deviation from an assumed normative cognitive decision frame is what 
underlies research in decision biases. To further study this hypothesised deviation, a discrepancy 
measure, computed as the difference between an assumed objective evaluation and subjective 
evaluation of the micro-economic environment, was developed. The objective factor was 
represented by the subject’s estimation of the project’s value. Subjects were asked to indicate the 
amount they will pay the rest of the group (excluding themselves) to obtain sole ownership of the 
project. The average subjective value offered was $3,322.57 CDN (Mean= $3,323, 
Median=$500, Std Dev=$9,046, maximum $60,000, Skewness=4.63) (see distribution in 
Appendix 5.2).The values were concentrated on the lower end of the scale, below $10,000 with a 
median of $500, a 25th percentile of $100 and a 75th percentile of $1,275. The log of this dollar 
amount was used to represent the value of the project in the analyses of the results. Taking 
logarithms of the variable transformed the probability distribution to approximate the Normal 
distribution (see distribution in Appendix 5.1), effectively reducing the excessive variance 
(Mean= $2.76, Std Dev=$0.83).  
The discrepancy measure was therefore the log of the project value minus the subjective 
expected value described above (Mean= -0.13, Std Dev=1.378). A high value for this 
discrepancy measure indicates a wider deviation from the normative and therefore the cognitive 
and implies a higher level of bias. Likewise a small value for the measure indicates a higher level 
of congruence in the supposed objective and subjective measures and therefore a lower level of 
bias. One should however note that the supposed objective value has a level of subjectivity in its 
elicitation. This is the case because the project value was taken from subjects’ subjective 
estimates rather than obtained from actual market sources. However, the project value is 
assumed to be a good proxy for an objective value of the project and may have merit because it 
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indicates the subject’s attempt to estimate of the objective value of the project. Hence the 
discrepancy measure provides the opportunity to compare the subject’s objective and subjective 
estimates of the project and outcomes and also the comparison provides insight into the subject’s 
realizations (in objective terms) and preferences (actionable preferences influenced by a 
subjective evaluation).   
Results: PA and cognitive evaluation (H2) H2 predicts a decrease in the level of 
cognitive evaluation when PA increases. In support of H2, there was a significant negative 
correlation between PA and the level of cognitive evaluation (r= -0.26 p<0.05)16, a positive 
significant relationship between the log of project value (objective measure) and PA (r= 0.37 
p<0.01), and a significant positive relationship between PA and the discrepancy measure 
(difference between log of project value and the level of cognitive evaluation) (r= 0.48 p<0.01). 
These relationships are shown in Figure 8.  
It appears high attachment prevented subjects from employing cognitive mental 
processes to enable them effectively incorporate objective valuation of future outcomes and 
probabilities associated with these outcomes. Hence, when subjects’ PA increased, their level of 
cognitive evaluation of the future outcomes decreased, widening the difference between that 
evaluation and their estimation of project value. While the subjective expected value 
computation and the discrepancy measure may not reflect the level of cognitive evaluation, these 
measures provide insight into how subjects weight value and expectancy in evaluating the micro-
economic environment. Irrespective of alternative explanations, the relationship between the 
measures and PA suggests a divergence in effects between PA as an affective construct and 
cognitive-type measures such as the expected value measure, computed here.  
                                                 
16 The PA measure used here is the composite multiple-item measure of PA which averages the actual scores of 
those affective items. However, the relationship was stronger when the two-item PA measure was correlated with 
the level of cognitive evaluation (r= - 0.37 p<0.01) 
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Further, in considering the individual dimensions of PA, the positive affective states was 
negatively correlated (r= -0.25, p<0.05) with level of cognitive evaluation while positively 
correlated with the discrepancy measure (r= 0.48, p<0.01). The self-identity affective states was 
also negatively correlated (r= -0.25, p<0.05) with level of cognitive evaluation while positively 
correlated with the discrepancy measure (r= 0.34, p<0.05). The main implications of these 
results are that PA seems to engage its affective components to cripple objective analysis of the 
commercialization environment when entrepreneurs are faced with market entry. The affective 
components seem to engage according to the level of attachment to the idea. Thus, as attachment 
increases the value placed on the idea, the level of threat perceived increases and cognitive 
evaluation is inhibited.  
 
Figure 8 
Relationship between Psychological Attachment, Objective and Subjective Evaluation of 
















NB: All correlation are with the PA measure. The level of cognitive evaluation denotes subjective evaluation and 
the log of project value denotes objective evaluation.  
 
 
Level of  
cognitive  
evaluation,  
log of project 
value 
Objective evaluation   
Subjective evaluation   
Psychological Attachment   
r=-0.26, p<0.05   
r=0.37, p<0.01   
Discrepancy 
correlated with PA, 
r= 0.48,  p<0.01 
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4.1.6. Measures and Analysis: Psychological Attachment and Control Tendency  
Measures: Control tendency Control tendency was measured by presenting subjects with 
six items (three reverse scaled) on three areas of control identified to be of concern to the 
entrepreneur: the right to the intellectual property of the opportunity, the right to influence 
decisions involving the opportunity, the right to the returns on the opportunity. Similar measures 
defined within these categories have been used in research on psychological ownership in the 
organizational setting (Pierce, Rubenfeld and Morgan, 1991) and property rights (Furubotn and 
Pejovich, 1974)17. For the set-up of the measures, subjects were introduced to a hypothetical 
potential commercialization partner and provided with the costs and benefits of developing a 
business relationship with the partner. Since commercialization decisions are decisions made 
under risk and uncertainty, an element of uncertainty is also introduced into the introductory 
statement. Subjects are told that they do not know anything about the company they are going to 
partner with and as such do not have any idea of how a business relationship may turn out. Pre-
tests led to the refinement of the items. (See Appendix 2 for study instrument).  
Instructions required subjects to rate on a five-point scale the extent to which they will 
want their decisions to prevail in the three areas and the extent to which they are comfortable 
allowing a fictitious potential partner to make overriding decisions on the commercialization 
effort. Table 7 provides descriptive statistics on the items used in this measure. When asked if 
they will “want to be the sole owner” of their projects, subjects response was strong (Mean=3.72, 
Std. Dev=0.93). The responses were also strong for questions on the extent of willingness to 
                                                 
17 These three rights were adapted from the characterization of rights in ownership culture (Pierce, Rubenfeld and Morgan, 1991) 
and from the property and control rights literature (Furubotn and Pejovich, 1974; Williamson, 1991; Grossman and Hart, 1986; 
Hart and Moore, 1990; Hart, 1995; Aghion and Tirole, 1994). Pierce, Rubenfeld and Morgan (1991) define ownership culture 
around certain rights associated with owning a business and from which employees can derive psychological ownership: the right 
to information about the status of the business, the right to exercise influence over the business and the right to some share of the 
financial value of the business. In the property rights literature, three types of property rights are identified: the right of use, the 
right of changing forms and structure of the product and the right to reap profits from the product (Furubotn and Pejovich, 1974; 




maintain the right to make overriding manufacturing and distribution decisions (Mean= 3.54, 
Std. Dev=0.93). Responses were also strong on the question of the extent to which subjects will 
prefer to be the key decision-maker in how money is spent on the project (Mean=3.65, Std 
Dev=0.85). On the question of the extent to which subjects are willing to allow the outsider to be 
the sole owner of the project, the response was low (Mean 1.58, Std. Dev=0.82). The response 
was not comparatively low for subjects when asked about allowing the outsider to control 
manufacturing and distribution (Mean=2.40, Std. Dev=0.95). Subjects were also not comfortable 
with allowing the outsider to make decisions on how financial disbursements are made 
(Mean=2.29, Std. Dev=0.97). 
  
Table 7 
Descriptive Statistics for Control Tendency Measure 
 
  












Allow outsider to 
decide on 
manufacturing 
and distribution  
Allow outsider  
to manage 
finances 
Mean 3.72 3.54 3.65 1.58 2.40 2.29 
Median 4.00 4.00 4.00 1.00 2.00 2.00 
Std. 
Dev 0.93 0.93 0.85 0.82 0.95 0.97 
Min 1 1 1 1 1 1 
Max 5 5 5 5 5 5 
 
 
Factor analysis supported the unidimensionality of the control tendency scale at an Eigen 
value of 2.186. The items in the scale also recorded a reasonably high inter-item reliability 
(Cronbach alpha, α=0.64). Reversing the scores for items based on outsider control, an average 
control tendency was computed. The average control tendency was quite high (Mean= 3.77, Std. 
Dev= 0.54). The distribution the control tendency average is skewed towards the left (Skewness= 
- 0.757) with the median and the mode falling into the range of values that define a high control 
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tendency (See Appendix 5.1). Given these analyses, one can conclude that on average, subjects 
were relatively control-oriented when dealing with hypothetical outsiders.  
Measures: Statistical control variables – Personality-type variables To better argue for 
significant effects of PA, there is the need to statistically control for conceptually similar but 
personality-type factors. These factors are chosen from a purely conceptual point of view. Thus, 
the personality controls have the capacity to influence CT in a similar manner to how PA will 
affect CT. Hence evidence of their insignificance in a statistical effect on CT lends support for 
the robustness of PA in influencing CT. Most of the items were taken from Dr. Goldberg’s 
International Personality Items Pool (IPIP), which is “a scientific collaboratory for the 
development of advanced measures of personality traits and other Individual differences” 
(www.ipip.ori.org).    
The first is Emotion-Based Decision Making (EBDM) (Barchard, 2001). CT could result 
from an individual disposition to make decisions by emotions. Therefore this measure is a good 
statistical control for testing PA. EBDM is one of seven components of Emotional Intelligence 
IPIP (EI-IPIP) developed by Barchard (2001). EBDM is the tendency to make important life 
decisions based upon emotions, rather than using logic. The construct is a 10-item measure with 
5 positively-keyed and 5 negatively-keyed items. Barchard modelled the scale on the TEIS 
(Tett’s Emotional Intelligence Scale) Flexible Planning subscale.  TEIS (Tett, Wang, Fisher et, 
1997; Tett, Wang, Gribler, Martinez, 1997) is a multi-dimensional measure of emotional 
intelligence which gives scores for twelve separate subscales and an infrequency scale. Some 
items of the emotion-based decision making scale are “I rarely, consider my feelings when 
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making decisions” and “I plan my life based on how I feel”.  The items as tested in this study 
produced a Cronbach alpha of 0.82 (9 items)18.  
The second is Risk-taking propensity. This measure is important because low-risk-taking 
developers might be control-oriented due to their perception of the risk of losing the idea on the 
market. Therefore, it becomes a good statistical control for testing the effects of PA. The Risk-
taking construct is also taken from the Jackson Personality Inventory (JPI-R). The construct 
assesses the propensity to take risks in general risk domains across a variety of situations related 
to health, finance and goal attainment. The scale taken from the IPIP database is a 10-item 
measure with 6 positively-keyed and 4 negatively-keyed items. Some items of the risk-taking 
scale are “I seek danger” and “I would never make a high risk investment”. Reliability test when 
the measure was administered in this study produced a Cronbach alpha of 0.82 (10 items)19.  
Another factor measured is Machiavellianism (IPIP, 2001). Machiavellianism is an ideal 
statistical control due to the similarities between the construct and CT with respect to control. 
Therefore CT might be a result of the Machiavellian disposition in developers. The 
Machiavellianism scale is also taken from IPIP and was modelled on the Social Astuteness 
aspect of the Jackson Personality Inventory - JPI-R (Jackson et al, 1972, Jackson, 1994).  
Christie and Geis (1970) developed the construct of Machiavellianism on the basis of the 
sixteenth century works of Niccolo Machiavelli. The trait of Machiavellianism refers to an 
orientation in which individuals think that manipulating others is an underlying strategy of social 
influence. Individuals with a high level of this trait have a powerful need to hold leadership 
positions, influence others, and they usually dominate relations with other people. The scale 
taken from the IPIP database is a 6-item measure with 3 positively-keyed and 3 negatively-keyed 
                                                 
18 Cronbach alpha for the scale from tests conducted by Barchard ( 2001)  is 0.73 
19 The scale is reported by IPIP (2001) to have a Cronbach alpha of  0.78 
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items. Some items of the Machiavellianism scale are “I have a natural talent for influencing 
people” and “I lack the talent for influencing people”. A reliability test for the measure in this 
study, revealed a Cronbach alpha 0.82 (6 items)20.  
The final personality-type construct measured is Need for control (Siegrist, 1996, 2002). 
CT could result from the innate disposition of having the need to control. Hence statistically 
controlling for need for control in testing the effects of PA provides insight into the 
characteristics of PA. The need for control construct is a subscale of the Effort-Reward-
Imbalance model (Siegrist, 1996, 2002) which is based on social reciprocity where an employee 
invests efforts and expects rewards. Illustrating further, where there is an imbalance, employees 
with excessive work-related overcommitment underestimate the external demands and 
overestimate their own coping resources, without realising their contribution to the imbalance. 
Need for control is described by need for approval, competitiveness, disproportionate irritability, 
and inability to withdraw from work. The construct is closely related to aspects of the type A 
behaviour pattern that reflect an exorbitant ambition in combination with the need for approval 
and esteem. Examples of the items on this scale include “Work rarely let me go, its still on my 
mind when I go to bed” (effort) and “'my job promotion prospects are poor” (reward). Items 
were personally received from Dr. Siegrist through email. References to “office work” in the 
original questionnaire were replaced with “group work” to fit the school work environment. 
Reliability test when administered to the sample in this study produced an alpha of 0.7621 (6 
items). 
Table 8 provides the descriptive statistics for the above-outlined personality-type 
variables. Machiavellianism scored highest among the variables (Mean=3.21, Std Dev=0.75). 
                                                 
20 The scale is reported by IPIP (2001) to have a Cronbach alpha of  0.79 
21 There was no available record of Cronbach alpha for the scale used but the alpha computed in this study was relatively high. 
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Risk-taking propensity was also high among subjects (Mean=3.12, Std Dev=0.66). Emotion-
based decision making (Mean=2.55, Std Dev=0.58) and need for control (Mean=2.30, Std 
Dev=0.63) recorded low averages. In essence, subjects had higher levels of Machiavellianism 
and risk-taking while having lower propensities to make decisions based on emotions or need for 
control. These results have significant implications for this study. If subjects have lower 
propensities to make decisions based on emotions and on the need for control, then any evidence 
of control tendency arising from PA suggests that the effects originate from their experiences 
with the project (context driven) rather than their innate psychological dispositions.  
Table 8 
Descriptive Statistics for Personality-Type Variables 
 
Personality-type 
variables Minimum Maximum Mean Std. Deviation 
Emotion-based decision 
making  1 4 2.55 0.58 
Risk-taking 1 4 3.12 0.66 
Machiavellianism 1 5 3.21 0.75 
Need for Control 1 4 2.30 0.63 
     (N, 92) 
Measures: Statistical control variables – other variables Another control variable 
considered was project value. As already reported above, subjects were asked to indicate the 
amount they will pay the rest of the group (excluding themselves) to obtain sole ownership of the 
project. The average subjective value offered was $3,322.57 CDN and the log of this dollar 
amount was used to represent the value of the project in analyses. (the variable is described in 
the measures section for H2).  
Yet another variable considered is trust. The social capital literature describes trust as a 
subjective belief about the likelihood that a potential partner will act honestly (see Dasgupta, 
2003). Some also draw a connection between trust and control. For example, Das and Teng 
(1998) identify trust and control as two alternative sources in developing confidence in partner 
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cooperation and suggest that trust level will facilitate the deployment of control mechanisms. In 
this study, since the subjects have no prior experience with the potential third-party, an attempt 
was made to capture dispositional trust (Rotter, 1980) towards the outsider, rather than 
employing a multidimensional view of trust (Rousseau Sitkin, Burt, and Camerer, 1998). Rotter 
(1980) defines dispositional trust as "a generalised expectancy held by an individual that the 
word, promise, oral or written statement of another individual or group can be relied upon."  
In effect, the subject’s trusting disposition towards a potential partner was measured by 
eliciting the likelihood that “the potential partner will write hidden clauses that limited the 
subject’s rights in the contract” (on a 10 points scale). There seemed to be a general dispositional 
distrust for the potential partner (Mean=6.46, Median=7, St. Dev= 2.30) (See distribution in 
Appendix 5.3). In other words, subjects expressed a considerable level of distrust towards 
hypothetical outsiders with the view that such hidden clauses had the potential to restrict their 
rights to the project.  
The next control variable considered is perceived likelihood of expected success from a 
potential collaboration. Simply put, entrepreneurial reward orientation could be shaped by 
pecuniary or non-pecuniary motives. Either way, the entrepreneur will build this motive into 
goals and expectations for the future outcomes concerning the opportunity. To capture the 
likelihood of such expectations in possible outside-party collaboration, subjects were asked to 
rate on a 10 point scale, the probability that the potential partner will play a positive role in 
realising an expected level of success. The responses show the perception that “the potential 
partner will help achieve the level of success expected” (Mean=6.13, Median=6, St. Dev= 1.84) 
(see distribution in Appendix 5.4).   
The final control variables considered are the perceived severity of a future loss of the 
opportunity and the likelihood of a future loss of the opportunity. Subjects might perceive the 
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consequences of a future loss of the project and therefore be less willing to give up control to 
outside party. This mechanism might occur outside of a PA to the idea. In effect, it is advisable 
to include this variable as a statistical control in studying the effect of this perception on CT. The 
severity variable was elicited by asking subjects to rank on a 5-point scale, how severe they think 
it will be if a third party “forcibly takes over ownership of the project idea”. As partly reported 
earlier, responses to this question was high in severity (low on the scale) (Mean=1.52, 
Median=1, Std Dev=0.80). Subjects largely felt that the impact on them, if they lost their idea on 
the market, will be devastating. 
Results: Correlational analysis – PA, CT and statistical controls Prior to analyzing the 
effect of PA on CT, correlations was computed for PA, CT and the identified statistical control 
variables. The variables in this correlation procedure included: PA; personality-type constructs; 
project value; level of cognitive evaluation; dispositional trust, the likelihood of personal gain 
from third-party partnership; and perceived severity of a future loss of the opportunity. CT was 
significantly and positively correlated with PA (r= 0.29, p<0.01), albeit weakly. Further, the 
correlational relationships between the personality-type control variables and control tendency 
were examined. Among the personality variables, the only correlation reported was a positive 
correlation between PA and Machiavellianism (r= 0.29, p<0.05). This implies that subjects who 
believe they can influence or manipulate their social interactions might be more attached to their 
opportunity, probably because they also believe they can influence the outcomes through the 
development and commercialization processes. Given that the average score for 
Machiavellianism was higher (Mean=3.20), it was not surprising that it was the only personality 
factor to be statistically significant in the correlations.  
Other correlations of interest that were not hypothesised are provided as follows. There 
was a positive relationship between Machiavellianism and risk-taking (r= 0.36, p<0.01) while 
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risk-taking was negatively correlated with need for control (r= -0.35, p<0.01). Intuitively 
subjects who felt they could manipulate others were also likely to take risks while those with 
need for control were less likely to take risks. Further, positive affective states were also 
positively correlated with need for control (r= 0.34, p<0.01) and positively with estimates of the 
project value (r= 0.40, p<0.01). Subjects who experienced a lot of positive affective states 
during development were likely to also have a need for control and these subjects were also 
likely to rate the value of the project high. PA was also positively correlated with project value 
estimates (r= 0.37, p<0.01). The more attached the subject is, the more likely they were to raise 
the value of their project. The average measure of attachment was positively correlated with the 
likelihood of achieving expected success with an outsider (r= 0.27, p<0.05) while increasing the 
perceived severity of a future loss (r= 0.27, p<0.05). 
Results: Hierarchical modeling analysis – PA and CT with statistical controls To test 
H3— as PA increases CT increases — the CT measure was modeled hierarchically (Raudenbush 
and Bryk, 2002) on factors identified in the previous section (see Table 9 below). Hierarchical 
linear models take into account the dependence between observations. Also, tests for identified 
hypotheses can be done at different levels making it possible to assess the amount of variation at 
each level. Table 9 provides the tests of models entered into the statistical software 
hierarchically. The models with the single unit labels (e.g. Model 1) are the initial models to 
which the subsequent models in the decimal unit labels (e.g. Model 1.1) are compared. Model 1 
predictors consisted of the personality-type variables. The results show that Machiavellianism 
was weakly significantly related to CT (p=0.90). The implication is that when subjects believed 
that they were capable of manipulating outsiders, they were more control-oriented. Model 1.1 
introduced the estimated project value, the level of cognitive evaluation and the multiple-item 
composite measure of PA into Model 1. Although none of the predictors were significantly 
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correlated with CT, the weak effects of Machiavellianism disappeared (also none of the model 
statistics was significant). The correlations computed earlier indicated a correlation between 
Machiavellianism and PA (r= 0.23, p<0.05) and this could have caused the disappearance of the 










































Table 9  















Constant  4.09**  3.82**  4.35**  3.97**  3.97**  3.65** 
  (0.60)  (0.62)  (0.59)  (0.61)  (0.60)  (0.82) 
Emotion-Based decision making ‐0.20  ‐0.17  ‐0.21  ‐0.18  ‐0.18  ‐0.14 
  (0.13)  (0.13)  (0.13)  (0.13)  (0.13)  (0.12) 
Risk-taking  ‐0.13  ‐0.18  ‐0.05  ‐0.14  ‐0.14  ‐0.08 
  (0.11)  (0.11)  (0.11)  (0.11)  (0.11)  (0.10) 
Machiavellianism 0.16†  0.13         
  (0.09)  (0.09)         
Need for control  0.06  ‐0.04  0.07  ‐0.05  ‐0.05  ‐0.17 
  (0.12)  (0.14)  (0.12)  (0.14)  (0.13)  (0.13) 
Estimated project value (log)  0.03    0.04  0.03  0.05 
    (0.09)    (0.09)  (0.09)  (0.08) 
Level of cognitive evaluation   ‐0.01    ‐0.00     
    (0.07)   (0.07)     
PA composite multiple-item  0.20    0.24†  0.24*  0.28* 
    (0.13)    (0.13)  (0.12)  (0.12) 
Trusting disposition          ‐0.05 
        (0.03) 






        (0.04) 





        (0.11) 
Likelihood of future  loss of opportunity         0.00 
            (0.04)
          
R2    0.14  0.21  0.09  0.18  0.21  0.37 
R2 adjusted  0.07  0.10  0.04  0.08  0.11  0.24 
R2 change   0.07    0.09    0.16 
F 2.05  1.81  1.67  1.78  2.15†  2.69* 
F change   1.42    1.81    2.41* 
(N, 56)             ** p <  0.01                *  p <  0.05                 † p <  0.10 
 
Model 2 excluded Machiavellianism as a predictor.  The predictors of Model 1.1 (without 
Machiavellianism) were repeated for Model 2.1. As expected we observe a positive and 
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significant coefficient for PA (β =0.24, p=0.06), hence H2 which predicted a positive 
relationship between PA and CT was supported. Thus, controlling for the personality-type 
variables (without Machiavellianism), PA was significant in explaining variability in CT. 
However, what is more striking about Model 2.1 is that there are interesting implications for the 
lack of significant effects found for the statistical control variables. There were no effects found 
for emotion-based decision making: implying that subjects were not control oriented because 
they were emotionally aroused in perceiving all the possible adverse conditions associated with 
losing IP, managerial, R&D and financing rights to the idea. Further, subjects were not control 
oriented because they were risk seeking or had a need for control as innate dispositions.  
More interestingly, there were no effects found for estimated project value. It was 
believed that since the question for this measure asked subjects to indicate their willingness to 
pay, this value was what they placed on the project. Therefore, if the project value was high it 
indicated that subjects viewed the project favourably and will consequently have a desire to 
control the rights due to their perceptions of favourable returns.  A rational model would indicate 
that a project valued highly will predict a high level of CT. Therefore the lack of effects for 
project variable lends strength to the effect of PA on CT, controlling for project value, among 
others. There were relatively large values recorded for changes in the coefficient of 
determination, R2 22, and the F values23 although not significant (see bottom panel of Table 9) 
For Model 3, the level of cognitive evaluation was removed to enable the inclusion of 
other correlates that form a part of the computation of the level of cognitive evaluation. The 
correlates are: the trusting disposition; likelihood of achieving expected level of success with 
outside partnership; perceived severity of a future loss of the opportunity; and the likelihood of a 
                                                 
22 R2 – The coefficient of determination is the proportion of variability in a data set that is accounted for by the 
statistical model 
23 The F test is calculated generally as F = (between-group variability) / (within-group variability).  
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future loss of the opportunity. Unlike Model 2.1, Model 3, with the removal of level of cognitive 
evaluation, registered a significant F value (p<0.10) and a slightly higher R2, meaning the model 
with the excluded variable performs better in predicting CT. This result is insightful because, 
aside from the potential statistical explanations, it suggests that without cognitive evaluation, 
subjects’ CT is better explained by PA. In terms of the effect of PA on CT, PA improved in 
significance (from p=0.06 to p=0.04) comparing Model 2.1 to Model 3 and the standard errors 
also decreased slightly.   
Model 3.1 included the variables for which the level of cognitive evaluation was removed 
from Model 3. The model seemed to improve over Model 3 with a significant F change (F=2.41, 
p<0.05) and a sizeable in R2 change (0.16). PA increased in significance in Model 3.1 (β =0.28, 
p=0.03) over Model 3 (β =0.24, p=0.04) in explaining variability in CT. Of the four correlates 
added to Model 3.1, two were weakly significant. The likelihood of achieving expected level of 
successes with outside partnership was weakly significant (β = -0.07, p=0.07). This result 
implied that when subjects’ viewed outsider assistance favourably in achieving expected level of 
success, their CT decreased. This finding is also very interesting because it implies that 
controlling for PA, the perception of a successful outsider partnership motivates control sharing. 
A further implication is that if this perception is strong, the effects of PA might be overcome and 
CT will decrease enough for an increase in performance. The other correlate that was weakly 
significant is the perceived severity of a future loss of the opportunity (β =0.18, p=0.098). 
Although the significance of this variable is very weak, the result suggests the intensity of the 
perception of adverse commercialisation outcomes may explain additional variance in CT, 
controlling for PA.   
 Finally, for validation purposes, the two-item PA measure was introduced into the 
models to replace the multiple-item PA measure. The Model 1.1 results for the two-item PA 
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measure revealed a similar trend to the composite measure (β =0.13, p=0.14). Also, the results 
were similar when entered into the following models: Model 2.1 which excluded 
Machiavellianism (β =0.16, p=0.06), Model 3 (β =0.17, p=0.04) and into Model 3.1 (β =0.19, 
p=0.03). Likewise, the results were similar in Model 3.1 for the additional correlates: the 
likelihood of achieving expected level of success with outside partnership (β = -0.07, p=0.06) 
and the perceived severity of a future loss of the opportunity (β = 0.20, p=0.07) – a slight 
improvement in the latter. Also, the model statistics were similar. Thus, the similarity in effects 
may be explained by the high correlation between the two-item and multiple-item measures of 
PA. Further, the multiple-item measure very well captures the essence of PA in explaining CT by 
virtue of the fact that the two-item measure asked subjects the extent to which they were attached 
to the idea. 
Further to testing the effects of PA (using the multiple-item measure), it is important to 
examine individually the effect of the PA dimensions on CT. To that end, the factor scores of the 
positive affective states and the self-identity affective states (dimensions) were introduced into 
Models 2, 2.1, 3 and 3, run above, in replacement of the multiple-item measure. The results are 
reported in Table 10 below. The models are renamed in continuation of the previous set run 
(hence are from 4 to 5.1). The models also exclude Machiavellianism which correlates with PA. 
Model 4.1 (converted Model 2.1), shows that the positive affective states dimension was 
significant in explaining variability in CT (β =0.20, p=0.03), while the self-identity dimension 
was not (β =0.05, p=0.54)24. These results present a very interesting take on the dimensions of 
PA. Although the results are not surprising, judging from the correlations between the 
dimensions and CT, it is worth speculating on. The lack of effect for the self- identity dimension 
                                                 
24 The pattern of effects is confirmed, but did not improve, when the factor scores are replaced by averages of the 
actual scores of the two dimensions. The positive affective states dimension was weakly significant (β =0.22, 
p=0.08), while the self-efficacy dimension was not (β =0.04, p=0.67) 
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implies that experiencing what is termed in this study as self-identity-enhancing affective states, 
does not automatically lead to CT. This is an intuitively reasonable conclusion since enhanced 
self-identity should not necessarily drive CT. The reason being that enhancing self-identity 
relates to personal association with the idea and this association can be upheld even when control 
is shared or relinquished. Developers can christen technologies according to their preferences 
when partnering with outsiders and obtain both the financial resources from improved business 
as well as the name-association with the technology.  
The pattern of effects for the dimensions is repeated in Model 5 and Model 5.1. Models 5 
and 5.1 exclude both Machiavellianism and level of cognitive evaluation as was the case in 
Models 3 and 3.1. There was a significant effect reported in Model 5 for the positive affective 
states (β =0.19, p=0.02) and no effect for self-identity affective states (β =0.04, p=0.54). Model 
5.1 results also report a significant effect for the positive affective states (β =0.19, p=0.02) and 
no effect for self-identity affective states (β =0.08, p=0.30). However, unlike in Model 3.1 when 
significant but weak effects were recorded for the likelihood of achieving expected level of 
success with outside partnership and the perceived severity of a future loss of the opportunity, 
Model 5.1 only recorded an effect for the likelihood of achieving expected level of success with 
outside partnership (β = - 0.07, p=0.07). The effects for the perceived severity of a future loss of 
the opportunity disappeared (β = 0.18, p=0.11) and this is not surprising since the effect was very 
weak in Model 3.1. However the pattern of the model statistics reported was also very similar to 
those of the other set of models with significant differences in statistics, showing improvements 






Table 10  











Constant  4.35**  4.82**  4.81**  4.55** 
  (0.59)  (0.64)  (0.63)  (0.10) 
Emotion-Based decision making ‐0.21  ‐0.19  ‐0.19  ‐0.15 
  (0.13)  (0.13)  (0.13)  (0.12) 
Risk-taking  ‐0.05  ‐0.13  ‐0.13  ‐0.08 
  (0.11)  (0.11)  (0.11)  (0.10) 
Need for control  0.07  ‐0.08  ‐0.07  ‐0.18 
  (0.12)  (0.14)  (0.13)  (0.13) 
Estimated project value (log)  0.02  0.02  0.04 
    (0.09)  (0.09)  (0.08) 
Level of cognitive evaluation   0.01     
    (0.07)    
Trusting disposition      ‐0.05 
        (0.03) 




        (0.11) 
Perceived severity of future loss of opportunity   0.18 
        (0.11) 
Likelihood of future  loss of opportunity     0.00 
        (0.04)
Positive affective states – factor scores 0.20*  0.19*  0.19* 
   (0.09) (0.08)  (0.08)
Self- identity enhancing affective 
states – factor scores    0.05  0.04  0.08 
    (0.07) (0.07)  (0.07)
R2    0.09  0.21  0.20  0.38 
R2 adjusted  0.04  0.09  0.11  0.24 
R2 change   0.12    0.18 
F 1.67  1.76  2.09†  2.75* 
F change   1.75    3.17* 
(N, 56)          ** p <  0.01              *  p <  0.05               † p <  0.10 
 In summary, one can conclude from the analyses that there is strong support for the 
influence of PA on CT, while statistically controlling for essential correlates. The key 
previously-hypothesised evidence in this section is the positive effect of PA on CT. Other 
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unhypothesized evidence include: the lack of effect of estimated project value, the weak positive 
effect of Machiavellianism, the negative effect of success expectations with outsider on CT, and 
the very weak positive effect perceived severity of loss of the opportunity on CT. The results 
also suggest that if PA is multidimensional, then there is the possibility of differing dimensional 
effect on CT.  Finally, personality-type factors such as Emotion-Based Decision-Making, Risk-
Taking and Need for Control were not significantly correlated with control tendency.  
 
 
4.1.6. Measures and Analysis: Testing the Moderating Effect of Threats on the Relationship 
between Psychological Attachment and Control Tendency  
4.1.6.1.  Introduction  
As noted earlier, commercialization presents a situation where an analysis of the micro-
economic environment is necessary in order to chart an efficient commercialization strategy. 
Results from data analysis in the previous session have shown that subjects perceive a high level 
of severity for adverse conditions concerning their projects. In the theory section, I noted the 
threat of loss is expected to influence the perception of future control or lack of control in the 
commercialization environment. The underlying argument was that the perception of loss of 
control will provide threatening signals that will influence the relationship between PA and CT. 
Essentially the notion of threat should be treated as a moderator of the relationship between PA 
and CT. The argument for the hypotheses, when the perception of threats is high, was a stronger 
relationship between PA and CT. I also introduced the main types of affective responses or 
emotional reactions to perceived threats: anticipatory and anticipated responses (Loewenstein et 
al., 2001). The hypotheses developed were H4a (Anticipated emotional reactions to perceived 
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threats will positively moderate the relationship between PA and CT) and H4b (Anticipatory 
emotional reactions to perceived threats will positively moderate the relationship between PA 
and CT). In this section I test hypotheses H4b, focusing on an experimental procedure aimed at 
inducing threat and assessing its impact on the relationship between PA and CT. I concentrate on 
anticipatory affect: affective states of the now.  
4.1.6.2. Experimental Design  
To study the effect of anticipatory affect on the relationship between PA and CT, I 
employed a quasi-experimental paradigm (Cook and Campbell, 1979). Quasi-experimental 
design is useful in applied research settings where real-life constraints restrict complete control 
over the research setting. Since subjects develop PA outside of the experimental process, the 
quasi-experimental paradigm provides a better framework for studying it effects. Classic 
experimental designs (Campbell and Stanley, 1963) are characterized by the ability to randomize 
subjects into treatment and control groups and thereby control the variables that are not explicitly 
included in the study. Quasi-experimental designs however, have to control for confounding 
variables explicitly through statistical techniques and are therefore sometimes labeled as 
correlational designs. Further, certain alternative hypotheses for instance, history effects, are 
allowed to prevail: a choice of relevance and external validity over control and internal validity. 
4.1.6.3. Experimental Manipulation  
After PA was measured, subjects were randomly assigned to two experimental groups. 
As noted above, the purpose of this experimental effort was to investigate the effect of 
anticipatory emotions such as fear on the relationship between PA and CT. There are various 
forms and causes of fear; personal fear, social fear, fears of physical danger, etc. Generally, fear 
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can be described as functional defense behaviour with survival advantages for the individual. 
Fear could be learned (e.g. Pavlovian classical conditioning) or be evolutionary (e.g. fear of 
snakes). Fear in this context refers to the personal fear of loss in a commercialization situation. It 
should be noted that since subjects consider potential dangers (such as theft of their creative idea 
in the future); there is the potential for fear to be mixed with anxiety at the point of 
commercialization25. Lerner and Keltner (2000, 2001) find that fearful people made more 
pessimistic judgments about the likelihood of adverse events and also made risk-averse choices. 
The authors argue that the specific impact of an emotion on cognitive appraisal shapes the 
willingness to take risks. Thus, fear is associated with low certainty, high anticipated effort, low 
control, and medium responsibility.  
The pathways of fear have been studied extensively through functional neuroimaging and 
neuropsychological studies which relate the fear system to the amygdala26 (LeDoux, 1996, 1998, 
see Zald, 2003 for a review). Other methods include physiological measures such as heart rate, 
skin conductance, and facial electromyography. Studies typically use threatening stimuli such as 
pictures (threatening or fearful faces), sounds and also masked stimuli (unconscious processing) 
for fear inducements (Zald, 2003). Lang, Bradley and Cuthbert (1999) develop a set of normative 
emotional stimuli for experimental investigations of emotion and attention. Findings have shown 
these stimuli to be effective. For instance, within the same framework, Cuthbert, Lang, Strauss, 
Drobes, Patrick, and Bradley (2003) assessed psychophysiological responses to fear memory 
imagery and found participants to be significantly more reactive (in physiology and report of 
affect) to fear than neutral cues.  







First Treatment It was believed that inducing ambient fear will create the environment 
for subjects to perceive the fear of loss when presented with potential commercialization 
partners. A pre-test of the first treatment used fearful pictures from the International Affective 
Picture System (IAPS)27 pool (Lang et al., 1999) as a better alternative to other stimuli such as 
sound. The IAPS database is a large set of standardized, emotionally-evocative, internationally 
accessible, color photographs that includes contents across a wide range of semantic categories. 
With regards to the database, emotions are defined as a coincidence of values on three strategic 
dimensions: affective valence (ranging from pleasant to unpleasant), arousal (ranging from calm 
to excited) and dominance or control. The database comes in CD-ROM format and includes over 
900 pictures which were assembled from studies in which 12 sets of 60 pictures each, varying on 
the dimensions identified, were rated in the course of 10 years (prior to 1999). Further, Mikels et 
al. (2005) provide an image set from the IAPS which they find to be effective in eliciting 
different discrete emotions, such as fear, more than others. Such a set avoids contamination of 
the targeted emotions by other related emotions. 
 In this study, only pictures depicting threat-evoking emotions with negative valence 
(such as snakes, tornadoes, gun threats), according to the data in Lang et al. (1999), were chosen 
for the inducements. Subjects are first screened to ensure that they were willing to view 
negatively-valenced graphic images. They were first shown four representative images excluded 
from the experiment and only those who are willing to participate were employed for the 
experiment. Subjects who refused were not included in the control group even though they were 
allowed to finish the experimental process. Willing subjects viewed each image after which 








irrelevant rating cards were provided for them to fill. In summary, subjects were taken through 
the procedure with sample pictures before they begun and they went through the rest of the 
pictures at their own pace. The control group was shown a set of neutral-to-scenic pictures. The 
results for this pre-test are given below.  
 First Treatment Results:  
Manipulation check asked subjects to rate the degree to which they felt the following 
emotions when they saw the pictures. The results are noted in Tables 11. The table provides 
descriptive statistics of subjects’ responses to the affective states experienced when they saw the 
pictures. By the averages, subjects felt less fear and anger than disgust and sadness. Clearly the 
manipulation did not have the desired impact on the subjects.  The upper 95% bound for fear is 
2.37, which is below “neutral” score.  
 
Table 11  
Descriptive Statistics for Affect-Type in Manipulation Check  
  
  N Minimum Maximum Mean Std. Deviation 
Fear  13 1 4 2.15 1.345 
Disgust 13 1 5 2.92 1.656 
Sadness 13 1 5 2.92 1.382 
Anger  13 1 4 1.77 1.092 
 
 
In further analysing just the fear factor, Table 12 was developed to show the frequency 
distribution for the variable. The table provides the distribution for the scores from the various 
facets of the 5-point scale. The tables shows that slightly more than half of the subjects (54%) 
chose “not at all” when asked the extent to which they felt fear when they viewed the pictures, 
while about 23% of subjects chose “somewhat”. Only 23% of the subjects felt fear to “a 






Descriptive Statistics for Fear in Manipulation Check  
Fear Frequency % 
Not at all 7 53.8 
 Somewhat 3 23.1 
A considerable amount   3 23.1 
A great amount 0  
  Total 13 100 
 
 
In sum, with respect to the first treatment, albeit the small sample size, the results showed 
that the fear manipulation using the IAPS pictures was not effective. In effect, the manipulation 
was changed from picture-induced fear to a recall-induced fear of loss, presented in the second 
treatment, reported below.  
Second Treatment The poor pre-test results confirmed the view that it is almost 
impossible to use fear inducing manipulations in such samples without evoking large demand 
effects. Therefore, theoretically, following methods adopted from social psychology and 
judgement decision making literature (e.g. loss aversion etc), a manipulation was designed to 
directly evoke a sense of loss. Subjects in the treatment group were asked to describe a loss of a 
personal possession in the past – in detail: providing details of the process of the loss, its effect 
on them and if they expect that such a loss can occur again in the future. Similar methods can be 
found in Keltner, Ellsworth and Edwards (1993) where subjects were asked to recollect events 
that make them feel what they felt then (when the event happened). The self-report methodology 
is also commonly used to elicit affective states (e.g. Smith and Ellsworth, 1985; Lerner and 
Keltner, 2001). There is also generally, a tradition of studying the carryover effects of emotions 
on economic decision making (see Lerner, Small and Loewenstein, 2004). The control group, on 
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the other hand, was asked to write about a recent realization they had or something interesting 
that they recently observed.  
Second Treatment Results Manipulation checks revealed no significant differences 
between the control and treatment groups. Results are presented in Table 13 and Table 14. Table 
13 provides descriptive statistics for the treatment and control groups before and after the study. 
Before and after the study, subjects were asked to indicate on a five-point Likert-type scale their 
affective state with the question “how do you feel?”  A score below three (3) indicated that the 
subject was in a bad mood and a score above three (3) means the subject is in a good mood. 
Table 13 shows that in general, subjects were very slightly above neutral (3) (into the “good 
mood” range, - Mean=3.39, Std. Dev=1.07) at the beginning of the study, compared to the end of 
the study (Mean=3.30, Std. Dev=0.97). The difference is very small and any differences could 
have been due to experimental fatigue rather the effects of the manipulation.   
 
Table 13 
Descriptive Statistics for Mood Changes before and After the Manipulation  
 






Interval for Mean 





Before Study Treatment 50 3.52 1.04 0.15 3.23 3.81 
  Control 45 3.24 1.09 0.16 2.92 3.57 
  Total 95 3.39 1.07 0.11 3.17 3.61 
        
After  Study Treatment 49 3.33 0.97 0.14 3.05 3.60 
  Control 43 3.28 0.98 0.15 2.98 3.58 
  Total 92 3.30 0.97 0.10 3.10 3.51 
 
Further, still observing from Table 13, we see that the results for the treatment and 
control groups also show that the mean mood for the treatment group seems to be slightly lower 
after the study (Mean=3.33, Std. Dev=0.97) than before the study (Mean=3.52, Std. Dev=1). 
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Meanwhile the mean mood for the control group was just slightly higher (0.06 points) after the 
study (Mean=3.28, Std. Dev=0.98) than before the study (Mean=3.24, Std. Dev=1.1). One will 
expect both groups to express a lower mean mood after the study, at least due to experimental 
fatigue, but the mood of the control group seem to have improved (very slightly) while that of 
the treatment group declined. Following this lead, ANOVA28 tests were conducted to check for 
statistical differences between these mood scores. The results shown in Table 14 indicate that the 








Squares Df Mean Square F Sig. 
Before Study Between Groups 1.80 1 1.79 1.60 0.21 
  Within Groups 104.79 93 1.13   
  Total 106.59 94    
       
After Study Between Groups 0.05 1 0.05 0.05 0.82 
  Within Groups 85.43 90 0.95   
  Total 85.48 91    
 
 
However, a paired-sample T test, which tests if the difference between two variables, 
within group, is different from zero, suggested dissimilar results. Table 15 presents results that 
suggest the mean difference in mood for the treatment group before and after the study was 







                                                 
28 This was a one way ANOVA test which is a technique used to compare means of two or more samples or groups 








Results for Paired Differences in Mood for Experimental Groups Before and After the 
Manipulation 
  











Interval of the 
Difference 
     Lower Upper 
Treatment 
group 
Before Study - 
After Study  0.18 0.53 0.08 0.03 0.34 2.44 48 0.02 
Control 
group 
Before Study - 
After Study 0.05 0.62 0.09 -0.14 0.24 0.50 42 0.62 
  
Delving deeper into the change in mood, subjects were also asked to indicate “the extent 
to which their mood had changed since they started the study” and “the extent to which their 
mood was affected by remembering the loss they suffered”. These questions were scored on a 5-
point Likert-type scale. The descriptive statistics for these two questions are provided in Table 
16. Given the neutral point as 3, both questions scored a mean of less than 3 – indicating “little” 
change, if any.  However, the means were lower for the treatment group (Mean=1.73) than the 
control group (Mean=2.91) especially on the question of the extent to which mood is affected by 
narration. The treatment group indicated that there was very little change in their mood during 
the study while the control group indicated more change than the treatment group. This 








Descriptive Statistics of Mood Changes Before and After The Study 
 
 
Extent of mood change since study 
begun 
Extent to which mood is affected by 










Mean 2.91 2.88 2.95 2.28 1.73 2.91 
Median 3.00 3.00 3.00 2.00 1 3.00 
Std. Deviation 0.48 0.48 0.48 1.25 1.02 1.21 
Minimum 2 2 2 1 1 1 
Maximum 4 4 4 5 4 5 
N  92 49 43 92 49 43 
 
 
Further, frequency distributions of the two questions were also computed and the results 
reported in Table 17 and Table 18. About 76% of the subjects indicated that there was no change 
in their mood in the course of the study. About 16% indicated their moods changed for the worst 
while about 8% indicated that their mood changed for the better. There were no differences in 
the pattern of the categories within which the treatment and control groups indicated the extent to 
which their moods changed during the study. Most subjects in the treatment and control groups 
expressed no change (around 76%) in their mood.  
 
Table 17 
Frequency Distribution for Mood Changes Within the Treatment and Control Groups  
 
Extent of mood 
change since study 
begun 
All Treatment group Control group  
Frequency % Frequency % Frequency % 
Change for the worst 15 16.3 9 18.4 6 14.0 
No change 70 76.1 37 75.5 33 76.7 
Change for the better 7 7.6 3 6.1 4 9.3 





            Frequency distributions for the question of the extent to which subject’s mood changed 
by the narration of the loss suffered (for the treatment group) and the realization (for the control 
group) however showed slight differences between the treatment and the control groups. Results 
are presented in Table 18. Compared to the total –all subjects— (41%), more subjects (60%) in 
the treatment group, in proportion, indicated that their mood change was to a” small extent” than 
those in the control group (21%). Likewise in comparison to the total –all subjects— (16%), 
fewer subjects (8%) in the treatment group, in proportion, indicated that their mood change was 
to a “considerable extent” than those in the control group (26%).  
 
Table 18 
Frequency Distribution for Mood Changes Within the Treatment Group 
 
Extent of mood affected 
by narration of loss 
suffered 
All Treatment Group Control group 
Frequency % Frequency % Frequency % 
To a small extent 38 41.3 29 59.2 9 20.9 
To a slight extent 11 12.0 8 16.3 3 7.0 
Somewhat 25 27.2 8 16.3 17 39.5 
To considerable extent 15 16.3 4 8.2 11 25.6 
To a large extent 3 3.3   3 7.0 
Total 92 100 49 100 43 100 
 
 
To gain further understanding of what subjects felt, if at all, subjects were asked to tick 
among a number of affective states that they were in after going through the treatment exercise. 
The options were: happiness, anger, excitement, fear sadness and nothing.  Table 19 gives the 
actual numbers of subjects indicating what they felt in the total, treatment and control groups. 
Intuitively, fewer subjects in the treatment group (2) indicated happiness than in the control 
group (14). This finding supports and explains evidence in the last two tables where the control 
146 
 
group had noted more change in mood than the treatment group. The result is expected since the 
control group was asked to write about an event that gave them a realisation they felt was 
“interesting” while the treatment group was asked to recollect and note down a loss of a personal 
property that was “dear to them”. This also explains why many more in the treatment group (15) 
reported sadness than in the control group (3). However, with the affective state of interest –
fear— the number of subjects reporting this state (2) was less than in the control group (4). 
Clearly, the concept of fear of loss did not explicitly connect with incidental fear. There is also 
the possibility of social desirability effects here, as subjects in the treatment group might sense 
that the loss narration was designed to make them feel fearful and therefore made a conscious 
effort to not report that affective state.  
 
Table 19 
Descriptive Statistics of Subject’s Specific Feelings after the Study 
 
What subject felt after the 
manipulation  All Treatment group 
Control 
group  
Happiness 16 2 14 
Anger 8 6 2 
Excitement  7 1 6 
Fear 6 2 4 
Sadness 18 15 3 
Nothing  58 30 28 
Total  113 56 57 
NB: Subjects had the option of choosing more than one emotion therefore the total number of responses is greater 
than the number of subjects  
 
In effect, hypothesis H4b on the moderating effect of anticipatory emotional reactions on 
the relationship between attachment and control orientation is not supported. However, it should 
be noted that, under the circumstances, lack of support for this hypothesis is due in part to failure 
of the manipulation or treatment employed. A better designed manipulation might unearth the 
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effects expected. Although the accepted test for differences between and within groups for the 
various measures (ANOVA) yielded no significant results, various descriptive statistics 
suggested differences might exist between the groups. To ensure that any “hidden” differences 
did not exist to affect the results in other tests, a dummy variable was created for the 
experimental groups for further analysis (1=treatment group, 0=control group). For illustration, 
this dummy variable was included in a regression of CT on its correlates. The coefficient for the 
dummy variable was not significant (β = 0.22, p=0.11). But, there was a very weak significance 
for estimated project value (β = 0.14, p=0.09). However, due to the weakness of the significance, 
this result is not explored further.  With slimmer chances of testing for moderation, while 
maintaining that some sort of moderation of the relationship between PA and CT takes place, I 
turned to the data to identify variables that could be used as moderators to test for possible 
effects.  
 
Additional moderation tests: identified moderator One of the variables employed in the 
cognitive evaluation computation (also included as a correlate in testing for effects on CT) is 
conceptually close to the indication of threat perception from the microeconomic environment. 
As previously reviewed and reported, subjects were asked to indicate the likelihood of loss of the 
opportunity (the IP) in future market attempts.  To briefly recap, subjects were asked to assume a 
commercialization decision scenario where they choose a partner, an outsider, to assist in the 
process. They were told that they know little about this outsider but the relationship can be 
successful or unsuccessful. Among other questions, subjects are specifically asked “How likely 
is it that the company (the partner) forcibly takes over ownership of the project idea?” The 
question was scored on a 10-point scale. As previously reported, the distribution of subjects’ 
responses were almost Normally distributed (Mean=5.28, Median=5, Std. Dev=2.04). About 
148 
 
half, 46%, of the subjects, noted that the chances of losing the project to the outsider were more 
than 50% (see Appendix 5.7 for the distribution). This variable was therefore considered for 
moderation analyses. Other variables eliciting likelihood were not considered appropriate to 
include in computing a composite moderation variable. These other variables asked about the 
likelihood of the project being imitated or the outsider including hidden clauses in a contract 
with the subject. These perspectives do not directly and necessarily lead to a loss of the idea and 
therefore were excluded in the moderation test.  
Additional moderation tests: Results Hierarchical multiple regression is employed in the 
analysis since the predictor (PA) and the moderator are measured on the continuous scale 
(Aguinis, 1995). To proceed, the predictor and moderator variables were standardized to avoid 
multicollinearity (high correlations) between the interaction tem and the predictor and moderator 
variables (Aiken and West, 1991, Cohen et, al, 2003). Standardizing also enables easier 
computation of standard deviations around the mean in plotting the moderator effects. After 
standardizing, the interaction term was created by computing the product of the standardized 
predictor and moderator variables (PA and likelihood of loss – LL).  
To test for interactions in the hierarchical regression process, the variables were added in 
steps as was done in testing the effects of PA on CT earlier (Aiken and West, 1991, Cohen et, al., 
2003). The first step involved testing the main effects of the predictor and moderator variables 
and the second step involved adding the interaction term (Aiken and West, 1991, Cohen et, al., 
2003, Judd et al., 1991). The next activities involve interpreting the effects of the predictor and 
the moderator variables; testing the significance of the moderator effect and plotting the 
significant moderator effect.  
For completeness, the three variants of the predictor were considered: the multiple-item 
PA, the positive affective dimension of PA and the two-item PA measure. Regression tests with 
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the multiple-item PA variable failed to identify any significant effects for the moderator. The 
moderator variable was not statistically significant (β = 0.07, p=0.28) on the second step as 
described above. The F change was also not significant (F=1.17, p=0.28).  The positive affective 
states dimension was also tested and reported no significance for the moderator coefficient (β = 
0.09, p=0.25) and the F change (F=1.33, p=0.25).  However, when the two-item PA was 
considered, there were some significant observations recorded. These results are shown in Table 
20 below.  
 
Table 20 







Constant 3.82** 3.85** 
  (0.06)  (0.06) 
PA (two-item) 0.17* 0.18** 
  (0.06)  (0.06) 
Likelihood of loss (LL) 0.03 0.02 
  (0.07)  (0.06) 
Interaction term (PA x LL)  0.11† 
    (0.06) 
R2    0.11  0.17 
R2 adjusted  0.08  0.12 
R2 change   0.06 
F 3.52*  3.68* 
F change   3.67† 
(N, 60), ** p <  0.01,   *  p <  0.05,  † p <  0.10 
Model 1 tests the main effects of PA and likelihood of loss. The results show that PA was 
statistically significant (β = 0.17, p=0.01) while the likelihood of loss (LL) was not (β = 0.03, 
p=0.71). Model 2 is the addition of the interaction term to Model 1. The results show that while 
PA improved in significance (β = 0.18, p=0.006), likelihood of loss remained not significant and 
the interaction term was weakly significant (β = 0.11, p=0.06). The Model statistics also showed 
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a small increase in R2 (0.06) moving from Model 1 to Model 2. This means that the interaction 
between PA and LL explained an additional 6% of the variance in CT scores over and above the 
11% explained by the first order effects of PA and LL alone. The F change was also significant 
(F=3.67, p=0.06). The indications are that they may be evidence of moderation between PA and 
CT when the two-item PA measure is used29. The lack of effects from the multiple-item and 
positive affective states dimensions is difficult to explain: except to speculate that the two-item 
measure used more direct questions on attachment although the potential for social desirability 
bias on the part of subjects in answering the question cannot be ruled out.  
Since some significance was found for the interaction term, a moderation plot was 
developed to assess the results further. A common procedure recommended by Cohen et al., 
(2003) is to choose the groups at the mean and at low (1 standard deviation from the mean) and 
high (1 standard deviation from the mean) values of the continuous variable. Figure 9 shows the 
interaction plot developed with predicted values that are calculated by multiplying the 
unstandardized regression coefficients for each variable by the appropriate value (-1, 1) for each 







                                                 
29 To check the effects of controlling for the other correlates used earlier in testing CT (Table 9), the following 
procedure was followed. Correlates were entered in the first step of the regression equation, followed by the 
predictor variable, moderator variable, and interaction term in the last step. In evaluating the last step, there was no 









      
       
       
       
       
       
       
       
       
       
       
       
       
       
High LL 3.58  3.87  4.17  
Mean LL 3.67  3.85  4.03  
Low LL 3.77  3.83  3.90  
  (N,56), Solid triangles- low LL, solid squares – mean LL and solid diamonds – high LL 
 
The plot shows some interaction between PA and LL in predicting CT. The differences in 
groups, in terms of control tendency, were larger in the high PA than in the low PA condition. 
Subjects with a highest level of CT (CT=4.17) were those who perceived a high likelihood of 
loss with high PA. This was higher compared to subjects who perceived a low likelihood of loss 
with high PA (CT=3.90). Subjects perceiving high and low likelihood of loss with mean PA 
were similar in their CT scores (CT=3.87, CT=3.83 respectively) and subjects perceiving high 
and low likelihood of loss with low PA did not differ as much (CT=3.58, CT=3.77 respectively) 
as those with high PA, in their CT scores. Essentially, given high PA, when there is a high 
likelihood of loss perceived, CT is also high. The results indicate the potential for investigating 







There are a number of decision making areas in venture commercialization where control 
tendency can be studied. One interesting area is entrepreneurial financing where entrepreneurs 
seem to prefer control in financing decisions. This preference sometimes implies choosing 
internal financing over external financing when ownership is at stake. This chapter discusses PA 
and control in terms of preferences for external financing.  
5.1 Control Tendency in Financing Decisions  
 
5.1.1 Types of Financing  
Choosing the appropriate financing package has tremendous implications for the 
performance of the new venture. The implications are more pronounced from the viewpoint of 
the entrepreneurial equity gap – shortage of financing availability (various sources). There is 
much debate about whether the equity gap results from insufficient supply of funds or from the 
prevalence of market problems such as information asymmetry, agency costs and moral hazard 
problems (Hillier and Ibrahimo, 1993) (see the introduction to this thesis for discussion). 
However, it is clear that in any commercialization partnership or contract, such market problems 
will impact on most of the conditions governing the financial offers as well as perceptions 
guiding acceptance of these offers. Both financiers and entrepreneurs react to these problems in 
unique ways. Their individual reactions, however, depend on the type of venture financing 
pursued.  
There are two types of financing strategies for venturing: internal and external financing. 
Internal financing involves producing funds from business operations or through close personal 
153 
 
relationships with no financing conditions and therefore avoiding most transaction costs. 
External financing is simply raising money through debt or equity. Intuitively, there is no reason 
to doubt that an equity gap exists, entrepreneurs and start-ups are credit constrained, and 
therefore often need to resort to external financing. However, the transaction costs involved in 
external financing coerces some to avoid that route even if such avoidance is costly. Some 
entrepreneurs will avoid external finance to retain control even if performance suffers as a result.  
5.1.2 Literature Review: External Financing 
For the sake of illustration, I recount some of the literature reviewed in the introduction 
and literature review sections of this thesis. I recap the literature on venture capitalist financing 
and introduce the literature on angel financing to compare and contrast with venture capital 
financing. As previously noted, there is evidence to suggest that entrepreneurs prefer internal 
financing over external financing especially if it affects ownership (Winborg and Landström, 
2001; Cressy, 1995; and Berggren, Olofsson, and Silver, 2000). Cressy (1995) relates the 
phenomenon to control aversion where entrepreneurs are averse to losing control of the 
opportunity, although aware that relinquishing some control would improve performance (Cressy 
and Olofsson, 1997). Müller (2007) argues that founders tend to remain in control and forego 
some growth opportunities, if the opportunities are too extensive to be realized with debt finance 
alone. These founders are content paying higher interest rates for additional loans in order to 
maintain control. The implication is that their firms are limited in their growth potential.   
However, as prefaced in the introduction to this thesis, in being control-oriented, 
entrepreneurs are simply reacting to financier strategies that attempt to wrestle control from 
entrepreneurs in the bid to safeguard investments. The notion of financiers seeking control is 
well studied in the venture financing literature with respect to agency problems — when the 
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economic incentives of the financier (principal) and entrepreneur (agent) are not costlessly 
aligned (Pratt and Zeckhauser, 1985). To combat agency problems, the financier can either; 
design an optimal contract (Jensen and Meckling, 1976) through pre-investment screening and 
due diligence; or use the incomplete contracts approach which concentrates on the post-contract 
allocation of control rather than the pre-contract screening and contract writing (Hart, 1995).  
Venture capitalists Financiers such as venture capitalists (VCs) often resort to either 
principal-agent or incomplete contracts or both approaches to combating agency problems. 
Especially in the incomplete contracting paradigm, entrepreneurs and venture capitalists (VCs) 
are known to wrestle over control rights due to conflicting objectives (Hart and Holmström, 
1987, Hart, 1995, and Kaplan and Stromberg, 2003). A VC is a person or entity that provides 
financing for new, growing or struggling businesses from a venture fund (a pooled investment 
vehicle that invests third party capital in ventures too risky for the standard capital markets or 
bank loans)(various sources). In VC financing, control rights are allocated such that the VCs 
obtain full control if the company performs poorly (Kaplan and Stromberg, 2003). But to boost 
the entrepreneur’s performance, VCs typically give up some of their control and liquidation 
rights, enabling the entrepreneur to obtain more control rights, when company performance 
improves. However, since VCs need to reduce information asymmetry to provide sufficient 
funds, agency costs increase and their control over the opportunity also increases. They typically 
need to assert considerable control over the opportunity to safeguard their investment of effort 
and money as well as ensure high performance. Nevertheless, we have seen from the foregoing 
that entrepreneurs’ perception of conditions for financing might be affected by their level of 
attachment to the opportunity. Initial control terms in a contract might prevent some from 
accessing these opportunities. 
155 
 
Angel investors Another group of external financiers that are somehow different from 
VCs are Angel investors (Angels). Angels are “private individuals using their own money 
directly in unquoted companies in which they have no family connection” (Mason and Harrison, 
1996).  Angels dominate early stage entrepreneurial investment - making 30 – 40 times as many 
deals as VCs, and risking about the same amount of dollars - $23.1 bn (Center for Venture 
Research, 2005) compared to $23.0 bn  (Moneytree, 2006). Angels invest their own money at the 
high-risk stage of a venture's existence (Freear, Sohl and Wetzel, 2002) which is often a catalyst 
for subsequent VC investment (Shepherd and Zacharakis, 2001).   
There are differences in Angel and VC financing, although there are basic similarities in 
their financing conditions. For example, Zacharakis and Meyer, (2000) suggests four main 
categories on which VCs base their decision: entrepreneur/team capabilities, product/service 
attractiveness, market/competitive conditions, and potential returns if the venture is successful.  
However, Angels do not necessarily use these categories. Feeney, Haines and Riding, (1999) 
note that although Angels  view management ability as important, they tend to concentrate on the 
growth potential of the opportunity and how reliable and capable the entrepreneur is in ensuring 
that growth potential.  Hence, the Angel is more likely to value the entrepreneur’s role in the 
business more than the VC, leading to differences in their contract preference. Van Osnabrugge 
(2000) suggests that VCs may prefer the principal-agent approach partly to demonstrate 
responsible conduct in competing for fund provider’s money (Van Osnabrugge, 2000) and partly 
to signal competence and reliability in the VC marketplace (Sapienza et al. 1996). Similarly, Fiet 
(1995) suggests that VC’s are more concerned about market risks or those risks due to uncertain 
market conditions that affect the size of the growth and accessibility of the market. In contrast, 
Van Osnabrugge (2000) suggests that Angels may prefer the contracts incompleteness approach. 
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Angels are also concerned with agency risks but they will tend to place more emphasis on the 
“fit” with the entrepreneur as an important ingredient in combating divergence in interests. 
5.1.3 Predictions 
Preference for Angel vs. VC financing given a level of PA From the foregoing, the 
indications are that, generally, entrepreneurs at the early stage of development may prefer Angel 
investment to VC investment. Angel investment is more associated with early stage financing 
and serves to prepare the opportunity for larger VC financing (Shepherd and Zacharakis, 2001). 
Also, entrepreneurs and technology developers might prefer Angel investors due to the 
connotation of the label “Angel”. They might view an Angel investor more like a “helper” than a 
profit-hungry investor (often associated with VCs in the business press). Entrepreneurs may also 
prefer Angel investors because of the more “informal” approach they bring to due diligence and 
contractual deliberations, compared to the VC. 
  However, it should be noted that both VCs and Angels employ control strategies to 
minimise investment risk. According to the literature just reviewed, the VC typically demands a 
high level of decision making control –while the Angel typically seeks to participate in the 
venture with the entrepreneur – in order to enhance the value of the business and also mitigate 
the risks. These forms of control limit the entrepreneurs’ independence, autonomy and rights 
over his or her creation. Hence highly attachment entrepreneurs, not willing to share control with 
financiers, will be weary of accepting external financing of any kind (as seen in the empirical 
evidence presented above).  
In effect, high levels of PA may increase CT as entrepreneurs perceive avenues for 
opportunism on the part of potential financiers. Opportunistic possibilities arising from 
informational asymmetries are quite pervasive during commercialization (Williamson 1979, 
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1985). As such, although VCs possess high matching abilities and are capable of matching 
entrepreneurs to essential financial resources; and BAs provide flexible finance terms and invest 
industry experience alongside funds; a high level of attachment is likely to increase developers’ 
preference for control even if they cognitively realise that relinquishing some control would 
improve performance.  
 
H4: High levels of psychological attachment are more likely to lead to strong control preferences 
in making financing choices, than low levels of attachment.  
 
5.1.4 Measures and Analysis 
Measures: Control preferences in financing decision Subjects were provided with 
generic information about commercialization, its definition and one-sentence description of a 
venture capitalist (VC) and an Angel investor. They were then provided with pairs of offers from 
a VC and an Angel with a share structure designed such that an optimal set of offers and takes 
could be easily determined. Table 21 presents the percentage shares of equity that financiers 
expect to take in six rounds of paired financing (VC paired with Angel). The first row indicates 
the rounds or deals presented to subjects. The second row provides the VC’s equity demanded, in 
percentages, for $4m investment into the company in each round presented to subjects. The third 
row provides the Angel investor’s equity demand for a $2.5m investment in the company for 
each round listed. It could be observed that the VC’s equity stake demanded decreased from 55% 
in the first round to 50% in the 6th round, in unitary decreases over the period. The Angel’s 
shares demanded increased from 45% in the first round to 50% in the 6th round. Also, the 







Percentage Takes In Venture Capital and Angel Investor Financing Decision Contexts 
 
Rounds 1 2 3 4 5 6 
VC offers $4m,  
takes shares  %    
55 54 53 52 51 50 
Angel offers $2.5m, 
takes shares %    
45 46 47 48 49 50 
 
Further, subjects were told that in partnering to commercialize, whichever party held 
more than 50% shares effected decisions on product development, finance, sales etc (See 
Appendix 2 for questionnaire). In each round, subjects were required to pick one option, the 
VC’s offer or the Angel’s offer. For instance, in the first round subjects choose between Option 
A: A VC offer of $4m with a 55% VC equity stake and Option B: An Angel offer of $2.5m with 
a 45% Angel equity stake. The six pairs were presented individually on separate pages with 
alternating positions for the options in each subsequent pair presented. The design takes 
motivation from the notions of loss aversion and the violations of first-order stochastic 
dominance in the work of Kahneman and Tversky (1979)30. On each round it was optimal to pick 
the VC’s offer over the Angel’s offer. Table 22 provides calculations that reveal the optimal 




                                                 
30 In prospect theory, loss aversion refers to the tendency for people to strongly prefer avoiding losses than acquiring gains. 
Some studies suggest that losses are twice as psychologically powerful as gains. First order stochastic dominance - The original 
version of prospect theory showed violations of first-order stochastic dominance (a situation where one lottery - a probability 
distribution over outcomes - can be ranked as superior to another. It is based on preferences regarding outcomes - e.g., if each 




Venture Capital and Angel Investor Offers and Developers Takes  
 
Venture capitalist       
A B C D E F G H 









1 4 0.55 3.27 7.27 0.45 3.27  
2 4 0.54 3.41 7.41 0.46 3.41  
3 4 0.53 3.55 7.55 0.47 3.55  
4 4 0.52 3.69 7.69 0.48 3.69  
5 4 0.51 3.84 7.84 0.49 3.84  
6 4 0.5 4.00 8.00 0.50 4.00  
        
 
Angel investor       











VC - Angel 
1 2.5 0.45 3.06 5.56 0.55 3.06 0.21 
2 2.5 0.46 2.93 5.43 0.54 2.93 0.48 
3 2.5 0.47 2.82 5.32 0.53 2.82 0.73 
4 2.5 0.48 2.71 5.21 0.52 2.71 0.98 
5 2.5 0.49 2.60 5.10 0.51 2.60 1.24 
6 2.5 0.5 2.5 5 0.5 2.5 1.50 
 
Column A is the list of rounds or deals presented to subjects (as shown Table 21). 
Column B represents the offers from the potential financiers: VCs offer $4m and Angels offer 
$2.5m. Column C provides the percentage of equity takes that the financiers demanded. E.g. For 
the first deal VCs requested 55% equity in the business when they offered $4m as was shown in 
Table 21.  Column D presents a calculation of pre-money valuation, which is the value of the 
business before investment. Investors use the pre-money valuation to determine the amount of 
equity to demand for the amount invested. In this example for Column D, it is calculated as offer 
x (1-% take) / % take. For example, for the first round, the Angel offered $2.5m and demanded 




Hence, the pre-money valuation when the Angel offered $2.5m and demanded 45% 
equity is $3.06m. This implies the total valuation of the company is $2.5m + $3.06m = $5.56m. 
Note that for the $5.56m total valuation, the 55% equity stake accruing to the developer amounts 
to $3.06 – the pre-money value. Having identified the total valuation and pre-money valuation, 
the investor evaluates the investment against the economic environment. For instance, in this 
example, the Angel has to determine that the business is worth $5.56m before committing the 
$2.5m for the 45% stake. Otherwise, the Angel can proceed to update the investment amount, the 
shares demanded or both.  
Column E in Table 22 provides the total valuation of the company (offer added to the 
pre-money valuation) given the offer and percentage equity stakes. Column F showcases the 
percentages of developer equity stakes as shown in Table 21 above. Column G indicates 
developers’ stake in the company in million dollar amounts (which also equals the pre-money 
valuation as shown in the example above. 
To determine the optimal offer, compare Column G for the financiers and developers 
across the rounds or deals. One can observe that for every deal the value of the developer’s stake 
in the company is higher from the VC offer than from the Angel’s offer. Column H provides the 
difference between developer values for the VC and Angel for each deal. E.g. for the first deal, 
the difference, $3.27 - $3.06, equals $0.21m. The deal value in Column H is positive for each 
deal and increases throughout the deals from $0.22m to $1.50.  
Essentially, subjects employing a cognitive model in their evaluations are expected to be 
close in judgement to realising the VC option as optimal in all deals31. In effect, the hypothesis 
                                                 
31 Note that even without the pre-money valuation calculations, the percent structure of stakes and offers, provides 
subjects with enough information to realise the optimal offers provided by the VC. Since the VC offers $4m and the 
Angel, $2.5, simple calculations quickly reveal the optimal offer in each paired deal. For example, adopting the 
developer’s percent stakes for illustration, the highest amount a developer obtains in equity within the VC offers is 
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tested with this design thrives on the notion that when PA is high and therefore the evaluation 
process is affect-biased, subjects are likely to concentrate on how much control they are 
relinquishing to the VC rather than the optimal offers the VC presents.  It should be stressed that 
the information presented to subjects was limited to the financiers’ percentage takes of equity 
and offers (see Appendix 2 for questionnaire).  In effect, subjects were expected to make choices 
more according to what they feel about control and the consequences of choosing the various 
options.  
Results: Control tendency in financing decisions The hypothesis of interest here is H5 
(High levels of PA are more likely to lead to strong control preferences in making financing 
choices, than low levels of PA).  The multiple and two-item PA measures provided a similar 
pattern of choices. The results from the use of the multiple-item PA are reported here, in the 
main text, and those of the two-item PA measure are placed in Appendix 6. Table 23 provides 
the proportions of subjects picking among offers in the high PA and low PA groups, computed 










                                                                                                                                                             
$2.2 (45% of the $4m offer in the first deal, when the VC demanded 55% equity), while the lowest is $2m (50% of 
the $4m offer, with VC demand of  50%). Conversely, the highest amount in the Angel offers for the developer is 
$1.38m (55% of the $2.5m Angel offer, when the Angel demands 45% equity), while the lowest is $1.25m (50% of 
the $2.5m Angel offer). Clearly, simple proportions show that the VC offers are optimal in all deal rounds. Hence, 
subjects are not expected to necessarily compute the pre-money valuation calculations to make the expected 




Percentages of Subjects Choosing VC and Angel Offers 
 
A Rounds of offers 1 2 3 4 5 6 VC Angel VC Angel VC Angel VC Angel VC Angel VC Angel 
B High 
PA     
% of subject 
choices 15 85 15 85 15 85 18 82 24 76 97 3 
               
C   a.8 b.47 a.8 b.47 a.8 b.47 a.10 b.45 a.13 b.42 a.53 b.2 
               
D Low 
PA  
% of subject 
choices 56 44 63 37 59 41 59 41 63 37 97 3 
               
E   c.25 d.20 c.28 d.17 c.27 d.18 c.27 d.18 c.28 d.17 c.43 d.2 
               
F  F 12.89** 18.68** 15.57** 12.72** 10.45** 0.02 
     
G VC (offer $4m),  takes 
% 
55 54 53 52 51 50 
H Angel (offer $2.5m) ,  
takes % 
45 46 47 48 49 50 
(N, 59),     **  p <  0.01,   *  p <  0.05,        † p <  0.10 
Note: The cells denoted as a, b, c and d, indicate the percentages of subjects choosing within each round (deals) 
and sums up to 100%.    
 
Using the alphabetical letter labels in the leftmost column and the numbers in the top row 
(which denote the rounds/deals); I describe the cells in Table 23. The columns corresponding to 
the rounds, 1,2,3..6, present the percentages of subjects preferring VC and Angel offers in each 
round. Rows B and D, report these preferences within the high and low PA groups respectively. 
For example, cell 1B (column, row), reports that in the first round of deals, subjects in the high 
PA group preferred the Angel’s offer (85%) over the VC’s offer (15%). Also computed is the 
distribution of subjects within each round on their preferences for VC and Angel offers in the 
high and low PA groups. These are reported in the C and E rows and labelled a, b in the C row 
and c, d in the E row for VC and Angel preferences respectively. a,b,c, and d sum up to 100%. 
For instance, for the first round of deals, cell 1C reports a=8% (high PA subjects who preferred 
the VC’s offer) and b=47% (high PA subjects who preferred the Angel’s offer); while the cell 
1E reports c=25% (low PA subjects who preferred the VC’s offer) and d=20% (low PA subjects 
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who preferred the Angel’s offer). So, the highest percentage of offers in the first round was from 
high PAs who preferred the Angel’s offer. These percentages add up to 100% for the subjects’ 
responses in the first round. The percentages across and within rounds are developed into charts 
that provide a pictorial view of the distribution of subject responses (See Figures 11, and 12 
below). Row F contains ANOVA results testing the differences between and within the high PA 
and low PA groups and the VC and Angel groups. Row’s G and H provide the VC and Angel 
equity demands (in percentages) for their investment. This is included in the table for 
comparison sake. Rows B and D are developed into a pictorial presentation as shown in Figure 


















Figure 10  





























 F 12.89** 18.68** 15.57** 12.72** 10.45** 0.02 
        
VC ($4m)   
takes  % 55 54 53 52 51 50 
Angel ($2.5m) 
takes % 45 46 47 48 49 50 
              (N, 59),     **  p <  0.01,   *  p <  0.05,        † p <  0.10 
 
 
The results in Table 23 and Figure 10 indicate that, except for the last round, subjects 
within the high PA group strongly and consistently preferred the Angel’s options, over the VC’s 
options (see Row B in Table 23 and the top part of Figure 10). The Angel offered more control 





against the conventional economic wisdom that subjects should choose the VC offers because 
they are economically optimal.  However, subjects within the low PA group had a choice pattern 
closer to the optimal set of choices as low PA subjects consistently preferred the VC’s offers (see 
Figure 12– to be discussed).  Despite the differences in their preference styles, subjects in the 
high and low PA groups unanimously voted for the VC offer in the last round where the 
financiers demanded 50% of equity with the VC providing $4m investment and the Angel, a 
$2.5m investment. Further, there were remarkable statistical differences between and within 
group for the first five rounds of deals but no significant difference for the last group of deals 
(see F values in row F of Table 23).  
To probe these results further, Figures 11 was developed to study distribution of 
preferences within each round of deals (see Rows C and E in Table 23). Figure 11 plots the 
percentages of subjects in the high and low PA groups preferring the VC and Angel offers within 
the rounds, thereby presenting a more integrated view of how the sum of a 100 percentage points 
is distributed among the groups in each round. The plot on the left (a) shows that from the first to 
the fifth round, the largest group in each round of deals was the high PA group who preferred the 
Angel’s offers. The next largest group was the low PA group who preferred the VC offers. The 
two smaller groups were the low PA groups that preferred the Angel offers and these groups 
were slightly larger than the high PA group that preferred the VC offers. The striking feature of 
the plot is that the largest group preferring the VC offers in the last round of equal share offers 
was the high PA group who had consistently preferred the Angel offers in the previous rounds. 
Although, the low attachment group comparatively voted more for the VC in the previous 





Figure 11   
Percentages of Subjects in High and Low Psychological Attachment Groups Choosing VC 
and Angel Offers within Rounds  

















(N,56); Solid triangles- High PA choosing Angel offer; solid squares – Low PA choosing VC offer;  stars - Low PA 
choosing Angel offer; and solid diamonds – High PA choosing VC offer, 
 
 Finally, Figure 12 was developed to model the deviation from the optimal choice across 
the 6 rounds of deals. For each round, the highest percentage of subjects preferring the VC or the 
Angel was recorded and the corresponding developer equity share value noted. For instance, if 
for the first round the majority preference was for the Angel, a value of $3.06 corresponding to 
the developer’s equity share value (when the Angel invests $2.5m and demands a 45% stake) 
was recorded. Figure 12 then plots the identified developer’s equity share values for the high and 
low PA groups, alongside the optimal developer share values (which are the developer values 
when accepting the VC offers). The plot shows that for each round, the low PA group preferred 
the optimal choice (lines coincide). However, the high PA group deviated away from the optimal 
choices till the last round when shares were of equal proportion. Nevertheless, it is striking to 
observe that developer share value for the high PA group consistently decreased in deviation 




consistently choosing the Angel offers, the high PA group lost share value in two ways: 1. Share 
value foregone by not choosing the VC offer which recorded an increasing share value for the 
developer, 2. Share value reduction due to share dilution as the Angel’s equity share demands 
increased over the period. More strikingly, for marginal control in the firth round where the VC 
demanded 51% and the Angel, 49%, high PA subjects preferred to forego $1.24m value and 
choose the Angel’s offer –in order to gain marginal control.  
 
Figure 12   
Comparison of Subjects Share Preferences in the High And Low Psychological Attachment 





 (N,56), Solid triangles- Low PA choice, solid squares – High  PA choice, and  
 solid diamonds – optimal choice. Note that the optimal and low PA choice are identical (coincide) 
VC ($4m)   
takes  % 55 54 53 52 51 50 
Angel ($2.5m) 
takes % 45 46 47 48 49 50 
 
 Consequently, the results show that despite the VC’s optimal offers, subjects in the high 
PA group forego economic intuition and prefer the non-optimal alternative - Angel’s offers. 









subject’s stake but the Angel’s equity stake was lower (below 50%) than the subject’s equity 
stake. Hence, to avoid the optimal offers of the VC implies that subjects were concerned about 
VC control. This claim is substantiated by the results from the sixth round of deals where 
subjects in the high PA group changed course and subscribed to the VC’s offer because both 
financiers demanded 50% equity stake and the VC offered 60% more investment than the Angel. 
Clearly, high PA subjects suddenly regained their economic wisdom when they encountered the 
sixth round where the equity allocations put them at equal footing with the financier.  
Therefore, given the correlation between PA and CT in previous analysis, evidence of the 
high PA group preferring the Angel offers suggests that: 1. High PA can lead to the desire to 
control in venture financing32 and 2. High PA can lead to disregard for rational intuition in 
venture financing decisions and consequently lead to inefficient financing strategies. As noted a 
few times already, Müller (2007) found founders to limit the growth potential of their firms by 
being content with paying higher interest rates for additional loans in order to maintain control. 
Given the results, H5 which predicted a control-orientation for high PA subjects in financing 
decision preferences is strongly supported.  
 Financier’s ability To check for possible alternative explanations, such as low credence 
for VC/Angel ability, subjects were later asked to indicate on a 5-point Likert scale the 
importance of the VC or the Angel’s management ability in ensuring the success of the 
commercialization effort33. Results are presented in Table 24 which shows the responses to 
                                                 
32 Note that in the instructions, subjects were told that whichever party has more than 50% equity holds sway in 
decision making  
33 The question asked subjects to indicate the importance of the VC or the Angel without separating the two. The 
question could have asked subjects to allocate marks of importance to the two financiers and then correlated with 
PA in analysis. However, while probably unwise, the VC and Angel were lumped together for fear of comparing 
VCs and Angels. Note that the labels “VC” and “Angel” were employed for description purposes and do not denote 
differences in VC and Angel equity demands. In reality, both VCs and Angels may demand more than 50% stake in 
the business in order to control decision-making. Therefore the labels could have been “Financier 1” and “Financier 
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subjects’ perceived importance within the ordinal points in the Likert scale. The responses are 
for all subjects, high PA, and low PA groups using the multiple-item measure of PA.   
Table 24 
Descriptive Statistics for Importance of Outside Financier Management Ability  
 
Importance of VC/Angel 







Not important 1 0 4 
  
Neutral 5 3 7 
  
Important 36 33 37 
  
Very important 58 64 52 
N 89 33 27 
 
A majority of subjects (58%) rated the VC or the Angel’s management ability on the 
upper end of the scale as “very important” and 36% rated the financiers ability as “important” 
(Mean= 5.42, Median= 5, Std. Dev= 0.64). Thus, 94% of all subjects (97% for the high PA 
group and 89% for the low PA group) thought the VC or the Angel’s ability was important in 
securing commercialization success. Since the question could not separate the VC and Angel in 
eliciting responses to the importance question (see footnote), interpretation of the results will 
involve some speculation.  
First, we have seen that the high PA group overwhelmingly preferred the Angel offers in 
the first five rounds, but suddenly switched (overwhelmingly) to the VC offer in the sixth round. 
This shows that subjects did not make choices between a “VC” and an “Angel” but between two 
potential financiers and also considered the level of control they were willing to relinquish to 
these financiers. Second, given the level of importance subjects ascribe to the financier’s ability, 
it was counter intuitive that majority (see Figure 12) will prefer the Angel’s offer when the 
                                                                                                                                                             
2” and the results are expected to be the same as those found using the labels “VC” and “Angel”. In effect the 
question was aimed at eliciting the level of importance subjects assign to financiers, in general.   
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Angel’s equity share demand was lower than the VC’s, in the first five rounds. The worst culprit 
was the high PA group who ascribed more importance to the financiers’ ability (97%) than the 
low PA group did (89%). Yet, this group preferred to hold control over decision making in a 
potential partnership deal with their preferred financier.  
One will expect that if subjects view the financier’s ability to be important, they should 
not strive to take over control of decision making from the financier (especially given the 
background of these subjects). In effect, the results support evidence cited earlier that 
entrepreneurs prefer control in financing decisions even when aware of positive effects on 
performance. For instance, to repeat for illustration purposes, Cressy (1995) coins the term 
“control aversion” to described situations where entrepreneurs are aversive to losing control of 
the opportunity, although aware that relinquishing some control would improve performance 
(Cressy and Olofsson, 1997).  
In closing, high levels of psychological attachment seem to increase developers’ desire to 
control as they likely overweight concerns over opportunism on the part of potential financiers. 
More importantly, subjects are willing to forego optimal financial offers for marginal control 
over their ideas. In addition to foregoing optimal offers, subjects also fail to incorporate their 
stated beliefs that the potential financiers possess the resources (ability) to aid in 
commercialization. These conclusions are derived from observations that highly-attached 
subjects indicated belief in the ability of the VC/Angel but preferred to control decision making 
even if this position was secured with marginal control over the idea and at the cost of foregoing 






6.1 Discussion   
 
The findings in this study support the underlying theory in this paper that psychological 
attachment influences the perception of outcomes and therefore control preferences. Among the 
key findings are the following. There is a positive effect of psychological attachment on control 
tendency, controlling for personality factors and other statistical control factors such as the 
subjective value of the developer’s project. As a proxy for how developers value their projects 
and therefore the returns they expect from pursing it, no statistical significance for the effect of 
estimated project value indicates the strength of psychological attachment in explaining control 
tendency.  
The results also highlight the possible differences between entrepreneurs’ cognitive and 
affective evaluations of the commercialization environment, given a level of attachment to the 
opportunity. In this study, subjects’ level of attachment was negatively correlated with their level 
of cognitive evaluation employed in evaluating the microeconomic environment. Further, as 
psychological attachment increased, the discrepancy between the proxy variables for objective 
and subjective evaluations of the project and its outcomes, increased. Thus, affect-based 
constructs such as attachment may cause entrepreneurs to overweight the possibility of losses, 
inadequately weight probabilities of gains and lower their subjective expected value of future 
commercialization outcomes even as the objective valuation increased. While subjects in this 
study did not necessarily possess base rate information on the probabilities of the outcomes 
presented to them, the pattern of correlations between these variables provide insight into 
affective mechanisms governing entrepreneurial decision making at the commercialization stage.   
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 The concepts were taken to a financing application context where subjects were 
confronted with hypothetical financing options. The main finding was that high levels of 
attachment are more likely to lead to control-oriented funding preferences than low levels of 
attachment. Also, preferring control let subjects to forego optimal financing options. These 
findings are very interesting due to the potential for economically bad choices as some 
researchers have pointed out. For instance, as noted several times already, Cressy (1995) argues 
that entrepreneurs are averse to losing control. Further, Cressy and Olofsson (1997), working 
with Swedish data, argue that this aversion can persist even if entrepreneurs are aware that 
relinquishing some control would improve performance.  
As expected, high levels of attachment will increase the desire to control as entrepreneurs 
become concerned with market issues and agency problems. Such a desire for control may be 
especially strong for technology developers when they overweight the fears of opportunism on 
the part of potential financiers. It should however be noted that depending on the level of equity 
already invested, the developer might be indifferent to the contractual conditions and accept any 
satisficing arrangement. In effect, attachment effects may be reduced in cases where external 
funds are instrumental to the continual development of the technology. Landström and Winborg 
(1995) find that when the firm experiences financial difficulties, the attitude towards external 
financiers changes and tends to be more positive. However, in cases where the development 
costs are low and attachment is high, one can envisage entrepreneurs avoiding necessary external 
funding due to preference for control. Interestingly, such situations describe the cases of millions 
of independent inventors who strive to either fill the shelves of hardware stores with new 
creations or to develop new ventures on these ideas.  
Considering other findings, personality-type factors such as Emotion-Based Decision-
Making, Machiavellianism, Risk-Taking and Need for Control were not significantly correlated 
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with control tendency. Machiavellianism was however weakly correlated with both 
psychological attachment and control tendency. In an attempt to interpret this finding, one can 
assert that when subjects felt they were capable of manipulating others, they were more attached 
to their creative ideas and also desired to control the rights to their ideas. However, the effects of 
Machiavellianism did not hold when other correlates were controlled for.  
Nevertheless, the lack of effects for these personality-type factors is important because 
the implication is that control tendency, as conceptualized in this study, is not an individual level 
personality-type construct and also differentiates from control-type personality dispositions like 
Need for Control. Thus, the implication for the field of entrepreneurship is that, irrespective of 
entrepreneurs’ psychological or attitudinal dispositions, as effort is exerted in the creative 
process and attachment increases, a control orientation develops. In effect, control tendency, as 
described here, is essentially context-driven and depends on the relationship between the 
opportunity and its developer.  
In terms of construct of psychological attachment, an attempt was made to study its 
dimensionality. Two theoretically-identified dimensions emerged, lending some statistical 
credibility to the notion that the construct may have a multidimensional scale. Positive affective 
states and self-identity-enhancing affective states seem to hold as two possible dimensions 
(among potential others not operationalized here). Results from testing the effects of the 
dimensions, individually, on control tendency, reported significant coefficients for the positive 
affective states but not for the self-identity-enhancing states. The indications are that, albeit the 
measurement errors in eliciting the latter, affective states that enhance self identity do not 
necessarily lead to control tendency. This result is intuitive because, an entrepreneur who highly 
identifies with the technology does not necessarily need to control the rights to the opportunity to 
reach his or her commercialization goals.  In effect, the investigation of dimensionality for the 
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construct achieved one objective – determining the extent to which positive affective states 
determine psychological attachment. However, it also indicated that there is the need to further 
investigate the issue of dimensionality to determine other possible dimensions of the construct.  
All in all, the issue is not whether it is rational for entrepreneurs to be attached to their 
ideas or to be control-oriented, but rather, the consequences excessive attachment and control 
present to the decision maker. As affect-based constructs, the effects of attachment and control 
tendency may be fleeting but are instrumental in entrepreneurial decision making because of the 
potential for unalterable rash decisions with grave economic consequences. For example, a 
control tendency in making decisions involving rapidly developing technologies can be 
extremely counter-productive and inefficient. Also, the spontaneity with which entrepreneurs 
react to their environment affords a fertile ground for affect-based constructs to play a part in 
their decisions. Baron (2008) notes that affect is likely to influence cognition and behaviour in 
entrepreneurial environments due to the unpredictability and rapid nature of change.  
It may then be reasonable to suggest that the negative effects of psychological attachment 
and control tendency in response to signals from the microeconomic environment may play a 
role in rampant over-entry into markets and subsequent business failure. The reason is 
psychological attachment and control tendency promote self-commercialization and dissuades 
essential cooperation with outside parties. Thus, in cases where cooperation provides better 
prospects, entrepreneurs may over-enter or fail. Thus, this work on affective biases may go a 
long way to complement current research on cognitive biases in understanding entrepreneurial 
decision making and entrepreneurial failure.  
For practitioners, the issue of interest is how to reduce the effects of psychological 
attachment. Although not tested in this study, methods to reduce attachment and therefore its 
consequences may include: educating entrepreneurs and promoting disengagement from the 
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opportunity, either through reduced interactions or deliberate psychological depersonalisation in 
the decision making process. Another issue is when to promote disengagement since 
psychological attachment may be needed to motivate the entrepreneur to persevere during the 
initial problem solving stages of the development process. Essentially, ways of de-biasing the 
decision-making process of highly-attached entrepreneurs will increase efficiency and 
performance. Further, from the regression results in this study, it appears assuring entrepreneurs 
of their expected personal gains will decrease their desire to control. Therefore, contracts that 
identify and assure entrepreneurs of their specific reward expectations may facilitate the transfer 
of control to outside parties, reduce information asymmetry and possibly increase performance.    
There may also be the need for more efficient government intervention in safeguarding 
the intellectual property of smaller entrepreneurs as well as more efficient financing schemes. 
Entrepreneurs will be hesitant to collaborate with outside parties if highly attached to the 
opportunity and without the necessary safeguards and funds. This implies missed opportunities, 
inefficient capital formation, and the risk of stifling innovation. Therefore, public policy schemes 
aimed at ensuring the positive effects of psychological attachment and reducing its negative 
effects will be socially desirable.  
 
6.2 Conclusion   
 
This thesis investigated the role psychological attachment to an entrepreneur’s 
opportunity plays in decision making at the commercialization stage. Essentially, the thesis 
explored the dimensionality of psychological attachment; the relationship between psychological 
attachment as an affective construct and cognitive evaluation of the microeconomic 
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environment; the relationship between psychological attachment and control tendency; and the 
effects of psychological attachment on control preferences within a financing context.  
Entrepreneurs, especially in technology, are noted for opportunistically taking an 
extemporized approach to strategy planning and implementation, considering potential revenue 
opportunities as they present themselves, rather than having a long term focus (Gans and Stern, 
2003; Bhide, 2000). The implication is that affect-based constructs such as psychological 
attachment and control tendency cannot be ignored. This is especially so when these constructs 
have the potential to influence decisions, in major ways, given the extent of unpredictability in 
the entrepreneurial environment (Baron, 2008). The argument for the role of such constructs is 
more compelling considering transactions costs and market problems in designing a partnership 
contract with outside parties at the point of commercialization. Agency theory suggests the need 
to preserve control as a leverage point for coercing partners to put up mutually beneficial 
behaviour. For outside parties, it implies putting measures in place to control the rights to the 
opportunity. For the entrepreneur, it implies safeguarding the rights to the opportunity to avert or 
minimise opportunism and expropriation. A high level of psychological attachment will motivate 
the entrepreneur to avoid such outside parties or if they are unavoidable, resist elements of the 
partnership that threaten attachment to the idea.  
The entrepreneur’s resistance and hesitation to partner is still expected even if the outside 
party is in the position to contribute much needed resources to the commercialization effort and 
even if the entrepreneur cognitively realises the outsider’s position. However, since 
psychological attachment is affect-based, the chances that the entrepreneur’s fears are 
unnecessarily heightened are rather high. Likewise, the chances that the entrepreneur’s 
evaluation of the micro-economic environment is biased are also high. Hence, a high level of 
attachment leads to biased perceptions and inefficient strategies. So, although attachment to the 
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opportunity might motivate the entrepreneur to persevere and also signal value to investors, 
attachment can also prevent the entrepreneur from effectively evaluating commercialization 
outcomes, choosing efficient market entry strategies and performing well.  
Data collected from 106 fourth-year engineering design students from a top engineering-
focused Canadian university, provided some interesting results. In the model estimated, the 
higher subjects’ psychological attachment was to the opportunity the more control oriented they 
were. Subjects’ perceived project value was statistically insignificant as a statistical control 
variable. The implication being that psychological attachment is a strong predictor of control 
tendency even when subjects’ perceptions of projected returns (value) are controlled for. Also, 
perceived likelihood of achieving success through outside party assistance correlated negatively 
with control tendency. From correlational analysis, when subjects’ psychological attachment 
increased, their level of cognitive evaluation of the microeconomic environment decreased even 
if they previously rated the project high. The indication is that, as an affect-laden construct, 
psychological attachment can lead to a decrease in objective, logical and cognitive evaluation of 
commercialization outcomes.  
Further, alternative explanations for control tendency failed to hold as individual 
personality-type factors such as Emotion-Based Decision Making, Machiavellianism, Risk-
Taking and Need for Control were not significant in explaining variability in control tendency. 
Control tendency may therefore be context-dependent, on attachment through a creative process, 
and not an individual level personality construct. Finally, analysis within a framework of 
financial decision making showed that although subjects rated the financier’s management skills 
as highly critical for performance, they strongly preferred to control the rights to decision 
making on the project and thereby forfeit optimal financial offers.  The results therefore provide 
insight into the role psychological attachment may play in forming behavioural tendencies during 
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important decision making stages of the entrepreneurship process. The results also provide insight into the 
implications of attachment- and control-oriented decision preferences for performance on the market, 
with particular emphasis on the role of affect in these preferences.  
 
6.3 Limitations  
 
There are a number of limitations to this study. Fundamentally, this study is exploratory 
and will benefit from a well grounded empirical exercise involving actual entrepreneurs. 
Although the student sample used share characteristics with technology developers, they are not 
full-fledged entrepreneurs and therefore generalizability of the results under certain conditions 
might be limited. Further, the need to measure psychological attachment required sampling to be 
done in a group that had spent sometime developing entrepreneurial ideas. However, the 
development process could not be captured adequately and therefore certain history effects might 
exist in the results. It is a big challenge to secure access to a sample that develop new technology 
in a similar technological area or industry and are on the same stage of the development process. 
Therefore, there might be the need to control some aspects of the process to be able to collect 
data for analyses. However, an actual entrepreneur sample may be more conducive. Further, a 
study capturing the opportunity recognition as well as the development aspects of the process 
may provide a better understanding of the creative process and psychological attachment to the 
idea.  
Lastly, the decision preferences measured were not actual decisions. Due to the 
circumstances of the sample, such as the opportunity being a school design project with stringent 
intellectual property safeguards to protect students ideas, it was not possible to observe and 
measure actual decisions. Thus, although intentions and tendencies to act may well predict actual 
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decisions and behaviour, the effects studied may be more appropriately unearthed if actual 
decisions are measurable. 
6.4 Contributions and Opportunities for Future Research 
However, in contributing to the research on the role of affect in entrepreneurship the 
study raises empirical questions that need further research. One such question is what role does 
psychological attachment play in commercialization strategy formulation inconsideration of the 
intellectual property position and complementary asset needs of the venture? Since, this question 
forms a crucial part of the commercialization process, I devote a few paragraphs to it and then 
present short paragraphs on two other areas of future research. 
Formulating commercialization strategies Innovation or the commercialization of new 
ideas is likely to require lateral, vertical and horizontal linkages. Successful commercialization, 
especially for entrepreneurs or start-ups, often needs to involve access to complementary assets 
that are not available within the organisation. In other words, without the necessary resources in-
house, start-ups have little choice but to partner in restrictive contracts with outside parties to be 
able to successfully enter their target market. However, in these contracts the most important 
concern for the parties involved is appropriability – the ability to extract rents from the 
opportunity. Appropriability is most effectively ensured through formal and informal intellectual 
property (the degree of excludability). Hence, to realise fair appropriability terms, a 
commercialization strategy should find a good balance between issues of complementary assets 
and intellectual property protection (Teece 1986; Gans, Hsu and Stern, 2002; Gans and Stern, 
2003; Arora and Ceccagnoli, 2006 and Hsu, 2006).  
A high level of IP protection implies a high degree of excludability of parties with bad 
intentions. Therefore, when the degree of excludability increases the entrepreneur is expected to 
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gain confidence in the intellectual property protection and be willing to share information on the 
technology. This should be the case because entrepreneurs will be able to legally enforce their 
control over the rights to the opportunity and also command a stronger bargaining power. 
However, due to the perceived possibility of a loss of control over the idea and of expropriation 
in a contract, highly-attached entrepreneurs may rather want tighter control than loose control. 
This view is further supported by the fact that strong excludability signals value to the 
entrepreneur and therefore the desire to control the rights to the opportunity further increases as 
the perceived value increases. Hence with high excludability, the highly-attached entrepreneur 
may desire more control when expected to desire less. 
In terms of complementary assets, cooperating with firms that own complementary assets 
seems to be an efficient strategy (Teece, 1986, Gans and Stern, 2003). Gans and Stern (2003) 
note that through cooperation, start-ups can avoid duplicative investment and thereby avoid 
sunken investment in complementary assets necessary for commercialization. However, Gans 
and Stern (2003) also note that firms with complementary assets are more likely to imitate the 
innovator. Entrepreneurs and start-ups typically do not have the knowledge, expertise and tact in 
choosing contracts that have proper safeguards to avert opportunism. Even when a seemingly 
appropriate outside party is located, there are still risks of opportunism present in the 
relationship. A common example is the “hold up” problem (Williamson, 1985; Levin, Klevorick, 
Nelson, and Winter, 1987). In a hold up situation, the partner firm might demand more of the 
quasi-rents of the joint effort. How will a highly-attached developer react to such situations? Due 
to the glaring power imbalance, the developer will be hesitant to sign any contract with the 
partnering firm if the terms are considered threatening to the rights to the idea. In other words, 
the perception of a possible future loss might retard a highly-attached developer’s progress in 
signing a contract even if the actual potential advantages loom large.  
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However, in reality, control preferences might be short-lived in conditions characterized 
by high excludability with complementary assets belonging to an outside party. As noted by 
Gans and Stern (2003), these market conditions provide the perfect opportunity to cooperate with 
outside parties to ensure a successful commercialization. So, considering that complementary 
assets often belong outside the start-up (Teece, 1986), entrepreneurs may have little choice but to 
partner with outside parties. However, there are possible cases where strong influence from 
psychological attachment and control preferences might motivate some developers to establish 
otherwise available complementary assets. That is, building manufacturing or distribution 
facilities when such facilities exist elsewhere and cooperating is the most efficient strategy. 
Examples are cases where failing start-ups refuse to outsource capabilities when it’s more cost-
effective to do so.  
In effect, although developers are expected to heed to the requirements of the 
microeconomic environment when faced with commercialization challenges, a strong influence 
from psychological attachment and control, especially when decision making is on an ad-hoc 
basis, can spell dire consequences. Future research can aim to unearth effects of psychological 
attachment and control on commercialization strategies; to develop own venture, license, sell or 
pursue other options.  
Other research interests The issue of risk perception is another potential area for further 
research. The results in this study suggest risk perception may be guided by shifting reference 
points. Thus, control tendency may motivate self-commercialization as a result of the “push” 
situation where affect-led perceptions of loss of the opportunity drive the entrepreneurs to 
develop their own venture. However, self-commercialization to “safeguard” the opportunity 
denotes risk-aversion but could be more “risky” due to higher uncertainty. This scenario implies 
a simultaneous existence of gambling and insurance. Future studies could employ the prospect 
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theory framework (Khaneman and Tversky, 1979) or other frameworks that study the role of 
emotions in expected utility models (Caplin and Leahy, 2001) to better explain risk-seeking as 
well as risk-aversion in entrepreneurship.  
Lastly, this study is in line with recent research attention on the role of affect in 
opportunity recognition (Baron, 1998, 2006b, 2008). Research in this area may also consider 
psychological “by-products” of the entrepreneurship process such as psychological attachment 
and its effects. A thorough scale development process to empirically test and validate 
antecedents and dimensionality of psychological attachment will provide a useful measure for 
further studies. Further, there is the need to identify potential mediators and moderators 
impacting the relationship between psychological attachment and control tendency. For instance, 
it will be interesting to investigate the moderating effects of psychological attachment (as an 
affective construct) on the relationship between micro-level factors (such as optimism and self-
efficacy) and new venture performance. Baron (2008) urges researchers to investigate the 
mediating role of affect in the relationship between individual-level (or micro-level) variables 
and macro-level variables. There is great research potential for affect and affective constructs.  
Below is a list of possible future issues or questions to study, related to the concepts 
unearthed here.  
Areas of Application for Research on Control Orientation and Psychological Ownership 
1. The role of control tendency in the transfer of management oversight from owner-
managers to more qualified personnel  
2. The role of control tendency in the transfer of responsibilities from CEO’s at any point in 
time 
3. The role of psychological ownership in how effective employed engineers are in 
preparing complete manuals on their inventions to prevent others from “reinventing the 
wheel”  
4. The role of psychological ownership in the effectiveness of transitioning between 
products for product champions 
5. The extent to which psychological ownership can help explain the Not Invented Here or 
the Invented Here syndromes 




7. The role of psychological ownership on the performance or turnover of employees whose 
creative solutions are subverted.  
8. The effect of control tendency on tenured researchers of academic faculty and their 
willingness to collaborate 
9. The effect of control tendency on the choice of commercialization options in tight and 
loose appropriability regimes (Teece, 1986, 1998), across countries, cultures, regions etc.  
10. The role of control tendency in different licensing agreements  
11. The effect of control tendency on complete vs. incomplete contracts 
12. The effect of control tendency on performance of agents considering different allocation 
mix for control rights in venture capital contracts 
13. The role of control tendency in the commercialisation decisions of VC-backed vs. non-
VC-backed technology. Are non-VC-backed developers missing market opportunities 
simply because of threat-related emotional reactions towards the VC structure?  
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Appendix 2:  Codebooks  
 
A. Pre-test of questionnaire 
 
This test involved the first attempt to measure psychological attachment using the 
psychological ownership measure. The measure for psychological ownership is adapted 
from Dyne and Pierce’s (2004) measure of the construct in the organisation (Seven items 
with Cronbach’s coefficient alpha, 0.87, 0.90, and 0.93 for three samples). Below is a 
tentative scale for measuring the construct in this study (Four items – items referring to 
OUR in terms of the organisation where deleted from the Dyne and Pierce (2004) scale).  
 
Psychological Ownership  
Instructions: Think about the car, bike or gadget you own, and the experiences and 
feelings associated with the statement ‘THIS IS MY CAR!’ The following questions deal 
with the ‘sense of ownership’ that you feel for the object (product) in front of you. 
Indicate the degree to which you personally agree or disagree with the following 
statements on a scale of 1 (disagree) to 5 (agree).  
Item 
1. This is MY___________(object, product) 
2. I feel a very high degree of personal ownership for this ___________(object, product) 
3. I sense that this is MY ___________(object, product) 
4. It is hard for me to think about this ___________(object, product) as MINE. (reversed) 
  
The items are consistent with the core meaning of psychological ownership and uses 
possessive vocabulary such as reflected in everyday associations with property and 
possessions, such as “That idea was MINE,” (Dyne and Pierce, 2004). 
 
 
Due to the failure of this scale to capture the construct, hypothetical items were written to 
theoretically get to the construct.  
 
Also included in the pre-test were threat-inducing pictures to introduce the threat 
manipulation. The pictures are not included due to space constraints.  
 
Other items tested were the items for the control tendency measure, the items for venture 
capitalist/Angel investor studies, control preferences in commercialization strategy 












































































































B. Final Study:  Part I 
This codebook outlines the questions for the first part of the final study. The first part was 
mainly to measure psychological attachment and compare with a later measure for differences. 




































































































































C. Final Study: Part 2 – Treatment group   
The treatment group was asked to recount a personal possession they lost and answer questions 






























































































































D. Final Study: Part 2 - Control Group   













































































































Appendix 3:  Sample interview transcripts from interviews with subjects 
 
Respondent 1 
1. What is the origin of this design project? What prompted the idea in the first 
place? How exciting was the realization? Any memories? 
Answer: 
The idea came up in a brainstorming session.  It was originally a more complex 
solution that resulted in problems that we couldn't immediately solve.  As a result, 
we dismissed the idea as not plausible and went about another idea.  This other idea 
was exciting for me - something I wanted to do.  However, group members opposed the 
idea at the start of the design phase and we reverted back to a simpler implementation 
of our original idea which was plausible.  This new implementation, being purely 
software based, was less interesting to me, thus, I was less excited about it. 
  
  
 2. How difficult or easy was the process of putting together the concept of the 
design project? What kinds of experiences did you have? Any memories?  
Answer: 
As first mentioned, the original idea did not seem plausible due to some unsolvable 
issues.  However, when reviewed, we discovered a simpler implementation which was 
feasible.  Our ideas went through several brainstorming sessions which made the whole 




3. Once the concept was put together, how did the development process evolve? Did you 
and your team members spend more time than you envisaged? Less time? What kinds of 
challenges did you face?>  
Answer: 
Our development process involved several major problems that had to be resolved in 
order for the system to work.  As a result, getting through each one was like reaching 
a milestone.  It was generally a step-by-step procedure to get piece-by-piece working 
which worked well for our project.  The time used was approximately what was 
expected.  Certain portions took less, others took more. 
  
4. Do you remember any moments of celebration during the development of the design 
project? What happened? How good was it? How did you feel?>  
Answer: 
Reaching each "milestone" (as mentioned above) was rewarding.  The group was happy and 
up-beat each time we triumphed over a problem. 
  
5. Do you remember any moments of frustration during the development of the design 
projects? What happened? How bad was it? How did you feel? 
Answer: 
There were several moments of frustration - unexpected issues and difficult problems.  
Each time we encountered one of these, it was very frustrating.  There were feelings 
of anger and despair at times - like we wouldn't be able to solve an issue. 
  
6. How will you describe the exhibition where the group showcased the idea? How did 
you feel about seeing the project on display, showing it off, or speaking about it? 
Answer: 
Personally, I felt good about it.  I knew exactly what it was capable of, as well as 
its shortcomings.  In terms of requirements, I knew it would pass, so I wasn't 
worried.  I think my group members were a little more worried than I was. 
  
7. How will you describe your level of attachment to this design > project? How 
attached do you feel to this project? Why? 
Answer: 





8. If you were to decide on transferring the project to someone else to market, will 
your attachment to it have any effect on the terms of agreement with this third-party? 
Why? 
Answer: 
I would doubt it.  With limited attachment to begin with, I would only ensure simple 
terms to ensure that I benefit from the sale of the idea, nothing spectacular. 
  
9. To what extent will you like to control the rights you have to the product prior to 
discussing transfer to a third party? What will you like to retain control of? Why? 
Answer: 
Personally, I would pass off a lot of the control provided I properly benefit from it. 
  
10. Do you think when people create new ideas like this design project; they become 
attached to it in a way? How? Why?  
Answer: 
I think that people do, depending on their interest in the idea.  If my group were 
still doing our 2nd idea (which I was most interested in), I would have been more 
attached to it. 
  
11. Do you think when people create new ideas like this design project; it is 
difficult for them to allow third-parties to become a part of the commercialization 
process? How? Why?  
Answer: 
Again, I think it depends on the interest in the idea and, thus, their attachment. 
  




1. What is the origin of this design project? What prompted the idea in the first 
place? How exciting was the realization? Any memories? 
  
Answer: 
One team member thought of this idea, it was one of many considered. The intent  
was to come up with a high-tech solution with some marketing potential. Any  
field of application would have been OK. There was a lot excitement to finalize  
the project topic. We knew it would be difficult, but better something  
interesting to motivate, than something straightforward but dull. 
 
2. How difficult or easy was the process of putting together the concept of the design 
project? What kinds of experiences did you have? Any memories? 
 
Answer: 
It was not a difficult process. Members volunteered ideas, and the group  
discussed advantages and disadvantages of each. People were not egotistic,  
hence all such meetings were educational and productive.  
 
3. Once the concept was put together, how did the development process evolve? Did you 
and your team members spend more time than you envisaged? Less time? What kinds of 
challenges did you face? 
  
Answer: 
A lot more time was invested in the project than the course  
required/recommended. But we anticipated this from the initial design. There  
were some insurmountable challenges most due to limitations on the hardware we  
selected. Project scope needed some adjustment. We plan on doing some  
additional work before Symposium to better demonstrate the potential of the  
product at that point.  
 
4. Do you remember any moments of celebration during the development of the design 





Yes.. we always wanted to go out and grab a drink/meal after each milestone.  
And we did have time for that sometimes... It was nice to socialize with team  
members instead of discuss the project at those times.  
 
5. Do you remember any moments of frustration during the development of the design 
projects? What happened? How bad was it? How did you feel? 
 
Answer: 
Yes.. sometimes very trivial errors took many days/weeks to find. The waste of  
time and effort is frustrating. Additionally, when people are stressed,  
sometimes they feel unhappy about any unbalance of control of the project  
across the team members.  
 
6. How will you describe the exhibition where the group showcased the idea? How did 
you feel about seeing the project on display, showing it off, or speaking about it? 
 
Answer: 
This will occur in the Winter term (at Symposium). How happy we are will  
greatly depend on whether we revamp the system in the next four months in our  
spare time.  
 
7. How will you describe your level of attachment to this design project? How attached 
do you feel to this project? Why? 
  
Answer: 
If it is a commercially viable product, we want to consider prospects of  
commercialization. We have enough attachment I think to continue forward with  
it. If we can't get it to work well enough, it will take some conscious effort  
to pull the plug (at least on my part).  
  
8. If you were to decide on transferring the project to someone else to market, will 




I'm not sure... My father is an entrepreneur, and I know how attachment limits  
marketing potential due to insistence on control and resistance to sharing. It  
will depend on how the majority of the group feels. If enough people want to  
participate in future development, we will keep control, otherwise, perhaps we  
should sell all of it.  
 
9. To what extent will you like to control the rights you have to the product prior to 
discussing transfer to a third party? What will you like to retain control of? Why? 
 
Answer: 
I don't think it's beneficial to keep control for emotional reasons. It should  
depend on interest and potential revenue.  
 
10. Do you think when people create new ideas like this design project; they become 
attached to it in a way? How? Why? 
 
Answer: 
It depends on the motivation behind their development. There can conceivably be  
three in my opinion: something to pass the course, something to market, or  
something revolutionary... the last motive will definitely cause emotional  
attachment. I think any could apply to any group, depending on the idea they  
came up in time for the proposal submission.  
 
11. Do you think when people create new ideas like this design project; it is 
difficult for them to allow third-parties to become a part of the commercialization 





I think they'll have difficulty taking risks. Because of the amount of  
development effort already invested. But design project shouldn't be too  
significant of a problem, because its duration was short, and is already shared  
with four people.  
 
The way I think of it, if they were able to come up with a great idea once,  
there will be many more down the road. No need to hang on too tightly... 
 

























Appendix 4:  Information on design projects 
 
A. Project Deliverables  
 
Design Project Timetable 
Term Deliverable Comments Scheme Code Submission Marker 
       
4A Class of 2007   ECE 492A Engineering    
                         Design Project 
0.15 credit    
       
 ECE Lab 
Access 
Request access to ECE 
project lab space and 
equipment 




 Pass/Resubmit PS UW ACE Instructors 
 Block 
Verification 
 Pass/Resubmit BV UW ACE Instructors 
 Detailed 
Design 




 Pass/Resubmit PT UW ACE Instructors 
 Prototype 
Demonstration 
Submit a hardcopy of the 
checklist to your 
consultant for assessment








Submit online and submit 
a signed hardcopy to the 
drop box in the ECE 
Main Office 










Group sign up   Sign up 
Proposal sign up   Sign up 
Project Agreement  P/F 1 sheet 
Abstract  P/F 50-100 words 
    
Statement of Work   4-5 pages 
Requirements Specification   2-3 pages 
Block Diagram   1-2 pages 
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Plan and Budget   2-3 pages 
Proposal Presentation   15 min. 
Proposal Critiques (x2)  P/F 1 sheet 
4 A EandCE 492A 0.15 credit -5% late penalty per day  
Block Verification  0.03 2-5 pages 
Detailed Design  0.03 5-20 pages 
Prototype Testing Checklist  0.03 2-5 pages 
Prototype Demonstration  0.03 See PT 
Experience Report  0.03 2-5 pages 
 
 




Engineering students showcase innovative tech projects 
WATERLOO, Ont., (Tuesday, Jan. 15, 2008) -- Students from the University of Waterloo's 
electrical and computer engineering program will exhibit innovative projects, such as an 
automatic transmission for bicycles and an energy storage system for home use, at the 
eighth annual design project symposium next week. 
They will present design projects covering technological developments in such diverse areas 
as computing, communications, entertainment, information technology and robotics, as well 
as in medical, power and transportation systems. 
The event will be held Wednesday, Jan. 23. at the William G. Davis Computer Research 
Centre on the UW campus, from 9 a.m. to 8 p.m. Visitors are welcome to browse the 
interactive displays and meet with students during the symposium. 
"This is an exceptional opportunity for people to see these exciting projects first-hand and 
to speak with our students," says Bill Bishop, fourth-year design project coordinator. "The 
symposium showcases the talent and innovation of our outstanding students in the electrical 
and computer engineering program." 
The more than 250 students will present 60 interactive projects in seminar format to guests 
from industry and the academic community. They will also display design project prototypes 
at a poster presentation session running the entire day. 
The Infusion Cup will be awarded for the best overall design project. The prize is sponsored 
by Infusion Angels, a company located at the Waterloo Research and Technology Park. 
The design projects include: 
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* Automatic Bicycle Transmission. The project showcases a prototype automatic 
transmission system for a bicycle. Riders input various parameters describing their bicycle 
and cycling style into the system. The design results in increased simplicity for riders, as 
well as improved customization, precision and performance. 
* Automatic Garbage Pickup Robot. The project's prototype aims to solve garbage pickup 
problems by creating a machine that automatically detects and collects garbage. The 
designed system involves a movable mini robot with a video camera. It features a control 
system that processes the incoming image to identify garbage and sends a signal for the 
robot to collect the trash. 
* Home Energy Distribution and Storage System. The project presents a prototype energy 
storage system for homes. It will draw and store energy from the electricity grid during off-
peak hours and supply a house with power during the day. The device will include the power 
electronics necessary to supply the house with electricity of acceptable quality. 
* Smart Avalanche Transceiver. The project's prototype combines existing avalanche 
transceiver technology with a new system that allows rescuers to locate an avalanche victim 
faster, more reliably and with less product-specific training. Each device will utilize GPS and 
continuous inter-device communication to provide information on the victim's whereabouts. 
Students participating in the symposium have completed an intensive design project course 
sequence. The final-year course challenges them to work in groups to identify and address 
specific design problems. 
 
Past Symposiums 
For the past seven years, the design project symposiums have provided excellent 
opportunities to the general public to view the innovative work of our undergraduate 
students in Electrical and Computer Engineering. If you have not yet had an opportunity to 
attend a previous symposium, you can get a feel for the event by viewing the following 
segment entitled, "Waterloo's Casinobot", that appeared nationally on the Daily Planet 














Appendix 5 : Additional statistical results 






























































Descriptive statistics for estimated project value  
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Histogram of log of estimated project value  


















5.3 Histogram of trust proxy  




















5.4 Histogram of perceived likelihood of expected success from a potential collaboration 















5.5 Histogram of perceived severity of idea loss on the market  




















5.6 Control Preferences for subjects using the two-item measure of psychological 
attachment  
 
1. Percentages of subjects choosing VC and Angel offers 
 
A Rounds of offers 1 2 3 4 5 6 VC Angel VC Angel VC Angel VC Angel VC Angel VC Angel 
B High 
PA      
% of subject 
choices 24 76 24 76 25 75 27 73 29 71 94 6 
               
C   a.13 b.44 a.13 b.44 a.15 b.43 a.16 b.42 a.17 b.40 a.54 b.3 
               
D Low 
PA  
% of subject 
choices 42 58 47 53 50 50 50 50 53 47 95 5 
               
E   c.18 d.25 c.20 d.23 c.21 d.21 c.21 d.21 c.22 d.21 c.41 d.2 
               
F  F 3.55† 5.77* 5.93* 4.90* 5.09* 0.02 
     
G VC (offer $4m),  takes 
% 
55 54 53 52 51 50 
H Angel (offer $2.5m) ,  
takes % 
45 46 47 48 49 50 
(N, 56),     *  p <  0.05,        † p <  0.10 
Note: The cells denoted as a, b, c and d, indicate the percentages of subjects choosing within each round (deals) 


























5.7 Percentages of subjects choosing VC and Angel offers within high and low 


























 F 3.55† 5.77* 5.93* 4.90* 5.09* 0.02 
        



















5.8 Percentages of subjects in high and low psychological attachment groups 

















5.9 Percentages of subjects in high and low psychological attachment groups 



























5.10 Comparison of subjects share preferences in the high and low psychological 
attachment groups with the optimal choice 
 
 
VC (offer $4m),  takes % 55 54 53 52 51 50 
Angel (offer $2.5m) ,  takes % 45 46 47 48 49 50 
 
 
 
Developer’s 
value  
